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Philip Morris USA v. Williams
07-1216
Ruling Below: Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 344 Ore. 45, 176 P.3d 1255 (2008).
Plaintiffs husband died from lung cancer after smoking cigarettes for over forty years. A jury
awarded Plaintiff over $80 million in actual and punitive damages in her suit against Philip
Morris for fraud and negligence. On appeal, Philip Morris argued that the trial court erred by
refusing to give a proposed jury instruction. The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the jury's verdict
and damages award. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court held that the Oregon
Supreme Court did not apply the correct constitutional standard and could have allowed the jury
to consider factors that violated the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On
remand, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld on procedural grounds its ruling that the trial court
did not err in refusing to give the proposed jury instruction.
Question Presented: When this case was last before it, this Court reversed the decision of the
Oregon Supreme Court and held that due process precludes a jury from imposing punitive
damages to punish for alleged injuries to persons other than the plaintiff. Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007). This Court then remanded the case to the Oregon
Supreme Court with directions to "apply the [constitutional] standard we have set forth." Id. On
remand, however, the Oregon Supreme Court refused to follow this Court's directive. Instead,
the Oregon court "adhered to" the judgment that this Court had vacated because it found that
Philip Morris had procedurally defaulted under state law and thereby forfeited its claim of
federal constitutional error. App., infra, 22a.
The question presented: Whether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits of a party's federal
claim and remanded the case to state court with instructions to "apply" the correct constitutional
standard, the state court may interpose-for the first time in the litigation-a state-law
procedural bar that is neither firmly established nor regularly followed.
Mayola WILLIAMS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jesse D. WILLIAMS,
Deceased, Respondent on Review,
V.
PHILIP MORRIS Inc., nka Philip Morris USA Inc., RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company, Fred
Meyer, Inc., and Philip Morris Companies, Inc., Petitioners on Review
Supreme Court of Oregon
Decided January 31, 2008
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted.]
GILLETTE, J. United States Supreme Court. Previously,
this court held (among other things) that
This matter is before us on remand from the certain federal constitutional limitations
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constraining punitive damage awards did not
require a trial court to instruct a jury that it
was not to use an award of punitive damages
to punish a defendant for harms to persons
who were not parties to the litigation.
Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 340 Ore. 35,
51-54 (2006). On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court vacated that opinion
and remanded. Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007). The
Court concluded that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the state from using punitive
damages to punish for harms to nonparties,
and that states must prevent punitive
damages from being misused in that way.
127 S. Ct. at 1065. On remand, we are called
upon to reconsider and reassess our earlier
holding, which arose in the context of the
trial court's refusal to give a particular
proposed jury instruction that defendant had
requested. Having reconsidered and
reassessed the issue, we now conclude that
the proposed jury instruction at issue here
also was flawed for other reasons that we
did not identify in our former opinion. We
therefore reaffirm this court's prior
conclusion that the trial court did not err in
refusing to give the instruction. We
otherwise reaffirm our prior opinion in all
respects.
Before we turn to the facts and procedural
posture of this particular case, we first
summarize the legal context in which it
arose. The issues in this case revolve around
federal constitutional limitations on punitive
damage awards. Those constitutional
limitations derive from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [T]he
Supreme Court has held that states
legitimately may use punitive damages to
punish and to deter wrongdoing by
defendants in tort cases. However, the Court
also has held that the amount of punitive
damages that a jury awards cannot be
arbitrary; the jury's discretion must be
limited. Otherwise, defendants will not have
adequate notice of potential sanctions, the
punishments may be arbitrary, and large
punitive damage awards may force one
State's policy choices onto other States. For
those reasons, the United States Constitution
requires both procedural and substantive
limits on punitive damage awards.
We turn to the facts of this case. The
plaintiff, Mayola Williams, is the widow of
Jesse Williams, a smoker who died of lung
cancer. Plaintiff, as personal representative
of Jesse Williams's estate, sued defendant
Philip Morris Inc., asserting that Philip
Morris's fraud and negligence caused Jesse
Williams's death.
The parties do not dispute this court's prior
overview of the evidence offered at trial,
which was presented in the light most
favorable to plaintiff. See Williams, 340 Ore.
at 38-43 (describing facts of case). Briefly,
the evidence permitted the jury to conclude
that Philip Morris and other tobacco
companies had known of the carcinogenic
dangers of smoking since at least the 1950s.
Nevertheless, Philip Morris, operating in
conjunction with the rest of the tobacco
industry, carried out an extensive publicity
campaign, from the 1950s into the 1990s, to
convince the public that doubts remained
about whether smoking actually was
dangerous to one's health. No legitimate
controversy existed about whether smoking
was harmful to health, although Philip
Morris and the rest of the tobacco industry
strove to persuade the public otherwise.
Philip Morris and the rest of the tobacco
industry also fostered the sham impression
that they were themselves vigorously
investigating the health effects of smoking
when, in actuality, their research institution
avoided doing research on that question.
The jury further could have concluded that
this program of disinformation succeeded in
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tricking Jesse Williams, who smoked from
the early 1950s until he died in 1997. He
was highly addicted to nicotine, eventually
smoking three packs of cigarettes-
primarily Philip Morris's Marlboro brand-
a day. Williams resisted his family's efforts
to convince him to quit smoking, because he
believed media representations that the
dangers of smoking were overstated or
nonexistent. See id. at 39 (presented with
article about dangers of smoking, Williams
had found "published assertions that
cigarette smoking was not dangerous"); id.
at 42 (Williams rejected arguments to quit,
because "he had learned from watching
television that smoking did not cause lung
cancer"). When Williams was diagnosed
with lung cancer, however, he asserted that
the "cigarette people" had betrayed him by
"lying" to him. Williams was dead within
six months after the cancer was discovered.
Near the end of trial, the parties offered
proposed jury instructions. One instruction
submitted by Philip Morris was its proposed
jury instruction No. 34, dealing with
punitive damages. Among other things, that
instruction provided:
The size of any punishment should
bear a reasonable relationship to
the harm caused to Jesse Williams
by the defendant's punishable
misconduct. Although you may
consider the extent of harm
suffered by others in determining
what that reasonable relationship
is, you are not to punish the
defendant for the impact of its
alleged misconduct on other
persons, who may bring lawsuits of
their own in which other juries can
resolve their claims and award
punitive damages for those harms,
as such other juries see fit.
The trial court analyzed the proposed jury
instructions line-by-line with the parties,
during which time Philip Morris argued that
the consider-but-don't-punish part of
proposed jury instruction No. 34 was needed
to ensure that this plaintiff did not receive
punitive damages that should be awarded (if
they were to be awarded at all) to other
plaintiffs. After the trial court had reviewed
Philip Morris's proposed jury instruction
No. 34 together with plaintiffs proposed
jury instruction on punitive damages-the
transcript of that part of the trial court's
analysis is 50 pages long-the trial court
declined to give proposed jury instruction
No. 34 as proffered.
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. The
jury's unadjusted award was $ 821,485.50 in
compensatory damages and $ 79.5 million in
punitive damages. The trial court, among
other things, reduced the punitive damage
award to $ 32 million. Williams, 340 Ore. at
44.
Plaintiff and Philip Morris both appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed on plaintiffs
appeal, concluding that the trial court should
not have reduced the punitive damages
award. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 182
Ore. App. 44, 72 (2002). The Court of
Appeals affirmed on Philip Morris's cross-
appeal, concluding that the trial court did not
err in refusing to give Philip Morris's
proposed jury instruction No. 34. This court
denied review.
The United States Supreme Court then
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case
to the Court of Appeals for further
consideration in light of the Supreme
Court's opinion in State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408 (2003). After an extended analysis on
remand, the Court of Appeals again reached
the same conclusions that it had reached in
its earlier opinion. Williams v. Philip
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Morris, Inc., 193 Ore. App. 527, 530 (2004).
Specifically, the court concluded that the
$79.5 million punitive damage award did
not violate due process. The court also
rejected Philip Morris's argument that the
trial court erred in refusing to give proposed
jury instruction No. 34.
This court then allowed defendant's petition
for review, and affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Williams, 340 Ore. at 38.
This court concluded, also after an extensive
analysis, that the $ 79.5 million punitive
damage award comported with federal due
process. As pertinent to the present
proceeding, this court also rejected Philip
Morris's argument that the trial court should
have given proposed jury instruction No. 34.
Philip Morris had argued that Campbell
prohibited courts from "'adjudicat[ing] the
merits of other parties' hypothetical claims
against a defendant,"' because of the
"'possibility of multiple punitive damage
awards for the same conduct[.]'" Id. at 52
(quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423). This
court concluded, however, that those
quotations from Campbell were taken out of
context. "The [full] quote referred only to
dissimilar acts and dissimilar claims; the
Court intended to prohibit a punitive damage
award from becoming a referendum on a
corporate defendant's general behavior as a
citizen." Id. at 52. But, this court stated,
"evidence of similar conduct against other
parties may be relevant to a punitive damage
award." Id. at 53. Because proposed jury
instruction No. 34 therefore incorrectly
stated federal requirements of due process of
law (at least as this court understood it), this
court concluded that the trial court did not
err in refusing to give the instruction.
[In a footnote, the Court explained:
"Plaintiff also had argued, in the alternative,
that the refusal to give proposed instruction
No. 34 was not error, because that
instruction misstated other points of law.
Given this court's holding that the
instruction was erroneous with respect to
federal due process law, however, this court
did not need to address those alternative
arguments. Now, in light of the remand from
the United States Supreme Court, we must
consider those alternative reasons for
affirmance."]
On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court reached a different conclusion. Philip
Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1057 et seq. The
terms of the Court's decision are important
to understanding the issues presented to this
court. We therefore review that opinion in
some detail.
After reviewing the procedural history of the
case, the Court summarized the limits that
due process imposes on punitive damages
awards. Although the United States
Constitution requires both procedural and
substantive limits on punitive damage
awards, in this case the Court only addressed
the procedural limits. Id. at 1063. As the
Court explained, "the Constitution's Due
Process Clause forbids a State to use a
punitive damages award to punish a
defendant for injury that it inflicts upon
nonparties or those whom they directly
represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon
those who are, essentially, strangers to the
litigation." Id. The Court identified three
reasons for that conclusion: First, a
defendant cannot effectively defend against
claims of injuries to nonparties. Second,
permitting a punitive damages award to
punish for harm to nonparties "would add a
near standardless dimension to the punitive
damages equation," with speculation about
the nonparties magnifying the risk of
arbitrary treatment. And, third, the Court
found that no authority existed to permit
using punitive damages to punish for harm
to nonparties.
That said, the Court also went on to
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acknowledge that harm to nonparties (to the
extent that it exists) may play a role in the
punitive damages calculus in the sense that
it is relevant to showing the degree of
reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct.
The Court distinguished, however, between
legitimate use of evidence of such harm to
establish reprehensibility and illegitimate
use of that evidence to punish defendant for
harm it caused to nonparties. As the Court
explained:
Evidence of actual harm to
nonparties can help to show that
the conduct that harmed the
plaintiff also posed a substantial
risk of harm to the general public,
and so was particularly
reprehensible. . . . Yet for the
reasons given above, a jury may
not go further than this and use a
punitive damages verdict to punish
a defendant directly on account of
harms it is alleged to have visited
on nonparties.
Id. at 1064. The Court repeated the same
point later in its opinion:
We have explained why we believe
the Due Process Clause prohibits a
State's inflicting punishment for
harm caused strangers to the
litigation. At the same time we
recognize that conduct that risks
harm to many is likely more
reprehensible than conduct that
risks harm to only a few. And a
jury consequently may take this
fact into account in determining
reprehensibility.
127 S. Ct. at 1065.
All in all, the Court concluded, the risks of
unfairness inherent in punitive damage
awards mean that state courts must "provide
assurance that juries are not asking the
wrong question, i.e., seeking, not simply to
determine reprehensibility, but also to
punish for harm caused strangers." Id. at
1064. The Court noted that that distinction
raised practical difficulties for reviewing
courts, difficulties that should be met by
appropriate procedures:
How can we know whether a jury,
in taking account of harm caused
others under the rubric of
reprehensibility, also seeks to
punish the defendant for having
caused injury to others? Our
answer is that state courts cannot
authorize procedures that create an
unreasonable and unnecessary risk
of any such confusion occurring. In
particular, we believe that where
the risk of that misunderstanding is
a significant one-because, for
instance, of the sort of evidence
that was introduced at trial or the
kinds of argument the plaintiff
made to the jury-a court, upon
request, must protect against that
risk. Although the States have
some flexibility to determine what
kind of procedures they will
implement, federal constitutional
law obligates them to provide some
form of protection in appropriate
cases.
Id. at 1065 (emphasis in original).
Having explained the general principles of
law, the Court then applied those principles
to this case. "The instruction that Philip
Morris said the trial court should have given
distinguishes between using harm to others
as part of the 'reasonable relationship'
equation (which it would allow) and using it
directly as a basis for punishment." Id. at
1064. The Court reviewed this court's
opinion in Williams, 340 Ore. at 35 et seq.,
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and concluded that that opinion permitted
direct punishment for harm to others,
without limiting the use of such harm to
determine reprehensibility. For that reason,
the Court vacated this court's opinion and
remanded for further proceedings. The Court
specifically explained its conclusion, and the
nature of the remand, as follows:
As the preceding discussion makes
clear, we believe that the Oregon
Supreme Court applied the wrong
constitutional standard when
considering Philip Morris' appeal.
We remand this case so that the
Oregon Supreme Court can apply
the standard we have set forth.
Because the application of this
standard may lead to the need for a
new trial, or a change in the level
of the punitive damages award, we
shall not consider whether the
award is constitutionally "grossly
excessive."
Id. at 1065 (emphasis added).
Under the Supreme Court's remand, then, it
is our task to apply the constitutional
standard set by the Supreme Court in our
consideration of the sole issue raised by
Philip Morris, viz., whether the trial court
erred in refusing to give proposed jury
instruction No. 34. As we shall explain,
however, there is a preliminary, independent
state law standard that we must consider,
before we address the constitutional
standard that the United States Supreme
Court has articulated.
A state court decision like the decision of
the trial judge in this case to refuse to give
proposed jury instruction No. 34 may be
affirmed, without reaching the federal
question, if there is an independent and
adequate state ground for doing so. See, e.g.,
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 123 (1990)
(Ohio Supreme Court, applying state law,
had held that defendant had waived due
process challenge by failing to object to jury
instructions at trial: "We have no difficulty
agreeing with the State that [defendant's]
counsel's failure to urge that the court
instruct the jury on scienter constitutes an
independent and adequate state-law ground
preventing us from reaching [defendant's]
due process contention on that point."). We
believe that this is such a case, i.e., one
resting on an independent and adequate state
ground for affirming the trial judge's ruling.
Under Oregon law, there are two different
types of error respecting jury instructions:
(1) error in the failure to give a proposed
jury instruction, and (2) error in the jury
instructions that actually were given. See
Bennett v. Farmers Ins. Co., 332 Ore. 138,
152-53 (2001) (so indicating). As noted,
Philip Morris failed to preserve for our
review any claim that the jury instructions
actually given were erroneous. See Williams,
340 Ore. at 54 (unpreserved in Court of
Appeals). This case, therefore, involves only
the failure to give a proposed jury
instruction.
In Oregon, there is a well-understood
standard governing claims of error
respecting a trial judge's refusal to give a
proffered instruction: An appellate court will
not reverse a trial court's refusal to give a
proposed jury instruction, unless the
proposed instruction was "clear and correct
in all respects, both in form and in
substance, and . . . altogether free from
error." Beglau v. Albertus, 272 Ore. 170,
179, (1975); see also Hernandez v. Barbo
Machinery Co., 327 Ore. 99, 106 (1998)
("there is no error [in refusing to give a
proposed instruction] if the requested
instruction is not correct in all respects");
Owings v. Rose, 262 Ore. 247, 258 (1972)
("The trial court is not obliged to give an
incorrect instruction, or to give the correct
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portions of one which includes errors."). The
effect of that standard is to require that a
party to litigation take responsibility for the
jury instructions that a trial court either
gives or refuses to give. That means that, in
the case of the refusal to give an
instruction-and we repeat that that is all
that is at stake here-the party seeking a
particular instruction must be correct
respecting the rule of law stated in the
instruction. In this case, the United States
Supreme Court has opined that there is a risk
that a jury will be confused about how to
take into account harm that the defendant
may have caused to others. A trial court
must, "upon request," protect against that
risk. But, as with any other request for an
instruction, the question that we first must
address is whether the rest of Philip Momis's
requested instruction correctly stated Oregon
law. It is not enough, for example, to offer a
proposed instruction that is correct in part
and erroneous in part, leaving the trial court
to solve the problem for itself. We also note,
in passing, that asking the court to give a
multiple-page instruction-essentially
placing all the party's eggs in one
instructional basket-involves a significant
danger that the proffered instruction will be
erroneous in some aspects. We turn to an
examination of proposed instruction No. 34
in light of the standard just discussed.
Proposed instruction No. 34 addressed a
range of issues relating to punitive damages,
and plaintiff contends that it was erroneous
in a number of ways that are unrelated to the
issues addressed by the United States
Supreme Court. Among other things,
plaintiff contends that proposed instruction
No. 34 would have instructed the jury
erroneously that (1) the Oregon statutory
factors that the jury must find in order to
justify a punitive damage award were
discretionary, when they are mandatory; and
(2) one factor to be considered in awarding
punitive damages was Philip Morris's
"motiv[ation]" to make "illicit profits." As
we will explain, we agree with plaintiff on
both points.
. . . [B]efore we examine what proposed
instruction No. 34 actually would have done,
we examine what it appears that defendant
intended the instruction to accomplish.
Oregon law provides that, in product
liability actions (such as the present case),
punitive damages should be awarded (if at
all) based on seven criteria. ORS 30.925(2),
which sets out that requirement, provides:
Punitive damages, if any, shall be
determined and awarded based
upon the following criteria:
(a) The likelihood at the time that
serious harm would arise from the
defendant's misconduct;
(b) The degree of the defendant's
awareness of that likelihood;
(c) The profitability
defendant's misconduct;
of the
(d) The duration of the misconduct
and any concealment of it;
(e) The attitude and conduct of the
defendant upon discovery of the
misconduct;
(f) The financial condition of the
defendant; and
(g) The total deterrent effect of
other punishment imposed upon
the defendant as a result of the
misconduct, including, but not
limited to, punitive damage awards
to persons in situations similar to
the claimant's ...
150
Proposed jury instruction No. 34 restated
most of the foregoing factors-often
drastically. It provided:
(2) The size of the punishment may
appropriately reflect the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct-that is, how far the
defendant has departed from
accepted societal norms of
conduct. Factors that you may find
to bear upon the degree of
reprehensibility include:
(a) The likelihood at the time that
serious harm would arise from the
defendant's misconduct, beyond
the harms generally understood to
inhere in cigarette smoking;
(b) The degree of the defendant[']s
awareness of that likelihood;
(c) The degree to which the
defendant was motivated by a
desire to obtain illicit profits from
its misconduct;
(d) The duration of the misconduct
and any concealment of it;
(3) In determining how much
punishment is necessary to achieve
the goal of appropriate deterrence,
you may consider the extent to
which the obligation to pay
compensatory damages will suffice
to cause defendant and others to
refrain from similar misconduct in
the future.
(4) Finally, you may also consider
the defendant's financial condition
as part of the process of arriving at
an appropriate punishment.
However, you may not punish the
defendant simply because it is
large. Rather, the paramount
consideration remains the degree
of reprehensibility of any
misconduct and the extent of any
harm caused by such misconduct.
We turn to plaintiffs critique of that
proposed instruction. Plaintiff first argues
that proposed jury instruction No. 34
incorrectly indicates that the statutory
factors are discretionary and nonexclusive-
"[fjactors that you may find to bear . . .
include" (emphasis added)-while ORS
30.925(2) actually makes those factors
mandatory and exclusive-"shall be
determined and awarded based upon the
following criteria." (Emphasis added.) Philip
Morris offers no argument against plaintiffs
proposed reading of the statute.
We agree with plaintiff that proposed jury
instruction No. 34 is defective in the way
that plaintiff argues. ORS 30.925(2) uses the
word "shall," which generally indicates that
something is mandatory. See, e.g., Preble v.
Dept. of Rev., 331 Ore. 320, 324, 14 P.3d
613 (2000). The legislature's instruction that
any punitive damage award "shall be
determined and awarded based upon the
following criteria" thus limited the scope of
the jury's authority to the list that followed.
Altering that list in a jury instruction (as
defendant proposed to do) would therefore
fly in the face of the statute. Plaintiff might
have a constitutional right to a further
instruction of the kind suggested by the
United States Supreme Court in Williams,
but nothing in that right negated the trial
court's duty to follow ORS 30.925(2) in all
other respects. To have given the instruction
in the form proffered by defendant thus
would have been error under Oregon law.
Plaintiff also maintains that proposed jury
instruction No. 34 misstates one of the
statutory factors in ORS 30.925(2). While
the proposed jury instruction would have
permitted the jury to consider "[t]he degree
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to which the defendant was motivated by a
desire to obtain illicit profits from its
misconduct," ORS 30.925(2)(c) actually
directs the jury to consider "[t]he
profitability of the defendant's misconduct."
That is, proposed jury instruction No. 34
focuses on motive or intent, while the statute
instead focuses on outcome. Again, to have
given the instruction in the form proffered
by defendant would have been error under
Oregon law.
On remand, Philip Morris makes no
argument that proposed jury instruction No.
34 accurately states the law in that respect.
In the prior briefing in this case, however,
Philip Morris had addressed that issue in
part. As to the words "illicit profits," Philip
Morris had contended that those words were
necessary to "prevent[] the jury from relying
on [Philip Morris's] 'profits'-without
regard to whether they were derived from
lawful or unlawful conduct-as an indirect
way of punishing lawful cigarette sales." In
support, Philip Morris cited Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 441-42 (2001), in which
the Court stated that "it would be unrealistic
to assume that all of [defendant's] sales of [a
competing product] would have been
attributable to its misconduct in using a
photograph of [plaintiffs product] in its
initial advertising materials." Id. at 442.
Again, we agree with plaintiff that Philip
Morris's justification fails, and proposed
jury instruction No. 34 misstated the law.
While the statutory factor requires an
examination of the profitability of the
misconduct-an objective fact-proposed
jury instruction No. 34 instead focuses on
Philip Morris's subjective state of mind
regarding profit-i.e., whether Philip Morris
was "motivated by a desire" to profit from
misconduct. And, while ORS 30.925(2)(c)
directs the jury to consider all "profitability
of the misconduct," the proposed jury
instruction permits the jury to consider only
"illicit profits from its misconduct"
(emphasis added), thus implicitly directing
the jury to try to subdivide the profits from
misconduct into legal and illegal parts-a
circular inquiry, at best.
We see no merit to Philip Morris's argument
that the jury instruction needed to refer to
"illicit profits" to keep the jury from
considering lawful profits, because that
simply misreads the statutory factor. ORS
30.925(2)(c) does not allow the jury to
consider profitability generally-it instead
limits the jury's inquiry to a consideration of
"the profitability of the misconduct."
(Emphasis added.) But, once the
profitability of the misconduct is identified,
it makes no difference whether it was
otherwise licit (not against law) or illicit
(against law). Either way, it was relevant to
the jury's inquiry.
We think that it follows from the foregoing
analysis that, even assuming that proposed
jury instruction No. 34 clearly and correctly
articulated the standard required by due
process, it contained other parts that did not
state the law correctly. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in refusing to give it. Our
previous conclusion to that effect is
reaffirmed. And, because our ruling
respecting the trial judge's refusal to give
proposed jury instruction No. 34 was
correct, it follows that the remaining aspects
of the judgment against defendant should be
reaffirmed. That latter point is true, not only
because reconsidering the remaining aspects
of the judgment would lie outside the scope
of the Supreme Court's remand, but also
because defendant has not advanced any
separate arguments for doing otherwise. We
therefore reaffirm our previous decision in
this case in all particulars.
The court's decision in Williams v. Philip
Morris Inc., 340 Ore. 35 (2006), is adhered
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to. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. The judgment of the circuit
court is reversed, and the case is
REMANDED to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
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"Justices to See Philip Morris Case a Third Time"
The New York Times
June 10, 2008
Linda Greenhouse
A staring contest between the United States
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of
Oregon over a $79.5 million punitive damage
award to a smoker's widow has entered its
fifth year, and so far neither side has blinked.
The justices have twice vacated the award
against the cigarette maker Philip Morris,
once in 2003 and again last year, and the
Oregon court has twice reinstated it. On
Monday, the justices announced that they
would review the case for a third time.
The scope of their review will be deliberately
narrow. Philip Morris, a unit of the Altria
Group, appealed the latest Oregon Supreme
Court decision on two grounds. One was that
the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages, nearly 100 to one, was so great as to
be constitutionally impermissible. The second
was that the Oregon court's invocation of a
state procedural law in its latest ruling against
Philip Morris came too late in the day to be
sustained and represented little more than an
effort to evade the instruction the justices
gave last year to reconsider the damages
award.
The justices denied review on the first
question, which would have had broad
application to all punitive damages cases. In
earlier rulings, the Supreme Court has
suggested that punitive damages should be no
more than nine times the compensatory
damages, and perhaps a good deal less than
that, but there is evidently not a clear majority
to convert the suggestion into a firm rule.
Instead, they will hear Philip Morris's appeal
only on the second question, which applies to
this convoluted case, now in its ninth post-
verdict year, and to no other. The justices, in
other words, appeared less concerned with
making law than with asserting their own
authority over that of state courts on the issue
of punitive damages.
In its February 2007 ruling in Philip Morris
USA v. Williams, the court overturned the
award on the ground that the jurors might
have been allowed to calculate the amount
based on harm to other, unnamed smokers in
addition to Jesse D. Williams, the man whose
widow, Mayola Williams, brought the
lawsuit. The 5-to-4 majority ordered the
Oregon Supreme Court to reconsider the
award and make sure it was not calculated
based on harm to "nonparties."
The Oregon trial court that originally heard
the case had rejected a proposed jury
instruction from the cigarette maker that
would have told the jurors "not to punish the
defendant for the impact of its alleged
misconduct on other persons, who may bring
lawsuits of their own."
In its latest ruling reinstating the $79.5
million award, the Oregon Supreme Court
said the trial court had been correct to reject
the proposed instruction because it was
flawed as a matter of state law by including
too many unrelated issues.
Philip Morris's appeal, also called Philip
Morris v. Williams but with a new docket
number, 07-1216, told the justices that the
state court had never raised this objection in
any of the previous proceedings. "The Oregon
Supreme Court's defiance of this court's
directive should not be countenanced," the
appeal said.
154
"Justices Uphold Cigarette Damages"
The Oregonian
February 1, 2008
Ashbel S. Green
The widow of a Portland janitor won
another round Thursday in her nine-year
legal battle with the world's largest cigarette
maker.
The Oregon Supreme Court upheld a $79.5
million punitive damage award against
Philip Morris for its role in the death of
Jesse D. Williams, a longtime Marlboro
smoker who died of lung cancer in 1997.
"Jesse wanted to fight back against the
cigarette companies," Mayola Williams said
in a statement. "If he was here, he would be
very proud today."
The ruling was a surprise.
Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court
overturned the verdict on the grounds that a
faulty jury instruction deprived Philip
Morris of its constitutional rights.
The nation's highest court-and the final
word on federal legal cases-sent the suit
back to Oregon.
But it didn't provide specific instructions
about what to do.
And with several options, Oregon's highest
court decided that the verdict could stand
because Philip Morris had effectively
forfeited its right to appeal the jury
instruction.
Company officials condemned the Oregon
court.
"This is an inexplicable attempt by the
Oregon Supreme Court to avoid the ruling
of the nation's highest court," William S.
Ohlemeyer, the company's vice president
and associate general counsel said in a
statement.
Ohlemeyer promised to appeal again to the
U.S. Supreme Court, which likely will
decide next fall whether to take the case
again.
To add to the intrigue, Thursday's ruling
was the second time the Oregon Supreme
Court has upheld the verdict after the U.S.
Supreme Court overturned it.
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered
Oregon to reconsider whether the $79.5
million punitive damage award was
excessive. The U.S. Supreme Court has said
that most punitive damage awards should be
no more than nine times the award of
compensatory damages.
The $79.5 million punitive award is nearly
100 times the $821,485 in compensatory
damages awarded in the case.
But the U.S. Supreme Court did not
explicitly tell Oregon to overturn the verdict.
And Oregon didn't.
In 2006, the Oregon Supreme Court noted
the 9-1 ratio, but said the company's
longstanding policy of lying about the risks
of smoking was so "reprehensible" that the
larger award was justified.
Benjamin C. Zipursky, a professor at
Fordham University School of Law in New
York, said the Oregon Supreme Court
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seemed unusually committed to the verdict
given "what is in some sense the obvious
direction of what the Supreme Court seems
to feel about this case."
But without a direct order to reduce the
verdict, the Oregon Supreme Court has so
far refused to do so.
"They're calling their bluff," Zipursky said.
Howard Bashman, a Pennsylvania attorney
who runs the influential legal blog, How
Appealing, said the ruling certainly had the
appearance of a state court ignoring the
orders of a superior court.
But Bashman said the decision was based on
state law and was carefully written in a way
that doesn't seem to thumb its nose at the
nation's highest court.
"It's not something that would cause offense
to the U.S. Supreme Court," he said.
With Philip Morris promising to appeal, the
big question is whether the U.S. Supreme
Court will take the case a third time and
squarely answer the question of whether the
$79.5 million award is excessively large.
Bashman doubts it, saying that because of
some procedural issues, the case has
"vehicle problems-it's not a good vehicle
for announcing a good rule on punitive
damages."
Zipursky also said he's not sure the Supreme
Court wants to take the case again because
the justices don't want to look as if they are
riding to the rescue of a tobacco company
that can easily afford to pay the verdict.
Why?
"Reputational concerns," Zipursky said.
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"Justices Overturn Tobacco Award"
The Washington Post
February 21, 2007
Robert Barnes
The Supreme Court yesterday overturned a
nearly $80 million verdict intended to
punish the Philip Morris tobacco company
for endangering the lives of smokers, and
the justices set limits on how jurors can
decide to make big business pay for
wrongdoing.
The court's narrowly written 5 to 4 decision
said that an Oregon court had improperly let
jurors calculate the harm done to many in
deciding damages paid to an individual.
The court ruled that the Constitution's due-
process clause forbids a state to use punitive
damages to punish a company for injury it
inflicts upon others who are "essentially,
strangers to the litigation," according to the
majority opinion, written by Justice Stephen
G. Breyer.
The case was seen at the beginning of the
term as one of the most important business
decisions that the court would make under
new Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., and it
was clearly a victory for Philip Morris and
other big companies. It continues the
reasoning in the court's recent rulings that
punitive damages-aimed at punishing a
company and deterring more wrongdoing-
must be proportionate to the wrong
committed.
But in sending the case back to Oregon
courts for further litigation, the justices
sidestepped a decision that industry had
most wanted: whether to set a solid limit on
how much could be awarded for punitive
damages, perhaps based on a specific ratio
to the actual damages done to the individual
who brought the suit.
Still, business advocates praised the
decision.
"This is a really important case for the
business community, and a big win," said
Robin Conrad, senior vice president of the
National Chamber Litigation Center of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. She said it
would be valuable to insurance companies,
automakers, pharmaceutical manufacturers
and other firms that have been hit with huge
punitive-damages awards in recent years.
But Robert S. Peck, the Washington lawyer
who represented the Oregon smoker's
widow who brought the suit, said the
decision "slays a dragon that didn't exist."
Peck contended that the jury calculated its
large award not on the number of other
victims but on the company's profitability,
and he predicted that Oregon courts will
"reaffirm" that they "did the right thing."
How the jury decided the amount to award is
unclear, and confusion at the Supreme Court
oral arguments foreshadowed the justices'
ultimate decision. "Isn't perhaps the better
course to send this back to them . . .?"
suggested Justice David H. Souter, who
voted with the majority to do just that.
The case involved Jesse Williams, a
Portland janitor who smoked at least two
packs of Marlboros every day for 45 years
and died of lung cancer in 1996. Philip
Morris, now owned by Altria Group, had
denied during that time that its cigarettes
were addictive, and at trial, lawyers for his
157
estate told the jury to consider the damage
done to other smokers in Oregon.
The attorney for his widow, Mayola
Williams, told the jury to "think about how
many other Jesse Williams in the last 40
years in the state of Oregon there have
been."
The jury awarded Mayola Williams
$821,000 in compensation and then tacked
on the $79.5 million punitive award. (Not all
states allow punitive awards; in Oregon, 60
percent of the award goes to the state, Peck
said.) The nearly 100 to 1 ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages is far
outside the "single-digit" ratio the Supreme
Court suggested in previous cases, but a firm
limit has never been set.
The majority opinion issued yesterday
agreed with Williams that the jury could
hear evidence of harm to others to show that
a company's conduct was reprehensible,
which could increase the punitive-damages
award.
But Breyer wrote that a "jury may go no
further than this and use a punitive damages
verdict to punish a defendant directly on
account of harms it is alleged to have visited
on nonparties."
Dissenting justices said they wondered how
a judge could properly instruct a jury to
consider what Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
called our "less than crystalline precedent."
The majority "relies on a distinction
between taking third-party harm into
account in order to assess the
reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct-which is permitted-from doing
so in order to punish the defendant
'directly'-which is forbidden," Justice
John Paul Stevens wrote. "This nuance
eludes me."
The court's split in recent decisions limiting
punitive damages is far different from the
ideological differences that are apparent in
many decisions on social issues. Breyer was
joined by Roberts and Justices Samuel A.
Alito Jr., Anthony M. Kennedy and David
H. Souter.
Stevens, who in the past has supported
limiting the amounts of punitive awards,
joined Ginsburg and Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas.
The case was sent back to the Oregon
Supreme Court, which had upheld the large
punitive award. Breyer wrote that the
application of the court's standard may "lead
to the need for a new trial, or a change in the
level of the punitive damages award."
The case is Philip Morris USA v. Williams,
case No. 05-1256.
158
"Oregon Supreme Court Backs $79.5 Million Tobacco Award"
The Oregonian
February 2, 2006
Ashbel S. Green
The Oregon Supreme Court today affirmed a
$79.5 million punitive damages award
against tobacco giant Philip Morris.
The decision comes about three years after
the United States Supreme Court ordered the
Oregon courts to reconsider the verdict in
what some interpreted as a strong suggestion
to reduce it significantly.
But the Oregon Supreme Court said Philip
Morris' conduct justified such a large award.
"Philip Morris' conduct here was
extraordinarily reprehensible, by any
measure of which we are aware," Justice
Michael Gillette wrote for the unanimous
court. "It put a significant number of victims
at profound risk for an extended period of
time. The state of Oregon treats such
conduct as grounds for a severe criminal
sanction, but even that did not dissuade
Philip Morris from pursuing its scheme."
Gillette wrote that "Philip Morris, with
others, engaged in a massive, continuous,
near-half-century scheme to defraud the
plaintiff and many others, even when Philip
Morris always had reason to suspect-and
for two or more decades absolutely knew-
that the scheme was damaging the health of
a very large group of Oregonians-the
smoking public-and was killing a number
of that group."
The award stems from a lawsuit by the
family of Jesse D. Williams, a former
Portland janitor and longtime smoker who
died of lung cancer in 1997.
During the 1999 trial, lawyers for the
Williams family argued for a large punitive
damages award because Philip Morris
officials had known for more than half a
century that smoking was deadly, had
consistently downplayed the health risks and
had manipulated the levels of nicotine to
keep smokers addicted.
In addition to the $79.5 million punitive
damages award, which at the time was the
largest smoking-death verdict in the country,
the jury awarded more than $800,000 in
compensatory damages.
On appeal, Philip Morris lawyers argued
that punitive damages were too high. They
pointed out that the U.S. Supreme Court had
said there must be a reasonable ratio
between the compensatory and punitive
damage awards.
The nearly 100-to-1 ratio in the Williams
case was too big, Philip Morris lawyers
argued.
The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld the
award, and the Oregon Supreme Court
refused to take it.
Philip Morris appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which in 2003 vacated the award and
ordered the Oregon Court of Appeals to
reconsider the case in light of a U.S.
Supreme Court opinion on punitive damages
out of Utah.
The Oregon Court of Appeals in 2004
upheld the award.
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"High Court Sends back Tobacco Case Award"
Los Angeles Times
October 7, 2003
David Savage
The Supreme Court tossed out a large
punitive damage verdict against cigarette
maker Philip Morris on Monday, telling
lower court judges to reevaluate the size of
the award.
The court set aside a $79.5-million award
that was designed to punish the tobacco firm
for the lung cancer death of an Oregon
janitor. In another personal injury case, it set
aside a $3-million verdict in which jurors
sought to punish DaimlerChrysler for the
death of a Kentucky man who was ejected
from his Dodge Ram pickup in a crash.
The court's one-line orders Monday
followed a major ruling in April that sharply
limited the power of juries to punish
companies with huge punitive damage
awards. The justices stressed that civil
lawsuits are intended to compensate
plaintiffs for their losses if they were injured
and wronged by another. It is not a system
for punishing unpopular industries and
"unsavory businesses," the court said.
Since the 1970s, an increasing number of
lawsuits filed by injured individuals have
resulted in multimillion-dollar verdicts
against corporations. Typically, the jurors
are asked to award actual damages to cover
the victim's losses and then award a second,
larger amount to punish the company for its
wrongdoing.
In its April decision in State Farm vs.
Campbell, the high court warned judges that
they must rein in punitive damage verdicts
that greatly exceed the actual losses of the
victims who brought the lawsuit.
In that case, a Utah jury had ruled against
the auto insurer with $145 million in
punitive damages for having refused to pay
the full verdict against a man who caused an
accident that killed another driver.
Ordinarily, after handing down such a
ruling, the justices act on a series of pending
appeals in related cases and send them back
to lower courts to be reevaluated.
They did just that in May when they
reversed two large verdicts against Ford
Motor Co., including a $290-million
punitive verdict in California. In that case, a
Stanislaus County jury had awarded more
than $6 million to a family that suffered
injuries and a death when its Bronco rolled
over, plus $290 million to punish Ford for
what it said was gross wrongdoing in
manufacturing a defective vehicle.
In Monday's action involving Philip Morris
and DaimlerChrysler, the high court did not
rule out the possibility of punitive damages.
Its order told lower courts that the amount of
these damages should be in line with the
actual losses of the victim.
Only in the rarest circumstance can the
punitive verdict "exceed a single-digit ratio"
compared with the actual damages, said
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. For example,
if a jury awards $1 million to a plaintiff for
actual losses, the punitive damages should
not exceed $9 million, he said.
In the Oregon case, lawyers for Philip
Morris had appealed, saying "the 97-1 ratio
of punitive-to-compensatory damages in this
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case cannot stand constitutional scrutiny."
Jesse Williams started smoking during the
1950s and continued a three-pack-a-day
habit for four decades. He died of lung
cancer in 1997. His family sued Philip
Morris and won $521,000 in compensatory
damages. The jury tacked on $79.5 million
in punitive damages. The verdict was upheld
last year by the Oregon Supreme Court.
On Monday, the court granted an appeal by
Philip Morris, vacated the lower court ruling
and sent the case back to Oregon "for further
consideration in light of State Farm vs.
Campbell."
The tobacco industry has several other large
punitive damage awards on appeal,
including four in California.
Last month, a state appeals court in San
Francisco reduced the punitive damages
awarded to a former smoker with lung
cancer to $9 million from $25 million. But
the court refused Philip Morris' request to
toss out the award entirely, saying $9
million was "permissible and appropriate"
because Philip Morris had "touted to
children what it knew to be a cumulatively
toxic substance."
Two other cases in California that resulted
in punitive damages of $28 billion and $3
billion were later reduced to $28 million and
$100 million, respectively.
Shares of Philip Morris parent Altria Group
Inc. rose 34 cents Monday to $45.03.
DaimlerChrysler gained 36 cents to $35.94.
Both trade on the New York Stock
Exchange.
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"Jury Awards $81 Million to Oregon Smoker's Family"
The New York Times
March 31, 1999
Barry Meier
A state jury in Portland, Ore., yesterday
ordered the largest award in a smoking-
related lawsuit, deciding that the Philip
Morris Companies must pay $81 million to
the family of a man who smoked Marlboro
cigarettes for four decades before he died.
The verdict, coming just a month after a San
Francisco jury awarded $51 million in
another case brought by an individual
smoker against Philip Morris, could indicate
that the tobacco industry's legal fortunes
may have shifted, analysts said. In recent
years, the public has witnessed a constant
drumbeat of documents damaging to
cigarette makers, which industry analysts
say may be a factor in the jury decisions.
For example, in both cases involving Philip
Morris, the juries called for large punitive
damages, which are meant to punish a
company for its behavior. In yesterday's
decision, the jury awarded $79.5 million in
punitive damages and $1.6 million in
compensatory damages to the family of
Jesse Williams, who died in 1997, five
months after lung cancer was diagnosed. In
the San Francisco case, the jury awarded
$50 million in punitive damages.
Yesterday Mr. Williams's wife, Mayola,
said he had had a dying wish. "He wanted to
make cigarette companies stop lying about
the health problems of smokers," she told
The Associated Press. "This jury agreed
with his goals."
Philip Morris, which is appealing the
California verdict, said yesterday that it
would also appeal the Oregon verdict.
Higher courts have thrown out the few
previous victories by smokers in cigarette-
related lawsuits, often on procedural
grounds.
"No verdict has ever withstood an appeal,
and we don't believe this will be a first one,"
said Gregory Little, the associate general
counsel for Philip Morris, which is the
country's biggest cigarette maker.
But tobacco industry analysts said
yesterday's decision was a particular setback
for cigarette makers because state product
liability laws in Oregon are far tougher than
those in California or Florida, the other
states in which producers have suffered legal
losses.
In Oregon, a smoker is barred from
receiving an award if a jury determines that
he or she bore more than 50 percent liability
for the problem over which a suit was
brought.
Cigarette company lawyers argued that Mr.
Williams was aware of the health risk when
he decided to continue smoking. The jury
determined that Mr. Williams and Philip
Morris equally shared liability.
William A. Gaylord,
Williams family,
acknowledged that Mr.
responsible for his deatt
a lawyer for the
said they had
Williams was partly
"The problem has been that Philip Morris
and other cigarette companies have never
accepted an ounce of responsibility," Mr.
Gaylord said. "They deny everything. They
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essentially say to their very best customers
that you get what's coming to you for
believing us."
Gary Black, a tobacco industry analyst with
Sanford C. Bernstein & Company in New
York, said that added to the California
decision, yesterday's verdict suggested that
the industry's $206 billion settlement last
year with 46 states had failed to put its legal
troubles to rest.
Under that agreement, which resolved
lawsuits brought by the states to recover
health care expenses related to smoking,
individual smokers and groups of them can
still sue. Four states had earlier settled their
claims in deals with the industry.
"I think the industry has got to get its head
out of the sand and stop believing that the
settlement got them closure," Mr. Black
said. "With all the documents and whistle-
blowers out there, juries are increasingly
going to award damages."
In trading after the verdict, Philip Morris
stock fell $3.4375 a share to close at $37.75
a share.
In the California case last month, the jury
ordered Philip Morris to pay $51.5 million
to Patricia Henley, who said her lung cancer
had been caused by more than 35 years of
smoking. That verdict was the largest award
of its kind until yesterday.
Cigarette industry officials have portrayed
that case as an aberration, pointing to a
number of recent legal victories. Earlier this
month, a Federal jury in Akron, Ohio, ruled
that tobacco companies did not have to
repay the costs of treating smoking-related
illnesses to dozens of union health and
benefit plans in Ohio.
But analysts said the back-to-back losses by
Philip Morris in individual cases suggested
that cigarette makers were likely to see more
defeats and escalating awards.
"It does seem to appear in the last two cases
that the juries wanted to punish Philip
Morris and the industry," said Bonnie
Zoller, an analyst with Credit Suisse First
Boston Corporation in New York.
The Oregon lawsuit was brought by the wife
and children of Mr. Williams, a former
janitor in the Portland school system who
was 67 when he died. It charged that Philip
Morris knew cigarettes caused cancer and
misrepresented that information.
In making its finding, the Oregon jury also
had to conclude that the misrepresentations
took place over the past decade because
state law limits the time in which plaintiffs
can seek damages.
There are more than 500 smoking-related
lawsuits pending against Philip Morris.
President Clinton also announced this year
that he had directed the Justice Department
to begin preparing a lawsuit against cigarette
makers to recover Medicare and other
Federal money spent treating illnesses
related to smoking.
Mr. Black said a Federal lawsuit could be in
the industry's interest because it might
provide a way to resolve individual cases as
well.
"The industry has got to make a decision,"
he said. "They have to recognize that the
tide has turned and decide they have to get
some type of settlement. Either that or they
have to build in the anticipated price of
litigation in the cost of cigarettes."
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"A New Day on Punitive Damages Law"
Scotusblog.com
June 25, 2008
Lyle Denniston
Conspicuous in the Supreme Court's lengthy
and scholarly review Wednesday of the role
punitive damages verdicts play in punishing
serious wrongdoing, especially by big
corporations, there is this crucially
significant statement: "The real problem, it
seems, is the stark unpredictability of
punitive awards." And, for that problem, the
Court has found a simple, easy-to-use
solution: a low numerical ratio between the
damages awarded to compensate for actual
loss or harm and the damages awarded on
top of that to punish or to make an example
of the wrongdoer. In the case before it
Wednesday, the Court set the ratio at 1-to-1.
That approach provides a rule-of-thumb that
may well guide the Court as it looks, in the
future, at a wide array of punitive verdicts.
It is necessary, in examining what the Court
has done in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker
(07-219), the celebrated case of the Exxon
Valdez's oil spill in Alaskan waters 19 years
ago, to acknowledge that this is not a
constitutional ruling, that it is only about the
Court's common-law powers, and that it
arises only in the context of law governing
maritime commerce. But to look at it only in
those narrow terms is to miss the signal that
the Court is giving-that is, it has grown
highly skeptical that it can spell out, in
words rather than numbers, workable
guidelines that could bring some sense-
some consistency-to punitive damages
awards.
For years, the Court has had on display its
prevailing view that punitive damage awards
in the modern era have gotten out of control.
It has undertaken, under the Constitution's
Due Process Clause, to lay down a number
of verbal standards that supposedly could
keep juries in check when they ponder
punitive verdicts. But, try as it might, its
efforts have not achieved that objective; year
after year, corporations return again and
again to the Court, arguing anew that juries
and some lower courts don't get it, that the
problem of punitives is not getting solved.
In Justice David H. Souter's long and
detailed opinion in Exxon Shipping, the
Court makes clear that it has not seen
convincing evidence that juries are acting in
runaway fashion, or that the actual dollar
amounts of punitive awards are far too high.
It homes in on the central problem it sees:
"stark unpredictability," which it perceives
as an indication that maybe the process is
not fair because of its inconsistency.
That comes in a part of the opinion where
the Court was examining punitive damages
in a much wider context than merely
maritime law, or federal common law.
Poring over the options it sees for dealing
with the unpredictability phenomenon, it
finds that "verbal formulations" of punitive
damages limits have not worked to produce
consistency. The Court says explicitly that it
is "doubtful that anything but a quantified
approach will work." It expresses its
concern over those trying to manage a
system without numerical guidelines being
"left at large, wandering in deserts of
uncharted discretion."
It then turns to alternatives for a verbal
approach: a hard dollar ceiling on any
punitive award, or "pegging punitive to
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compensatory damages using a ratio or
maximum multiple." And, since it is
operating in the Exxon Shipping case as a
common-law court, unguided by
constitutional or statutory mandates, it is
free to choose which of those alternatives to
apply in the maritime context. It chooses the
ratio approach, and settles here on the 1-to-
1. (It should be noted, as a matter of caution,
that this particular 1-to-1 gauge is chosen in
a case where corporate behavior was found
to be more reckless than malicious, and
where there was a sizable compensatory
verdict; a somewhat higher ratio-but still a
number-might be appropriate without
those two factors in a future case.)
Justice Souter's opinion goes on to reject the
suggestion that the Court, in so choosing, is
engaging too much in policy and too little in
principle. The opinion comments:
"Traditionally, courts have accepted primary
responsibility for reviewing punitive
damages and thus for their evolution, and if,
in the absence of legislation, judicially
derived standards leave the door open to
outlier punitive-damages awards, it is hard
to see how the judiciary can wash its hands
of a problem it created, simply by calling
quantified standards legislative. . . . History
certainly is no support for the notion that
judges cannot use numbers."
Since it is the Court that decides
constitutional standards, perhaps the same
sentiments as expressed by Justice Souter
might apply in that context, too. If so, those
making future Due Process claims against
punitive awards might well suggest that
there is merit to going to the numerical
approach there, too. True, Justice Souter
does say, at one point, that the Court was
reaching for "more rigorous standards" in
the maritime/common law arena than the
Constitution would require, that may not
mean that the Court, in time, would find that
using the numbers is a better alternative than
the verbal formulations the Court has laid
down in judging the constitutionality of
punitive verdicts.
What's more, in a final footnote in the
opinion, Justice Souter suggests, even in the
Exxon Shipping context, "the constitutional
outer limit may well be 1:1 ."
It hardly will be a surprise if lawyers for
corporations facing large punitive awards
will find ways to cite Exxon Shipping as
persuasive authority for adopting the
numbers approach as a workable formula
under the Constitution.
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Altria Group v. Good
07-562
Ruling Below: Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 501 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2007).
Plaintiffs are all smokers who allege that Defendant cigarette manufacturers committed fraud
when they advertised cigarettes as "light" or "low in tar" without including actual tar and
nicotine levels. Plaintiffs claim this action violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act.
Defendants claim that Plaintiffs' action is preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertisement Act. The First Circuit ruled that the Plaintiffs' state law action was not explicitly
or implicitly preempted by federal law, overturning the District Court.
Question Presented: To ensure that interstate commerce is "not impeded by diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations," Congress has
precluded the States from imposing any "requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health . . . with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes," and has authorized the
Federal Trade Commission to regulate "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the advertising of
cigarettes." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1334, 1336. Based on studies suggesting that cigarettes with
comparatively lower tar and nicotine yields may present fewer health risks, the FTC requires
tobacco companies to disclose those yields as measured using an FTC-mandated test, and has
authorized tobacco companies to advertise cigarettes using "descriptors," such as "light," as
shorthand references to the numerical test results. Respondents in this case contend that such
descriptors are misleading, in violation of a state deceptive trade practices statute.
The question presented is whether state-law challenges to FTC-authorized statements regarding
tar and nicotine yields in cigarette advertising are expressly or impliedly preempted by federal
law.
Stephanie GOOD, Lori A. Spellman and Allain L. Thibodeau, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants
V.
ALTRIA Group, Inc., and Philip Morris USA Inc., Defendnats-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Decided August 31, 2007
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted.]
HOWARD, Circuit Judge company (collectively, "Philip Morris"), on
state-law claims based on the marketing of
The plaintiffs appeal from the entry of "Light" cigarettes. The district court ruled
summary judgment for the defendants, that these claims were preempted by the
Philip Morris USA Inc. and its parent Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
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Act (the "FCLAA"), which provides that
"[n]o requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health shall be imposed under
State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of
which are labeled in conformity with the
provisions of this chapter." 15 U.S.C. §
1334(b) (1998). Because we find that the
claims are not preempted, and because
Philip Morris's alternative arguments for
affirmance are also unavailing, we vacate
the decision of the district court and remand
for further proceedings.
I.
The plaintiffs, who say they have smoked
Marlboro Lights for at least fifteen years,
claim that Philip Morris has employed unfair
and deceptive practices in "designing,
manufacturing, promoting, marketing and
selling Marlboro Lights and Cambridge
Lights purporting to be 'light' and having
'Lowered Tar and Nicotine,' all while [it]
knew those cigarettes would not deliver less
tar or nicotine to the consumer." These
brands have rings of ventilation holes in
their filters, causing air to mix with the
smoke as the smoker draws on the cigarette.
As a result, "Lights" register lower levels of
tar and nicotine than their so-called "full-
flavor" counterparts under a test known as
the "Cambridge Filter Method." This test
uses a machine to "smoke" a cigarette,
collecting the resulting tar and nicotine in a
filter for weighing.
The plaintiffs allege that a person smoking
"light" cigarettes, however, engages in
unconscious behaviors that essentially
negate the ventilation effect, such as taking
more frequent, voluminous, or longer puffs,
covering the air holes with the lips or the
fingers, or smoking additional cigarettes.
Due to such "compensation," which the
plaintiffs attribute to the addictive nature of
nicotine, they assert that a smoker consumes
the same quantities of tar and nicotine from
light cigarettes as from full-flavored ones.
The plaintiffs explain that the relative levels
of these substances bear on a reasonable
consumer's decision on which cigarette to
purchase because consumers understand that
reducing the quantities of tar and nicotine in
cigarettes reduces their adverse health
effects. Thus, the plaintiffs allege that Philip
Morris has misrepresented material facts by
describing its "Lights" as such or as having
"lower tar and nicotine," and that Philip
Morris-which was aware of the
"compensation" phenomenon before it
began marketing its "Lights" brands-did so
with the intent to deceive.
The plaintiffs claim that these
misrepresentations amount to unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in violation of the
Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 207 (2002). This statute
entitles any person who suffers a loss of
money or property as a result of such acts or
practices to sue for "actual damages,
restitution and for . . other equitable relief."
Id. § 213(1). The plaintiffs have expressly
disclaimed any "damages for personal
injuries," but they do seek other relief,
including the return of the sums they paid to
purchase Marlboro Lights and Cambridge
Lights, in addition to punitive damages and
the attorneys' fees as authorized by the Act.
The plaintiffs also seek to certify a class of
all purchasers of Marlboro Lights or
Cambridge Lights in Maine through
November 2002.
In response to the plaintiffs' amended
complaint, Philip Morris promptly moved
for summary judgment. Philip Morris argued
that the plaintiffs' claims were (1) expressly
preempted by the FCLAA, (2) implicitly
preempted by "the efforts of Congress and
the [Federal Trade Commission] for 40
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years to implement a national, uniform
policy of informing the public about the
health risks of smoking," and (3) for similar
reasons, not cognizable under the Maine
Unfair Trade Practices Act, which does not
apply to "[t]ransactions or actions otherwise
permitted under laws as administered by any
regulatory board or officer acting under the
statutory authority of the . . . United States."
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 208(1)....
[Starting in 1959, the FTC required cigarette
manufacturers to report the amount of tar
and nicotine in their cigarettes based on the
Cambridge Filter Method. The FTC also
reported the test results to Congress through
1998, continuing even after the cigarette
companies agreed to voluntarily report the
test results in their advertising.]
Based on this regime, Philip Morris
characterized the lawsuit as "a challenge to
the FTC's regulatory scheme," because
"terms like 'light' and 'lowered tar' .
convey precisely the same comparative
information" as the tar and nicotine
measurements derived from testing under
the Cambridge Filter Method. The district
court agreed, reasoning that
To respond to Plaintiffs' claims,
Philip Morris would have to tell
the public that the FTC Method
test, though accurate in the
laboratory, was inaccurate in real
life, and that light cigarette
smokers . . . infused greater
amounts of nicotine and tar than
the designation 'Lights' and
'Lowered Tar and Nicotine' would
imply. But, this information, if
conveyed through a form of
advertising, would run head first
into . . . the comprehensive federal
scheme governing the advertising
and promotion of cigarettes.
436 F. Supp. 2d at 152. Finding the
plaintiffs' claims thus "grounded on Philip
Morris's 'advertising or promotion of . . .
cigarettes labeled in conformity with the
provisions of federal law and regulation,"'
the district court concluded that they were
expressly preempted by the FCLAA. Id. at
153; (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)). The
court did not decide Philip Morris's
alternative arguments for summary
judgment. This appeal followed.
II.
The plaintiffs challenge the ruling below as
at odds with Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), where a plurality
of the Supreme Court held that some-but
not all-actions for damages under state law
are expressly preempted by the FCLAA. In
response, Philip Morris argues that the
district court correctly found the plaintiffs'
claims preempted under Cipollone. Philip
Morris simultaneously urges us to affirm the
entry of summary judgment in its favor on
the alternative grounds not reached below,
namely, that the plaintiffs' claims are
implicitly preempted by federal law or that
they complain of "actions otherwise
permitted under laws" and therefore cannot
serve as the basis for liability under the
Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. We
review these arguments de novo. See Philip
Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 62
(1st Cir. 1997).
A.
"A fundamental tenet of our federalist
system is that constitutionally enacted
federal law is supreme to state law. As a
result, federal law sometimes preempts state
law either expressly or by implication." N.H.
Motor Transport Ass 'n v. Rowe, 448 F.3d
66, 74 (1st Cir. 2006). Preemption questions
ultimately turn on congressional intent, and
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the primary indicator of that intent is the text
of the congressional act claimed to have
preemptive effect. But "[t]he text of the
preemption provision must be viewed in
context, with proper attention paid to the
history, structure, and purpose of the
legislative scheme in which it appears."
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 591 (2001).
1.
As noted at the outset, the FCLAA's
preemption clause states that "[n]o
requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health shall be imposed under
State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of
which are labeled in conformity with the
provisions of this chapter." 15 U.S.C. §
1334(b). Those provisions mandate that the
packages of all cigarettes sold in the United
States-and, in general, their
advertisements-bear one of a rotating
series of labels warning about the adverse
health effects of smoking. Id. §§ 1333(a),
(c). But no additional "statement relating to
smoking and health . .. shall be required on
any cigarette package." Id. § 1334(a). The
FCLAA also bans cigarette advertising "on
any medium of electronic communication
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Communications Commission," id. § 1335,
and preserves the authority of the FTC over
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
advertising of cigarettes," id. § 1336.
These provisions were added to the FCLAA
through the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, enacted as the
restrictions on cigarette advertising
contained in the prior version of the FCLAA
were set to expire. As the expiration date
approached, both federal and state
authorities prepared to resume their efforts
to regulate cigarette advertising. See
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 514-15.
Congress amended the FCLAA
Thus,
to establish a comprehensive
Federal program to deal with
cigarette labeling and advertising
with respect to any relationship
between smoking and health,
whereby-
(1) the public may be adequately
informed about any adverse health
effects of cigarette smoking by
inclusion of warning notices on
each package of cigarettes and in
each advertisement of cigarettes;
and
(2) commerce and the national
economy may be (A) protected to
the maximum extent consistent
with this declared policy and (B)
not impeded by diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing
cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations with respect to any
relationship between smoking and
health.
With these purposes in mind, the Cipollone
Court considered whether the FCLAA's
preemption clause barred a state-law suit for
damages brought by a smoker who had
allegedly developed lung cancer from the
defendants' cigarettes. 505 U.S. at 509-10.
The smoker asserted a number of common
law causes of action, including strict
liability, negligent failure to warn, breach of
express warranty, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy. The
court of appeals held that, while § 1334(b)
did not expressly preempt common law
claims, the FCLAA's labeling requirement
"revealed a congressional intent to exert
exclusive federal control over every aspect
of the relationship between cigarettes and
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health." Id. at 517. Accordingly, the court of
appeals ruled that the plaintiffs claims
"challenging the adequacy of the warnings
on labels or in advertising or the propriety of
[the defendants'] advertising and
promotional activities" were implicitly
preempted.
A plurality of the Court disagreed with this
analysis, holding that "the preemptive scope
of the [FCLAA] is governed entirely by the
express language in [§ 1334(b)]," id., which
did, in fact, reach some common law
actions. Id. at 521-23;. But because "[fjor
purposes of [§ 1334(b)], the common law is
not of a piece," the plurality explained that it
had to "look to each of [the smoker's]
common-law claims to determine whether it
is in fact pre-empted." . . .
. . . [T]he plurality determined that the
FCLAA preempted the claim, pleaded as a
failure to warn, that the defendants'
"advertising and promotions should have
included additional, or more clearly stated
warnings," because it relied on "a state-law
'requirement or prohibition ... with respect
to ... advertising or promotion."' Id.
The plurality proceeded to consider the
smoker's two theories of fraudulent
misrepresentation. The first, that the
defendants, "through their advertising,
neutralized the effect of federally mandated
warning labels," was preempted by the
FCLAA. Id. at 527. As the plurality
explained, this theory was "predicated on a
state-law prohibition against statements in
advertising and promotional materials that
tend to minimize the health hazards of
smoking," which is itself "merely the
converse of a state-law requirement that
warnings be included in [such] materials."
Id. This fraudulent misrepresentation claim,
then, was "inextricably related to" the
failure-to-warn claim and therefore also
premised on a "requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health" imposed by
state law. Id. at 528.
But the plurality reached a different
conclusion as to the smoker's second
fraudulent misrepresentation theory:
"intentional fraud and false
misrepresentation both by false
misrepresentation of a material fact and by
concealment of a material fact." Id. First, the
plurality held that the FCLAA does not
preempt fraudulent concealment claims that
"rely on a state-law duty to disclose such
facts through channels of communication
other than advertising or promotion," e.g., in
the case of a state law requiring cigarette
manufacturers "to disclose material facts
about smoking and health to an
administrative agency." Id. Second, the
plurality held that
fraudulent-misrepresentation
claims that do arise with respect to
advertising and promotion (most
notably claims based on allegedly
false statements of material fact
made in advertisements) are not
pre-empted by [§ 1334(b)];. Such
claims are predicated not on a duty
"based on smoking and health" but
rather on a more general
obligation-the duty not to
deceive.
Id. at 528-29;. The plurality saw this result
as consistent with the text, structure, and
purpose of the FCLAA. Id. at 529. First, the
FCLAA "offered no sign that [Congress]
wished to insulate manufacturers from
longstanding rules governing fraud"-in
fact, the Act "explicitly reserved the FTC's
authority to identify and punish deceptive
advertising practices . . . ." Id. Second,
reading § 1334(b) to exclude fraud claims
would not frustrate the FCLAA's stated goal
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of protecting commerce from "diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette
labeling and advertising regulations with
respect to any relationship between smoking
and health," 15 U.S.C. § 1331(2), because
"state-law proscriptions on intentional fraud
rely only on a single, uniform standard:
falsity." 505 U.S. at 529.
2.
The parties agree that whether the FCLAA
expressly preempts the plaintiffs' claims
depends on how best to categorize them by
analogy to the various causes of action
considered in Cipollone. In doing so, as the
district court recognized, we must look
beyond the plaintiffs' own classification of
their claims and to their actual substance.
The plaintiffs seek relief under the Maine
Unfair Trade Practices Act, which, in
relevant part, outlaws "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade
or commerce." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §
207. Though this prohibition encompasses
various kinds of behavior, including "a
material representation, omission, act or
practice that is likely to mislead consumers
acting reasonably under the circumstances,"
Maine v. Weinschenk, 2005 ME 28, 868
A.2d 200, 206 (Me. 2005), the substance of
the plaintiffs' claim is that Philip Morris has
falsely represented certain of its brands as
"light" or having "lower tar and nicotine"
although they deliver the same quantities of
these ingredients to a smoker as do "full-
flavored" cigarettes. So, under the functional
approach, we consider how this particular
theory-as opposed to a more generalized
claim under the Maine Unfair Trade
Practices Act-resembles the various
common-law causes of action considered in
Cipollone. If, as the plaintiffs argue, they
have indeed alleged fraudulent
misrepresentation claims, the claims are not
preempted because, as Cipollone explains,
they are not premised on a state-law duty
based on smoking and health. But if, as
Philip Morris argues, the plaintiffs have in
reality alleged failure-to-warn or warning
neutralization claims, the claims are
preempted.
. . . [T]he district court concluded the
plaintiffs' claims were expressly preempted
by the FCLAA as construed by Cipollone.
We differ with the district court's view of
the fit between the plaintiffs' theory and the
Cipollone taxonomy and, more
fundamentally, of Cipollone itself. To start,
we do not read Cipollone to hold that
the FCLAA preempts claims "grounded on
[a defendant's] 'advertising or promotion of
... cigarettes labeled in conformity with the
provisions of federal law and regulation," as
the district court ultimately explained its
conclusion. 436 F. Supp. 2d at 153.
Cipollone reasoned that "each phrase" in; §
1334(b)-not just the phrase "with respect
to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes"-"limits the universe of
common-law claims pre-empted by the
statute." 505 U.S. at 524. So "[t]he
appropriate inquiry is not whether a claim
challenges the 'propriety' of advertising and
promotion, but whether the claim would
require the imposition under state law of a
requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health with respect to
advertising and promotion." Id. at 525. A
claim is not preempted, then, merely
because it is "grounded on" the advertising
or promotion of cigarettes with FCLAA-
compliant labels.
Nor is a claim preempted merely because it
arises out of the adverse health
consequences of such cigarettes, as both the
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reasoning and the result in Cipollone make
clear. There, in fact, all of the plaintiffs
claims were "based on smoking and health"
in the sense that they "alleged that [she]
developed lung cancer because she smoked
cigarettes," 505 U.S. at 509, yet the Court
held that the FCLAA preempted only some
of them. And the fate of each claim
depended on "whether the legal duty that is
the predicate of the common-law damages
action"-not the claim itself-met the
criteria of § 1334(b). Id. at 524. Thus, for
example, while the theory that the
defendants in Cipollone "had expressly
warranted that smoking the cigarettes which
they manufactured and sold did not present
any significant health consequences," id. at
509, was clearly based on smoking and
health, it was not preempted because "it
[did] not rest on a duty imposed under state
law," but on the defendants' own
''contractual commitment voluntarily
undertaken," i.e., the warranty. Id. at 526.
Accordingly, the FCLAA preempts only
those claims based on a "requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health
under State law with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes
the packages of which are labeled in
accordance with" the FCLAA. 15 U.S.C. §
1334(b). It does not preempt claims because
they are "based on smoking and health."
Because the state-law "duty not to deceive"
is one such "more general obligation," it
falls within Cipollone's express holding that
"claims based on allegedly false statements
of material fact made in advertisements"
survive FCLAA preemption. 505 U.S. at
528-29. In line with this holding, courts
have routinely (though not uniformly)
concluded that the FCLAA does not preempt
fraudulent misrepresentation claims arising
out of false statements made in advertising
or promoting cigarettes. A number of these
decisions, in fact, hold that the FCLAA does
not preempt the very theory the plaintiffs
advance here-that a cigarette manufacturer
has perpetrated fraud by stating that its light
brand offers lower tar and nicotine than its
full-flavored one.
... Unlike the district court, then, we do not
see the plaintiffs' claims as arising out of
what Philip Morris "should have said," but
rather, what it did in fact say: that Marlboro
Lights and Cambridge Lights have "lower
tar and nicotine" than their full-flavored
counterparts.
... The district court's ruling was in error.
B.
Philip Morris also challenges the plaintiffs'
claims as impliedly preempted by federal
law. Even in the absence of express
preemptive language-which the FCLAA
contains, but which we have concluded does
not reach the claims in this case-federal
law can preempt state law by implication in
two other ways. See, e.g., California v. ARC
Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989). First,
"Congress implicitly may indicate an intent
to occupy an entire field to the exclusion of
state law." Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline
Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988). "Second,
even if Congress has not occupied the field,
state law is nevertheless pre-empted to the
extent it actually conflicts with federal law,
that is, when compliance with both state and
federal law is impossible, or when the state
law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." ARC
Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 100-01; And,
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whether through field or conflict
preemption, "state laws can be pre-empted
by federal regulations as well as by federal
statutes." Hillsborough County, Fla. v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
713 (1985).
Philip Morris does not argue that either
Congress or the FTC has evinced an intent
to occupy the entire field of cigarette
advertising, or even the narrower field of
low-tar cigarette advertising. Nor does
Philip Morris protest that complying with
both the state law the plaintiffs say has been
violated and some contrary federal law
would be impossible. Instead, Philip Morris
maintains that the "[p]laintiffs' claims
conflict with the FTC's 40-year history of
regulation and control over the development,
testing and marketing of low tar cigarettes,
as well as the reporting of tar and nicotine
measurements pursuant to the FTC Method
and the use of descriptors substantiated by
those measurements." Because Philip Morris
has limited its implied preemption argument
to the so-called "frustration-of-purpose"
theory, see Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861, 873-74 (2000); it cannot
prevail unless "the rule of law for which [the
plaintiffs] contend [stands] 'as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the
important means-related federal objectives"
at stake. Id. at 881.
In identifying those objectives, Philip Morris
argues that "Congress and the FTC have
both sought uniform, national standards for
cigarette advertising with respect to smoking
and health. And State-law actions like this
one would create a different standard of
deceptiveness that would plainly conflict
with these goals." At the outset, we reject
the notion that the plaintiffs' claims would
interfere with any congressional designs on
cigarette advertising. It is true that, in the
FCLAA, "Congress prohibited state
cigarette advertising regulations motivated
by concerns about smoking and health."
Reilly, 533 U.S. at 548. By the same token,
however, "Congress offered no sign that it
wished to insulate cigarette manufacturers
from longstanding rules governing fraud,"
which are not so motivated. Cipollone, 505
U.S. at 529. As we have taken pains to
elucidate, the plaintiffs' claims seek to
enforce state-law prohibitions on fraud, not
state-law prohibitions on cigarette
advertising based on smoking and health. So
their asserted rule of law-that the
statements "light" and "lower tar and
nicotine" constitute fraud-does not
interfere with the goals of the FCLAA,
which do not include establishing any
national "standard of deceptiveness" for
cigarette advertising.
Philip Morris . . . founds its implied
preemption claim on the FTC's oversight of
cigarette advertising under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq.
(1997) ... [W]e do not agree that the FTC's
exercise of its authority in this area has
preempted state-law damages actions, like
this one, alleging that a cigarette
manufacturer has engaged in such acts or
practices through its use of the terms "light"
and "lower tar and nicotine."
In brief, the FTC Act prohibits "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce," 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), and
empowers the Commission both to define
and enforce that prohibition in a number of
ways relevant here. The Commission may
prescribe either informal "interpretive rules
and general statements of policy with
respect to unfair or deceptive acts or
practices," id. § 57a(a)(1)(A), or, pursuant to
notice-and-comment procedures, see id. §§
57a(b)-(e), formal rules which define those
173
acts and practices "with specificity," id. §
57a(a)(1)(B). In addition, the Commission
may issue cease-and-desist orders against
those engaged in violations of the Act. Id. §
45(b). The FTC may enforce such orders-
as well as its formal rules-by suing
violators for either civil penalties, id. §
45(m), or "such relief as the court finds
necessary to redress injuries to consumers"
or other injured parties, id. §§ 57b(a);, (b).
The FTC has regularly trained these powers
on tar and nicotine claims in cigarette
advertising; as the district court observed,
"the tobacco industry is hardly unregulated
in what it says to consumers about its
products, including light cigarettes." 436 F.
Supp. 2d at 151. . . [U]nder the established
rules of conflict preemption we have recited,
we must determine whether the FTC's
oversight of tar and nicotine claims
manifests a federal policy intended to
displace conflicting state law....
[Recounting the history of FTC regulation of
cigarette advertising, including a proposed
rule requiring manufactures to disclose tar
and nicotine levels that was put on hold
when the manufacturers voluntarily agreed
to make the disclosures.]
Based principally on these exercises of
authority over tar and nicotine claims, Philip
Morris argues that the FTC has expressed a
"policy of allowing their use so long as
substantiated with the FTC Method
numerical results and requiring publication
of those results in all brand advertisements."
Because the plaintiffs' claims "stand[] as an
obstacle" to this policy, Philip Morris
continues, they are implicitly preempted.
Like the plaintiffs, we see a number of
problems with this argument.
First, since its 1969 agreement with the
tobacco companies, the FTC has never
issued a formal rule specifically defining
which cigarette advertising practices violate
the Act and which do not....
... [F]ormal rulemaking comes with a host
of procedural protections under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),
such as notice of the proposed rule, an
opportunity for interested parties to
participate, a statement of the basis and
purpose of any rule adopted, and its
publication in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C.
§ 533 (2007). Limiting the preemptive
power of federal agencies to exercises of
formal rulemaking authority, then, ensures
that the states will have enjoyed these
protections before suffering the
displacement of their laws. This reasoning
has particular force in the case of the FTC
Act, which imposes procedural requirements
on the Commission's rulemaking powers
that exceed those of the APA. 15 U.S.C. §§
57a(c)-(e). Indeed, courts and commentators
have understood these additional safeguards
to reflect a congressional concern-well-
documented in their legislative history-
over the preemptive effect of FTC regulation
on state consumer protection law.
Second, apart from the likely import of its
rulemaking provisions, the FTC Act raises
an additional hurdle to Philip Morris's
implied preemption theory. . . The Act states
that "[r]emedies provided in [15 U.S.C. §
57b] are in addition to, and not in lieu of,
any other remedy or right of action provided
by State or Federal law." 15 U.S.C. §
57b(e). And § 57b, as we have observed,
empowers the Commission to sue for relief
on behalf of consumers against those who
violate its cease-and-desist orders against
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. We do
not think it a stretch, then, to say that when
the FTC merely issues such an order, but
never uses it as the basis for a subsequent
lawsuit, the order does not supplant state-
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law rights of action any more than the
lawsuit would have....
Third, as the one court squarely holding that
FTC consent orders can preempt state law
has recognized, the mere entry of such an
order dealing with a particular practice "is
insufficient to preclude supplemental state
regulation." Gen. Motors Corp., 897 F.2d at
39. Thus, even if we were to agree that FTC
action short of formal rulemaking-
including consent orders-can implicitly
preempt state law in some cases, we do not
think that this is one of them, because the
plaintiffs' state-law claims do not pose a
threat to any federal regulatory objectives
apparent in the FTC's approach to tar and
nicotine claims in cigarette advertising.
Though Philip Morris argues that FTC
policy permits a manufacturer to make such
claims so long as they are consistent with
the results of testing under the Cambridge
Filter Method and those results are disclosed
in the manufacturer's advertising, the
Commission has on occasion challenged
statements about the tar or nicotine content
of a particular brand even though they were
supported by such testing. In 1982, for
example, the FTC told a cigarette
manufacturer that it could not rely on the
Cambridge Filter Method to substantiate
claims that one of its brands had only
1 milligram of tar, because the method did
not accurately measure the tar and nicotine
content of that brand due to its unusual filter
design. The FTC has also challenged a
manufacturer's advertisements "that
consumers will get less tar by smoking ten
packs of [its] brand cigarettes than by
smoking a single pack of the other brands of
cigarettes depicted in the ads," since the
claim was based on "ratings obtained
through smoking machine tests that do not
reflect actual smoking, in part because the
machines do not take into account such
behavior as compensatory smoking." In re
Am. Tobacco Co., 119 F.T.C. at 4.
The FTC, then, has not invariably allowed
tar and nicotine claims that are supported by
the Cambridge Filter Method, but has
recognized that such claims may
nevertheless amount to unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in certain circumstances.
We acknowledge that the claim at issue
here-that Marlboro and Cambridge Lights
have "lower tar and nicotine" than their full-
flavored versions-differs from those the
FTC has challenged in the past, but our task
is not to decide whether the FTC would
view a particular kind of tar and nicotine
claim as a violation of the FTC Act. Instead,
we must determine whether the FTC's
oversight of such claims "convey[s] an
authoritative message of a federal policy"
jeopardized by the plaintiffs' common-law
damages action. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 67.
Because the only policy we perceive is that
certain tar and nicotine claims consistent
with Cambridge Filter Method test results
can still amount to unfair or deceptive acts
or practices, we think not.
[I]t is not the fact of agency action on a
particular subject alone-but the reasons for
the action-that control its preemptive
effect. And here, no clear rationale emerges
from the history of the FTC's treatment of
tar and nicotine claims; indeed, the parties
point to conflicting statements by the
Commission itself on whether it even has an
official position on the definitions of the
terms "light" and "lower tar and nicotine."
Compare, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 48, 158, 48,163
(Sept. 12, 1997) ("There are no official
definitions for these terms") with, e.g., 1980
FTC Rep. to Congress 18 n. 11 ("The FTC
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has not defined . . . any term related to tar
level except for 'low "tar'", which the FTC
defines as 15.0 mg or less 'tar."').
Moreover, as in Sprietsma and in contrast to
Geier, the Solicitor General recently filed a
brief in the Supreme Court explaining that
the FTC "has never promulgated definitions
of terms such as 'light' and 'low tar' and
that its previous statements purporting to
define them "did not reflect an official
regulatory position." On this record, we
cannot discern a coherent federal policy on
low-tar claims, let alone one driven by the
sort of "important means-related federal
objectives" necessary to preempt conflicting
state law. Geier, 529 U.S. at 881. The
plaintiffs' claims are not implicitly
preempted.
III.
In summary, we conclude that the plaintiffs'
claims that Philip Morris has made
fraudulent misrepresentations in violation of
the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act by
advertising and promoting Marlboro and
Cambridge Lights as "light" and having
"Lowered Tar and Nicotine" are not
(1) expressly preempted by the FCLAA, (2)
implicitly preempted, either by the FCLAA
or by the FTC's oversight of tar and nicotine
claims in cigarette advertising, or (3) barred
by the Act's exemption for "transactions or
actions otherwise permitted." We do not, of
course, reach any conclusion on the merits
of the plaintiffs' claims, the availability of
summary judgment on other grounds, or the
force of or any other defense potentially
available to Philip Morris; and nothing in
what we have said should be construed as
expressing any views on those issues that
are not before us. As always, "we leave the
extent and nature of further proceedings in
the hands of the district court." Patterson v.
Patterson, 306 F.3d 1156, 1162 (1st Cir.
2002).
We VACATE the judgment of the district
court and REMAND for further
proceedings.
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"Altria Gets U.S. High Court Hearing on 'Lights' Suits"
Bloomberg
January 18, 2008
Greg Stohr
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear
arguments from Altria Group Inc. in a case
that may shield the tobacco industry from
suits seeking billions of dollars over the
marketing of "light" cigarettes.
The justices today said they will review a
lower court decision that said Altria's Philip
Morris USA unit, the nation's largest
cigarette maker, must face Maine smokers'
claims that it fraudulently portrayed lights as
safer than other cigarettes. Philip Morris
contends that federal law bars the suit,
which invokes a state consumer protection
law, from going forward.
The clash may determine the fate of more
than 30 similar lawsuits around the country
against Philip Morris, Reynolds American
Inc.'s R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. and other
cigarette makers. An Illinois suit at one
point threatened Philip Morris with a $10.1
billion award before it was overturned.
"These staggering stakes provide a
compelling reason for this court to resolve
the question," Philip Morris argued in its
petition seeking Supreme Court review.
The high court's decision to hear the case
suggests it will rule in favor of the tobacco
industry, Morgan Stanley analyst David
Adelman said in an investors' note. That
probably would mark "the death knell of the
remaining lights class-action cases," wrote
Adelman, who rates Altria shares
"overweight."
Lower courts have disagreed about the
propriety of the suits. In letting the Maine
case go forward, the Boston-based 1st U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals criticized a
different federal appeals court's decision to
block a Louisiana suit over light cigarettes.
Deception Alleged
The lawsuit seeks to recover the money
smokers spent on Philip Morris's Marlboro
Lights and Cambridge Lights through
November 2002, plus punitive damages.
The smokers, led by Stephanie Good,
contend that Philip Morris intentionally
deceived consumers by describing the
cigarettes as being "light" and containing
"lowered tar and nicotine."
"For over 30 years, Philip Morris falsely
reported on its cigarette packages that
consumers would receive lower amounts of
tar and nicotine from Marlboro Lights than
from regular Marlboro cigarettes," the group
argued in a filing that urged the Supreme
Court to reject the appeal.
The Supreme Court fight will focus on a pair
of cigarette-labeling laws enacted in the
1960s. Those measures require each package
of cigarettes to carry a specified warning
label while barring additional state law
requirements "based on smoking and
health."
In 1992, a splintered Supreme Court said
that law barred some, though not all, smoker
lawsuits against tobacco companies.
Cipollone Case
The smokers argue that the 1992 ruling,
known as Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
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permits suits that accuse tobacco companies
of violating generally applicable laws, such
as those that bar companies from deceiving
consumers.
"Congress did not intend to give the tobacco
companies a free pass to violate state laws
that are promulgated pursuant to traditional
state police powers and are binding on all
other commercial actors," the consumers
argued.
Philip Morris contends the Cipollone
decision allows those types of suits only if
they claim that cigarette makers lied about
their products. The company says it didn't
lie and simply used terms that had been
endorsed by the Federal Trade Commission,
the agency that oversees cigarette testing.
The smokers "do not allege that PMUSA's
tar and nicotine descriptors are inherently
false and do not dispute that they provide an
accurate shorthand means of conveying tar
and nicotine testing results to consumers,"
the cigarette maker argued.
Two Hurdles
R.J. Reynolds and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce joined Philip Morris in urging
Supreme Court review. Philip Morris is
based in Richmond, Virginia, while its
parent company's headquarters are in New
York. Altria fell $1.38, or 1.8 percent, to
close at $75.42 in New York Stock
Exchange composite trading.
The pre-emption question is one of two
hurdles that have prevented some lights
cases from going forward. Courts have
derailed other suits by refusing to grant
class-action status, a designation that lets
smokers with relatively small claims sue
together.
The high court case "is an absolute must-
win issue for plaintiffs, but not for the
industry," Adelman said in his investors'
note.
A victory for Altria would mean the lights
cases "are essentially wiped out," said Ed
Sweda, an attorney at the Tobacco Products
Liability Project at Northeastern University
School of Law in Boston. He said that result
would be a "tragedy depriving these
aggrieved consumers from having their day
in court."
The case is Altria v. Good, 07-562.
178
"'Light' Cigarette Case not Preempted, First Circuit Says"
Trial
November 1, 2007
Allison Torres Burtka
The First Circuit recently allowed a case
brought by "lights" smokers against
cigarette manufacturers to move forward,
reversing a district court's decision. The
lower court had granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment, ruling that
the plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act (FCLAA). The plaintiffs sued Philip
Morris USA, Inc., and its parent company,
Altria Group, Inc., under the Maine Unfair
Trade Practices Act (MiUTPA). The
manufacturers' claims that light cigarettes
were lower in tar and nicotine than regular,
"full-flavor" cigarettes-when they actually
delivered the same amount of tar and
nicotine-constituted unfair and deceptive
trade practices, the plaintiffs argued. They
sought the return of sums they had paid to
buy lights, as well as punitive damages and
attorney fees.
The First Circuit held that the plaintiffs'
claims were neither expressly nor implicitly
preempted by the FCLAA, nor implicitly
preempted by Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) oversight of cigarette advertising, nor
barred by exemptions in the MUTPA. (Good
v. Altria Group, Inc., 2007 WL 2460039 (1st
Cir. Aug. 31, 2007)).
The decision revitalizes light cigarette
litigation and "protects the legitimate claims
of consumers deceived by a scam that goes
back to the early 1970s," said Edward
Sweda, senior attorney with the Boston-
based Tobacco Products Liability Project.
Light cigarettes yield lower nicotine and tar
levels than full-flavor cigarettes in a
machine test known as the Cambridge Filter
Method, but actual smokers unconsciously
compensate for the holes that lights have in
their filters-by puffing harder, covering the
holes, or smoking more-which exposes
them to just as much tar and nicotine as
smoking regular cigarettes would, the
plaintiffs argued.
The district court concluded that the
plaintiffs' claims were expressly preempted
by the FCLAA because they were grounded
in the company's advertising or promotion.
But the plaintiffs argued that that ruling
conflicted with the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
which held that the FCLAA expressly
preempted only some actions under state
law. (505 U.S. 504 (1992)). The First Circuit
sided with the plaintiffs, holding that "the
FCLAA preempts only those claims based
on a' requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health under state law with
respect to the advertising or promotion of
any cigarettes the packages of which are
labeled in accordance with' the FCLAA. It
does not preempt claims because they are
'based on smoking and health."'
Circuit Judge Jeffrey Howard wrote for the
three-judge panel that the plaintiffs'
"asserted rule of law-that the statements
'light' and 'lower tar and nicotine' constitute
fraud-does not interfere with the goals of
the FCLAA."
Sweda said the court was "very careful in
adhering to precedent in Cipollone."
The defendants argued the lawsuit
challenged the FTC's regulatory scheme,
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and the district court agreed. But the First
Circuit held, "[E]ven if we were to agree
that FTC action short of formal
rulemaking-including consent orders-can
implicitly preempt state law in some cases,
we do not think that this is one of them,
because the plaintiffs' state law claims do
not pose a threat to any federal regulatory
objectives apparent in the FTC's approach to
tar and nicotine claims in cigarette
advertising."
The court said it disagreed "with those
courts holding that the FTC has 'authorized'
Philip Morris's 'light' and 'lower tar and
nicotine' claims so as to put them beyond
the reach of state consumer protection
statutes with exceptions similar to Maine's."
Samuel Lanham of Bangor, Maine, who
represents the plaintiffs, said it was
significant that although the district court
ruled only on express preemption, the First
Circuit also addressed implied preemption.
Howard wrote, "As the Supreme Court has
cautioned, to 'infer preemption whenever an
agency deals with a problem
comprehensively is virtually tantamount to
saying that whenever a federal agency
decides to step into a field, its regulations
will be exclusive. Such a rule, of course,
would be inconsistent with the federal-state
[balance] embodied in our Supremacy
Clause jurisprudence.'"
William Ohlemeyer, Philip Momis's vice
president and associate general counsel, said
in a statement that the company would seek
Supreme Court review. "Attempts by
plaintiffs' lawyers to use state laws to
regulate the marketing and sale of cigarettes
are at odds with the nationwide regulations
established by the Congress," he said.
But Sweda noted that the cigarette
manufacturers were trying to get "a special
immunity that Congress never intended."
Good creates a split in the circuits; the Fifth
Circuit held last February that fraudulent-
misrepresentation claims regarding light
cigarettes were preempted by the FCLAA.
(Brown v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 479 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2007).)
The Good decision is likely to affect lights
cases pending in other states, Sweda said,
especially Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos.
(No. SJC-9981 (Mass.)), set for argument in
November, and Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. (No. A05-1359 (Minn. App.
argued Sept. 18, 2007)). Sweda noted that
similar cases have been filed in more than
20 states.
In June, the Supreme Court considered
another lights case. The plaintiffs argued
that Philip Morris manipulated the design of
its light cigarettes, using techniques to make
them register lower levels of tar and nicotine
on the Cambridge Filter Method than they
actually delivered to consumers-and that
these amounts of tar and nicotine were
greater than the adjective "light," as used in
the company's advertising, indicated. The
plaintiffs argued that the company's
behavior was deceptive and misleading
under Arkansas law.
Philip Morris removed the case from state
court by invoking the Federal Officer
Removal Statute, arguing that it was acting
under a federal officer or agency-the FTC.
The district court agreed, holding that the
plaintiffs attacked the company's use of the
government's cigarette-testing method, and
the Eighth Circuit also found in the
company's favor.
A unanimous Supreme Court disagreed and
reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision. "A
private firm's compliance (or
noncompliance) with federal laws, rules, and
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regulations does not by itself fall within the
scope of the statutory phrase 'acting under'
a federal 'official,"' the Court held. (Watson
v. Philip Morris Cos., 127 S. Ct. 2301
(2007).)
A recent study found that more than 100
cigarette additives enhance or maintain
nicotine delivery, mask smoke odor, mask
illnesses, and could increase cigarettes'
addictiveness. (Michael David Rabinoff et
al., Pharmacological and Chemical Effects
of Cigarette Additives, Am. J. Pub. Health
(July 31, 2007).) Lanham said more
information on how manufacturers
manipulate cigarette design "would make a
strong case even stronger on the merits," but
"the challenge is getting to the merits."
Lanham noted, "In Maine, we are thrilled
for the opportunity to get to the real merits
of the case."
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"Bid to Shift Tobacco Cases to U.S. Courts Denied"
Boston Globe
June 12, 2007
John Donnelly
WASHINGTON-In a major blow to
tobacco companies, the U.S. Supreme Court
yesterday denied tobacco giant Philip
Morris's request to shift all smokers'
lawsuits to federal courts, which generally
give greater leeway to corporations and
smaller damage awards to those claiming
harm from years of exposure to tobacco
smoke.
The decision, in a case involving the alleged
marketing deception of "light" cigarettes, is
expected to affect liability lawsuits against
tobacco companies filed in 20 states,
including Massachusetts. Some state awards
in recent years have been in the billions of
dollars, although many of those judgments
were later overturned on appeal.
The case stemmed from a class-action
lawsuit in Arkansas brought by smokers
Lisa Watson and Loretta Lawson. The suit
alleges that Altria Group, the corporate
owners of Philip Morris USA, violated state
advertising laws by portraying Marlboro
Light and Cambridge Light cigarette brands
as low in tar and nicotine, though tests
showed levels of both were dangerously
high.
Attorneys for Philip Morris argued that,
because the Federal Trade Commission is
responsible for regulating the tobacco
industry, federal courts should have
jurisdiction over the case. The company also
argued that because the U.S. government has
allowed tobacco companies such as Philip
Morris to assume responsibility for tests to
determine tar and nicotine levels in
cigarettes, the federal court should decide
the case.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Circuit agreed, but the Supreme
unanimously reversed that decision.
Eighth
Court
In the opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer
wrote that the high court found no evidence
that the federal government had delegated its
legal authority allowing the tobacco
companies to take over testing for tar and
nicotine from the U.S. government.
Breyer pointed out that Philip Morris and
other tobacco firms are highly regulated,
citing the FTC's rules on "advertising,
specifications for testing, requirements
about reporting results."
"This is a big loss for the industry," said
Edward L. Sweda Jr., senior attorney for the
antismoking Tobacco Products Liability
Project at Northeastern University School of
Law in Boston. "If the appeals court ruling
had been upheld, it would have basically
eliminated state courts as a venue for
lawsuits against the tobacco companies."
Sweda said other industries, such as
pharmaceutical companies and automakers,
could argue that lawsuits against them
should move to federal court because of
their relationship with federal regulators.
William Ohlemeyer, associate general
counsel for Philip Morris, downplayed the
Supreme Court's decision as "narrow" and
insisted it would not affect the case.
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"We have compelling defenses to the
Watson claim that have been advanced in
state courts," Ohlemeyer said in a statement.
Because the high court has allowed the case
to proceed in state court, Sweda said, the
ruling "now makes it easier for the plaintiff
attorneys to bring these light-cigarette
lawsuits against the companies."
Several analysts said the ruling was largely
expected, especially given the questions and
comments from justices during oral
arguments earlier this year.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for instance,
said Philip Morris was serving the
consumer, not the U.S. government. "The
company is doing it so they can stay in
business and market a product, not serve the
U.S. government," she said.
Some of the pending cases in 20 states were
sidetracked until the Supreme Court ruled in
the Watson case.
In Massachusetts, a suit filed by Lori
Aspinall and Thomas Geanacopoulos in
1998 is now before the state Superior Court.
In 2004, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, in a 4-to-3 decision, allowed smokers
to proceed with a class-action suit over the
marketing of light cigarettes.
The lawsuits involving the marketing of
light cigarettes are part of the latest trend of
litigation against tobacco companies.
Starting in the mid-1990s, aided by
damaging internal tobacco company
documents, smokers and states won many
cases against the companies based on
product liability claims.
Thomas Glynn, director of cancer science
and trends at the American Cancer Society
in Washington, said the high court's verdict
yesterday "certainly favors smokers and
nonsmokers alike."
"The main thing is it's going to help the
cases pending in state courts move forward,
which was in some question before."
Glynn said that the percentage of smokers in
the United States has dropped by more than
half over the past two generations, but the
gains have leveled off in recent years. In the
1960s, 43 percent of American adults
smoked. Today, that figure has dropped to
21 percent or 45 million Americans.
Now he is hopeful that several upcoming
legal cases will cause smokers to rethink
their risky habit. "Whenever litigation
occurs, it focuses attention on the issue,
which is vitally important," Glynn said. "It
does cause people to consider their tobacco
use and revisits the whole idea, either for
their health or the health of people around
them."
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Wyeth v. Levine
06-1249
Ruling Below: Levine v. Wyeth, 2006 VT 107, P3 (Vt. 2006).
Levine received treatment for nausea by receiving injections of the drug Phenergan. The drug
was mistakenly injected into an artery in her arm, which resulted in a section of her arm being
amputated. Levine contended, and the lower courts agreed, that the warning label with the drug
was inadequate under state common law. Wyeth's warning label was in compliance with federal
regulations when Levine received the injection. Wyeth contends that they were preempted by
federal law and that by permitting this claim the courts are creating an obstacle to compliance
with federal purposes.
Question Presented: Whether the prescription drug labeling judgments imposed on
manufacturers by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") pursuant to FDA's comprehensive
safety and efficacy authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301
et seq., preempt state law product liability claims premised on the theory that different labeling
judgments were necessary to make drugs reasonably safe for use.
Diana LEVINE,
V.
WYETH.
Supreme Court of Vermont
Decided October 27, 2006
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted.]
JOHNSON, J.
Defendant Wyeth, a drug manufacturer,
appeals from a jury verdict in favor of
plaintiff Diana Levine, who suffered severe
injury and the amputation of her arm as a
result of being injected with defendant's
drug Phenergan. Plaintiff claimed at trial
that defendant was negligent and failed to
provide adequate warnings of the known
dangers of injecting Phenergan directly into
a patient's vein. Defendant argues that the
trial court should not have allowed the jury
to consider plaintiffs claims because the
claims conflict with defendant's obligations
under federal law regulating prescription
drug labels. We hold that there is no conflict
between state and federal law that requires
preemption of plaintiffs claim. Defendant
also raises two claims of error relating to the
jury instructions on damages. We hold that
the court's rulings on these jury instructions
were correct, and we affirm.
In April 2000, plaintiff was injected with
defendant's drug Phenergan at Northeast
Washington County Community Health, Inc.
("the Health Center"). The drug was
administered to treat plaintiffs nausea
resulting from a migraine headache. Plaintiff
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received two injections. The drug was first
administered by intramuscular injection.
Later the same day, when plaintiffs nausea
continued, she received a second dose by a
direct intravenous injection into her arm,
using a procedure known as "IV push." The
second injection resulted in an inadvertent
injection of Phenergan into an artery. As a
result, the artery was severely damaged,
causing gangrene. After several weeks of
deterioration, plaintiffs hand and forearm
were amputated.
Plaintiff brought a superior court action for
negligence and failure-to-warn product
liability, alleging that defendant's
inadequate warning of the known dangers of
direct intravenous injection of Phenergan
caused her injuries. During a five-day jury
trial, both parties presented expert testimony
regarding the adequacy of the warnings
defendant placed on Phenergan's label.
Plaintiffs experts testified that the label
should not have allowed IV push as a means
of administration, as it was safer to use other
available options, such as intramuscular
injection or administration through the
tubing of a hanging IV bag. Defendant's
expert testified that allowing IV push with
instructions cautioning against inadvertent
arterial injection was sufficient. The court
instructed the jurors that they could consider
the FDA's approval of the label in use at the
time of plaintiffs injury, but that the label's
compliance with FDA requirements did not
establish the adequacy of the warning or
prevent defendant from adding to or
strengthening the warning on the label. At
the conclusion of the trial, the jury found in
favor of plaintiff on both the negligence and
product-liability claims and awarded her
$2.4 million in economic damages and $5
million in noneconomic damages. Pursuant
to the parties' stipulation, this award was
reduced to a total of $6,774,000 to account
for pre-judgment interest and plaintiffs
recovery in a settlement of a separate action
she had filed against the Health Center.
In a summary judgment motion prior to trial,
as well as in its timely motion for judgment
as a matter of law following trial, both of
which the superior court denied, defendant
argued that federal law preempted plaintiffs
claim. These arguments rested in part on
defendant's contention that it had submitted
an adequate warning to the FDA, but that
the FDA rejected the change because it did
not favor strengthening the warning.
Plaintiff contended that neither warning
would have been adequate. The trial court
stated, in its decision on defendant's motion
for judgment as a matter of law, that
although the FDA had rejected a new
warning, the agency's "brief comment"
failed to explain its reasoning or
demonstrate that it "gave more than passing
attention to the issue of whether to use an IV
infusion to administer the drug. The
proposed labeling change did not address the
use of a free-flowing IV bag." The court
concluded that there was "no basis for
federal preemption" and upheld the jury's
verdict.
Defendant claims the superior court erred
by: (1) failing to dismiss plaintiffs claim on
the basis that the Food and Drug
Administration's approval of the Phenergan
label preempted state common law claims
that the label was inadequate; (2) failing to
instruct the jury to reduce plaintiffs
damages by the amount of fault attributable
to the Health Center; and (3) failing to
instruct the jury to calculate the present
value of plaintiffs damages for future
noneconomic losses. We reject these claims
of error, and we affirm.
I. Federal Preemption
Defendant's principal argument on appeal is
that the court should have dismissed
plaintiff s claim because it was preempted
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by federal law. Defendant asserts that any
state common law duty to provide a stronger
warning about the dangers of administering
Phenergan by IV push conflicts with the
FDA's approval of the drug's label. As
preemption is a question of law, we review
the trial court's decision de novo. We hold
that the jury's verdict against defendant did
not conflict with the FDA's labeling
requirements for Phenergan because
defendant could have warned against IV-
push administration without prior FDA
approval, and because federal labeling
requirements create a floor, not a ceiling, for
state regulation.
The United States Constitution provides that
federal law is the supreme law of the land.
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy
Clause is the basis for the doctrine of
preemption, according to which "state law
that conflicts with federal law is 'without
effect."' Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). In Cipollone, the
Court described the relevant analysis for
determining whether Congress intended a
federal statute to preempt state law:
Congress' intent may be explicitly
stated in the statute's language or
implicitly contained in its structure
and purpose. In the absence of an
express congressional command,
state law is pre-empted if that law
actually conflicts with federal law,
or if federal law so thoroughly
occupies a legislative field as to
make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Absent clear congressional intent to
supersede state law, including state common
law duties, there is a presumption against
preemption. This presumption has "add[ed]
force" when there has been a "long history
of tort litigation" in the area of
common law at issue. Bates v.
Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431,
(2005).
state
Dow
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Defendant concedes that Congress has not
expressly preempted state tort actions
through the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act
(FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399, and that
Congress did not intend the FDCA to
occupy the entire field of prescription drug
regulation. Rather, it asserts that plaintiffs
action "actually conflicts with federal law."
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. This requires
defendant to show either that "it is
impossible for a private party to comply
with both state and federal requirements," or
that Vermont's common law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress." Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,
514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995).
Defendant presents two alternative bases for
its assertion of conflict preemption: (1) in
the specific context of the Phenergan label,
the FDA was aware of the dangers of IV-
push administration and specifically ordered
defendant to use the warning it used, making
it impossible for defendant to comply with
both its state common-law duty and the
requirements of federal law; and (2) by
penalizing drug companies for using FDA-
approved wording on drug labels, state tort
claims like plaintiffs present an obstacle to
the purpose of the FDA's labeling
regulations. Before reaching these issues, we
briefly examine the FDA's role in regulating
prescription drug labels and the general
approach courts have taken to the
preemptive effect of federal labeling
requirements.
A. Regulatory Background
Prior to distributing a prescription drug such
as Phenergan, the manufacturer must submit
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a New Drug Application (NDA) for FDA
approval. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). The FDA
must approve the application unless it fails
to meet certain criteria, including whether
test results and other information establish
that the drug is "safe for use under the
conditions prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the proposed labeling thereof,"
whether there is "substantial evidence that
the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of
use prescribed, recommended, or suggested
in the proposed labeling thereof," and
whether, "based on a fair evaluation of all
material facts, such labeling is false or
misleading in any particular." Id. § 355(d).
"FDA regulations mandate the general
format and content of all sections of labels
for all prescription drugs as well as the risk
information each section must contain," and
"[flinal approval of the NDA is 'conditioned
upon the applicant incorporating the
specified labeling changes exactly as
directed, and upon the applicant submitting
to FDA a copy of the final printed label
prior to marketing."' McNellis v. Pfizer,
Inc., 2005 WL 3752269, at *4 (D.N.J.).
Once a drug and its label have been
approved, any changes to the label
ordinarily require submission and FDA
approval of a "Supplemental NDA." Id.; 21
C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(v)(A).
If the NDA process and the submission of
changes for FDA approval were the
exclusive means of creating and altering
prescription drug labels, this might be a very
different case. A key FDA regulation,
however, allows a drug's manufacturer to
alter the drug's label without prior FDA
approval when necessary. The regulation
provides in relevant part:
The agency may designate a
category of changes for the
purpose of providing that, in the
case of a change in such category,
the holder of an approved
application may commence
distribution of the drug product
involved upon receipt by the
agency of a supplement for the
change. These changes include, but
are not limited to:
(iii) Changes in the labeling .. . to
accomplish any of the following:
(A) To add or strengthen a
contraindication, warning,
precaution, or adverse reaction;
(B) To add or strengthen an
instruction about dosage and
administration that is intended to
increase the safe use of the drug
product[.]
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c).
Section 314.70(c) creates a specific
procedure allowing drug manufacturers to
change labels that are insufficient to protect
consumers, despite their approval by the
FDA. "The FDA's approved label . . . can
therefore be said to set the minimum
labeling requirement, and not necessarily the
ultimate label where a manufacturer
improves the label to promote greater
safety." McNellis, 2005 WL 3752269, at *5.
While specific federal labeling requirements
and state common-law duties might
otherwise leave drug manufacturers with
conflicting obligations, § 314.70(c) allows
manufacturers to avoid state failure-to-warn
claims without violating federal law. Id.
("[I]t is apparent that prior FDA approval
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need not be obtained, nor will a product be
deemed mislabeled, if the manufacturer
voluntarily or even unilaterally strengthens
the approved warnings, precautions or
potential adverse reactions upon the label
pursuant to 21 C.F.R. §
314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A)."). There is thus no
conflict between federal labeling
requirements and state failure-to-warn
claims. Section 314.70(c) allows, and
arguably encourages, manufacturers to add
and strengthen warnings that, despite FDA
approval, are insufficient to protect
consumers. State tort claims simply give
these manufacturers a concrete incentive to
take this action as quickly as possible.
B. Conflict Preemption in Other
Jurisdictions
In light of the leeway created by § 314.70(c)
for drug manufacturers to add warnings,
courts have been nearly unanimous in
holding that state failure-to-warn tort claims
do not conflict with federal law. See, e.g.,
McNellis, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37505,
2005 WL 3752269, at *7 ("[T]he FDCA and
the FDA's regulations do not conflict with
New Jersey's failure to warn law because
those federal regulations merely set
minimum standards with which
manufacturers must comply."). See also
Cartwright v. Pfizer, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d
876, 882 (E.D. Tex. 2005) ("With little
exception, courts that have considered this
exact issue have concluded that state failure
to warn claims are not preempted by the
FDCA and its attendant regulations.").
* * *
... Section 314.70(c) does not allow us to
interpret FDA approval of a drug label as
anything but a first step in the process of
warning consumers. When further warnings
become necessary, the manufacturer is at
least partially responsible for taking
additional action, and if it fails to do so, it
cannot rely on the FDA's continued
approval of its labels as a shield against state
tort liability. While a state common-law
duty may encourage departure from a label
that the FDA has approved in great detail,
such a duty does not create a conflict with
federal requirements because the FDA and
the state share the purpose of encouraging
pharmaceutical companies to alter their drug
labels when they are inadequate to protect
consumers. We agree with the significant
majority of courts that state failure-to-warn
claims are generally not preempted by
federal labeling requirements.
We must now apply this reasoning to
defendant's two original contentions:
(1) notwithstanding the fact that it is
generally possible for manufacturers to
comply with both federal and state law
through the procedures created by
§ 314.70(c), the FDA's specific actions with
respect to Phenergan made it impossible for
defendant to comply with both federal and
state law; and (2) even if plaintiffs claim
and the cases cited above do not make it
impossible for manufacturers to comply
with both state and federal law, they present
an obstacle to federal objectives.
C. Impossibility of Compliance
Defendant contends that in this case it was
impossible to comply with both state and
federal law because the FDA prohibited the
use of a stronger warning with respect to IV-
push administration of Phenergan. This
claim is not supported by the evidence
defendant presented to the trial court. The
record lacks any evidence that the FDA was
concerned that a stronger warning was not
supported by the facts, that such a stronger
warning would distract doctors from other
provisions in the drug's label, or that the
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warning might lead to less effective
administration of the drug. Instead,
defendant essentially relies on two factual
assertions: (1) the FDA approved the label
that was in use in 2000; and (2) the FDA, in
reviewing the label for use in a different
version of Phenergan, expressed its opinion
of the adequacy of the warning in the
original label by stating, "Retain verbiage in
current label."
With respect to defendant's first assertion,
our analysis above demonstrates that FDA
approval of a particular label does not
preempt a jury finding that the label
provided insufficient warning, as defendant
was free under § 314.70(c) to strengthen the
warning without prior FDA approval.
Defendant's second assertion depends on the
meaning of the instruction, "[r]etain
verbiage in current label." Tort liability for
defendant's failure to strengthen its warning
could have created a direct conflict requiring
federal preemption only if the FDA intended
the instruction to prohibit any language
strengthening the original warning. In other
words, unless we interpret the FDA's
statement as evidence that it would have
rejected any attempt by defendant to
strengthen its label through § 314.70(c), we
cannot conclude that it was impossible for
defendant to comply with its state common-
law duty without violating federal law.
Defendant argues that the instruction
reflected the FDA's opinion not only that a
stronger warning was unnecessary, but also
that it would have harmed patients by
eliminating IV push as an option for
administering Phenergan. The record does
not support this interpretation.... The FDA
could have rejected the new warning for any
number of reasons, including clarity or
technical accuracy, without implicitly
prohibiting a stronger warning. Defendant's
unsupported hypothesis that the FDA saw
the new warning as harmful seems among
the least likely explanations, as the rejected
proposal would not have eliminated IV
push as an option for administering
Phenergan.... There is no evidence that the
FDA intended to prohibit defendant from
strengthening the Phenergan label pursuant
to § 314.70(c). Thus, we cannot conclude
that it was impossible for defendant to
comply with its obligations under both state
and federal law.
D. Obstacle to Congressional Purposes
and Objectives
Defendant next contends that state common-
law liability for its use of an FDA-approved
label presents an obstacle to federal
objectives. We hold that plaintiffs claim
does not interfere with any objective that
can legitimately be ascribed to Congress.
We agree with the reasoning in the cases
cited above, that federal labeling
requirements pursuant to the FDCA create a
floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation.
Defendant presents a new FDA rule
containing language disputing this
reasoning, but this statement does not alter
our conclusion that there is no conflict
between federal objectives and Vermont
common law.
1. The Purposes and Objectives of Congress
In the absence of a conflict that makes it
impossible for a regulated entity to comply
with both state and federal law, federal law
will preempt state law only if it "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress." Freightliner, 514 U.S. at 287,
115 S.Ct. 1483 (quotations omitted). We
must therefore examine what "the full
purposes and objectives of Congress" were
with respect to federal labeling requirements
for prescription drugs. We agree with the
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McNellis court that a system under which
"federal regulations merely set minimum
standards with which manufacturers must
comply" is
fully consistent with Congress'
primary goal in enacting the
FDCA, which is "to protect
consumers from dangerous
products," United States v.
Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696, 68
S.Ct. 331, 92 L.Ed. 297 (1948), as
well as Congress' stated intent that
the FDCA "'must not weaken the
existing laws,' but on the contrary
'it must strengthen and extend that
law's protection of the consumer."'
United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277 [282, 88 L.Ed. 48]
(1943).
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37505, 2005 WL
3752269, at *7; see also Witczak, 377 F.
Supp. 2d at 731 ("Congress certainly did not
intend to bar drug companies from
protecting the public. In the 1962
amendments to the FDCA, Congress
included a clause expressly limiting the
preemptive effect of the statute: "Nothing in
the amendments made by this Act to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall
be construed as invalidating any provision of
State law . . . unless there is a direct and
positive conflict between such amendments
and such provision of State law." Drug
Amendments of 1962 (Harris-Kefauver
Act), Pub.L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat.
780, 793 (1962).
This amendment essentially removes from
our consideration the question of whether
common-law tort claims present an obstacle
to the purposes and objectives of Congress.
Congress intended that the FDCA would
leave state law in place except where it
created a "direct and positive conflict"
between state and federal law. Drug
Amendments § 202. This language "simply
restates the principle that state law is
superseded in cases of an actual conflict
with federal law such that 'compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility."' See S. Blasting
Servs., Inc. v. Wilkes County, 288 F.3d 584,
591 (4th Cir.2002). In other words, under
any circumstances where it is possible to
comply with both state law and the FDCA,
the state law in question is consistent with
the purposes and objectives of Congress.
Thus, our discussion above regarding
defendant's impossibility argument, supra,
TT 21-23, provides a complete answer to the
question of preemption.
2. The FDA's New Statement on Preemption
Defendant, after oral argument in this case,
cited a new FDA regulation that contains a
statement relating to the preemptive effect of
the FDCA. The substance of the regulation
changes certain aspects of labeling
requirements for prescription drugs, but
these changes are irrelevant to this appeal
because the new rule did not take effect until
June 2006. Food and Drug Administration,
Requirements on Content and Format of
Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, Supplementary
Information, 71 Fed.Reg. 3922, 3922 (Jan.
24, 2006). The rule's "Supplementary
Information" section, however, contains a
broad statement regarding the preemption of
state common-law failure-to-warn claims.
In this statement, the FDA asserts that recent
cases rejecting preemption of these claims,
including those cited above, pose an
obstacle to the agency's enforcement of the
labeling requirements. Among the
interpretations the agency claims are
incorrect are: (1) those rejecting preemption
on the basis of § 314.70(c); and (2) those
stating that federal labeling requirements are
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minimum standards and that "[s]tate law
serves as an appropriate source of
supplementary safety regulation for drugs by
encouraging or requiring manufacturers to
disseminate risk information beyond that
required by FDA under the act."
We are ordinarily required to defer to an
agency's interpretation of a statute it
administers. Plaintiff, however, urges us not
to defer to the FDA's statement. . . . We
need not decide this difficult question of
administrative law, however, because we
conclude that irrespective of the level of
deference we might apply, the statement
would not affect the outcome of this appeal.
Under Chevron, deference to an agency's
interpretation is appropriate only when a
statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue" the agency has
considered; otherwise, "the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress." 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct.
2778. Moreover, "[tihe judiciary is the final
authority on issues of statutory construction
and must reject administrative constructions
which are contrary to clear congressional
intent." Id. "If a court, employing traditional
tools of statutory construction, ascertains
that Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue, that intention is the law
and must be given effect." Id. When an
agency's interpretation is not the type of
interpretation entitled to Chevron deference,
we must still grant it some respect, but only
''a respect proportional to its 'power to
persuade."' Mead, 533 U.S. at 235, 121
S.Ct. 2164.
. . . Nothing in the FDA's new statement
alters our conclusion that it would be
possible for defendant to comply with both
its federal obligations and the obligations of
state common law. The regulatory
framework for prescription drug labeling
allows drug manufacturers to add or
strengthen a warning "to increase the safe
use of the drug product" without prior FDA
approval. Even if the new rule eliminated or
altered this provision, the change in the
regulation did not take effect until June
2006. Without such a change, it is possible
for manufacturers to comply with both FDA
regulations and duties imposed by state
common law, and there is no "direct and
positive conflict" between state and federal
law.
Here, we are not attempting to infer the
effect of statutory language that only
indirectly addresses the specific state law at
issue. Instead, we are interpreting an
unambiguous express preemption clause that
specifically preserves the type of state law at
issue. Under these circumstances, ordinary
preemption principles must give way to
Congress's intent to preserve state laws that
do not create a "direct and positive conflict"
with federal law. Drug Amendments § 202.
There is no such conflict here. Accordingly,
the FDA's statement is neither an
authoritative interpretation of an ambiguous
statutory provision entitled to deference,
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct.
2778, nor a persuasive policy statement
entitled to respect. Mead, 533 U.S. at 235,
121 S.Ct. 2164. Plaintiffs claim does not
impose conflicting obligations on defendant
or present an obstacle to the objectives of
Congress. We therefore agree with the trial
court that the claim is not preempted by
federal law.
AFFIRMED.
REIBER, C.J., dissenting.
The overarching issue in this appeal is
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whether plaintiffs common-law claim for
failure to warn conflicts with the FDA's
regulation of Phenergan, the drug
responsible for plaintiffs injuries. I would
conclude that the jury's verdict in this case
conflicts with federal law for two reasons.
First, it would be impossible for defendant
Wyeth to comply with the requirements of
both state and federal law. Specifically, the
FDA approved IV administration of
Phenergan and required that IV
administration be listed on the Phenergan
label. By contrast, plaintiffs theory of the
case required Wyeth either to remove this
approved use from the Phenergan label, add
a warning that would directly contradict the
label's indication that IV administration was
a safe and effective use, or, at a minimum,
add a warning that only certain types of IV
administration should be used. Thus,
compliance with state law in this case would
require Wyeth to eliminate uses of
Phenergan approved by the FDA and
required to be included in the Phenergan
labeling.
Second, plaintiffs state-law claim conflicts
with federal law in that it poses an obstacle
to federal purposes and objectives. In short,
by approving Phenergan for marketing and
distribution, the FDA concluded that the
drug-with its approved methods of
administration and as labeled-was both
safe and effective.
For both of these reasons I would conclude
that the state-law cause of action is
preempted. I respectfully dissent.
I. Impossibility of Compliance
As explained by the majority, because there
is no clause in the FDCA expressly
preempting state law, Wyeth must
demonstrate that preemption is implied by
showing either that federal law thoroughly
occupies the regulatory field (a claim that
Wyeth does not advance) or that there is an
actual conflict between state and federal
law. Actual conflict, in turn, can be
demonstrated in one of two ways: by
showing that it is impossible for the
regulated party to comply with both state
and federal law or that state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress." Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,
514 U.S. 280, 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131
L.Ed.2d 385 (1995).
The majority in essence concludes that it is
not impossible for Wyeth to comply with
both federal and state standards because
Wyeth never sought FDA approval of a
"stronger warning" of the type advocated by
plaintiff. According to the majority, because
the FDA was not presented with, and
therefore did not explicitly reject, such
strengthened language, there is no reason to
presume that the FDA would disapprove.
Therefore, the majority reasons, there is no
actual conflict between state and federal
law. It is inaccurate, however, to
characterize the requirements imposed by
the jury verdict in this case as merely
requiring a "stronger warning." Rather, what
plaintiff sought was an elimination of a use
of Phenergan that had been approved by the
FDA. Furthermore, the FDA's rejection of
Wyeth's efforts to alter the language of the
warning in 2000 supports Wyeth's claim
that the FDA had an affirmative preference
for the language of the original warning.
A.
The crux of plaintiffs claim was not based
on the label warnings per se, but on the
approved uses listed there. See, e.g., ante,
T 3 ("Plaintiffs experts testified that the
label should not have allowed IV push as a
means of administration. . . ."). A review of
plaintiffs complaint and the evidence
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presented at trial makes clear that the
standard plaintiff sought to establish (i.e.,
the change to the label that would be
required in light of the jury's finding of
liability) was to remove IV administration-
or at least certain types-as an approved
use. . . . In her appellate brief, plaintiff
characterizes the evidence as revealing "that
Wyeth was aware of research indicating that
direct IV administration of Phenergan was
unsafe." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff further
refers to expert testimony "that the label
should have restricted Phenergan to
intramuscular injection as this method of
administration presents no risk of
inadvertent arterial injection; or,
alternatively, that if IV administration is
used, it must be by injecting the Phenergan
into a hanging IV bag, not through a direct
IV." (Emphasis added.)
Here, the FDA clearly addressed the risks
attending IV administration of the drug. The
label approved IV administration generally,
and specifically warned of the dangers of
direct IV administration, including
inadvertent arterial injection possibly
resulting in amputation. In light of this, it
cannot be argued that the FDA did not
(1) assess the risk of IV administration,
including direct IV administration and the
associated risk of amputation due to
inadvertent arterial injection; (2) conclude
that the benefits of allowing IV
administration with appropriate warnings
outweighed the risk; and (3) reach a decision
regarding precisely what warning language
should be used. These assessments are, in
fact, the very essence of the FDA's approval
and are in furtherance of the federal
objective of advancing public health by
balancing the risks and benefits of new
drugs and facilitating their optimal use.
The majority reconciles this manifest
conflict by relying on 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c),
which allows a drug manufacturer to alter a
label "[t]o add or strengthen a
contraindication, warning, precaution, or
adverse reaction" or "add or strengthen an
instruction about dosage and administration"
prior to FDA approval. On this basis, the
majority concludes that Wyeth "was free
under § 314.70(c) to strengthen the warning
without prior FDA approval." Ante, T 22.
But, it is an overstatement to claim that
manufacturers are "free" to change drug
labels under § 314.70(c). To the contrary, a
manufacturer may change a label only to
add or strengthen a warning, not to eliminate
an approved use, as plaintiff would require
here. In other words, what plaintiff
advocates is not a stronger warning but
language that would directly contradict
language approved and mandated by the
FDA.
Further, the apparent purpose of § 314.70(c)
is to allow manufacturers to address newly
discovered risks. Even courts that conclude
that § 314.70(c) provides manufacturers
broad latitude to add warnings to labels
acknowledge that such supplements are
aimed at previously unknown and
unanalyzed risks. Another section of the
regulation makes clear that any changes to a
label that exceed the scope of § 314.70(c)
are considered "major changes" that require
prior approval before the drug may be
distributed. § 314.70(b), (b)(2)(v). In short,
the regulation does not allow manufacturers
to simply reassess and draw different
conclusions regarding the same risks and
benefits already balanced by the FDA. Here,
the FDA had already evaluated the risk of
inadvertent arterial injection from direct IV
administration of Phenergan, and had
mandated warning language for the label to
reflect that risk assessment.
In addition, any change accomplished under
§ 314.70(c) is subject to ultimate FDA
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review and approval. Thus, any additional
or different warnings must ultimately be
supported by scientific research that meets
the FDA's standards. Neither a
manufacturer, a state court, nor a state
legislature can permanently substitute its
judgment of the risk-benefit analysis for that
of the FDA.
B.
Wyeth argues that even if § 314.70(c)
theoretically allows a manufacturer to make
unilateral changes to a drug label, in this
case, the FDA actually rejected Wyeth's
attempts in 2000 to change the warning
regarding intra-arterial injection and
amputation. The trial court concluded that
the FDA gave only "passing attention" to
the risks of IV administration in 2000. The
majority similarly concludes that the record
does not indicate "that the FDA wished to
preserve the use of IV push as a method of
administering Phenergan." Ante, T 23. I
cannot agree with this assessment of the
record.
Both the original label and Wyeth's
proposed alternative were titled.
"INADVERTENT INTRA-ARTERIAL
INJECTION." On the original label, the first
two sentences of the warning read:
Due to the close proximity of
arteries and veins in the areas most
commonly used for intravenous
injection, extreme care should be
exercised to avoid perivascular
extravasation or inadvertent intra-
arterial injection. Reports
compatible with inadvertent intra-
arterial injection of [Phenergan],
usually in conjunction with other
drugs intended for intravenous use,
suggest that pain, severe chemical
irritation, severe spasm of distal
vessels, and resultant gangrene
requiring amputation are likely
under such circumstances.
On the proposed label, the first sentence of
the warning read: "There are reports of
necrosis leading to gangrene, requiring
amputation, following injection of
[Phenergan], usually in conjunction with
other drugs; the intravenous route was
intended in these cases, but arterial or partial
arterial placement of the needle is now
suspect." While the proposed change to the
warning language may not reflect what
plaintiff would require in a warning, it
cannot be disputed that Wyeth's proposed
alternative warning (1) placed greater
emphasis on the risk of necrosis and
amputation by referencing it in the first
sentence, and (2) gave the FDA the
opportunity to consider the specific,
alternative warning advanced by Wyeth, as
well as the adequacy of the warning in
general. Despite this opportunity, the FDA
mandated that Wyeth retain the language of
the existing warning. The alleged extent of
the FDA's consideration of the issue is not
relevant, in my view.
In 2000, the FDA confirmed its assessment
that health care professionals should be
permitted to choose IV administration in its
various forms as a means of delivering the
drug, where appropriate. Wyeth could not
both list all forms of IV administration as an
approved use, as required by the FDA, and
exclude all or some forms of IV
administration as unsafe, as required by the
jury's verdict in this case. It would be
impossible to comply with both
requirements.
II. Obstacle to Federal Purposes and
Objectives
I would further conclude that Wyeth has
demonstrated actual conflict preemption by
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showing that plaintiffs state-law failure-to-
warn claim poses an obstacle to federal
purposes and objectives. The majority does
not address this issue, concluding that
Wyeth does not have the option of proving
this form of actual conflict preemption. The
majority reaches this conclusion by relying
on the following clause in the 1962
amendments to the FDCA:
Nothing in the Amendments made
by this Act to the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be
construed as invalidating any
provision of State law . . . unless
there is a direct and positive
conflict between such amendments
and such provision of State law.
Ante, T 26 (quoting Drug Amendments of
1962 (Harris-Kefauver Act), Pub.L. No. 87-
781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962))....
[T]he majority concludes that the provision
''essentially removes from our consideration
the question of whether common-law tort
claims present an obstacle to the purposes
and objectives of Congress," because the
1962 provision "simply restates the principle
that state law is superseded in cases of actual
conflict with federal law such that
compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility."
Ante, 27. "In other words," the majority
explains, "under any circumstances where it
is possible to comply with both state law and
the FDCA, the state law in question is
consistent with the purposes and objectives
of Congress." Id. Thus, the majority
eliminates the possibility of proving actual
conflict preemption independently through
the "obstacle" prong of that standard.
But neither the passage in Southern Blasting
on which the majority relies nor the United
States Supreme Court decision cited as
authority in that passage provide an
explanation or even an affirmative statement
that the phrase "direct and positive conflict"
in the 1962 amendment eliminates the
"obstacle" prong of the actual conflict
preemption standard. Thus, the majority
eliminates one of the two means by which
Wyeth may show actual conflict based on a
single, unclearly reasoned Fourth Circuit
decision that is itself lacking in case law
support. There is no basis for eliminating
this prong of the actual conflict standard,
and I disagree with the majority's
conclusion to the contrary.
Assuming, then, that Wyeth may
demonstrate actual conflict preemption by
showing that state law is an obstacle to
federal regulatory purposes and objectives, I
believe the facts here support the conclusion
that the state tort-law verdict in this case is
preempted. The
Court's decision
Honda Motor Co.,
1913, 146 L.Ed.2d
on the question of
obstacle to federal
In that case,
United States Supreme
in Geier v. American
529 U.S. 861, 120 S.Ct.
914 (2000), is controlling
when state law poses an
purposes and objectives.
the Department of
Transportation had issued a safety standard
that required automobile manufacturers "to
equip some but not all of their 1987 vehicles
with passive restraints." Id. . . . The
Supreme Court held that a lawsuit premising
negligence on the failure to install an air bag
conflicted with the objectives of the federal
safety standard and was therefore
preempted.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted
that the plaintiff and the dissenting
opinion-like the majority in the instant
case-viewed the federal regulation as
setting a minimum safety standard that states
were free to supplement or strengthen. Id.
However, by examining the comments
accompanying the regulation, the Court
concluded that a safety standard allowing a
choice of passive restraint systems while not
mandating any particular system was a
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deliberate decision that reflected a balance
of diverse policy concerns.
Application of the Supreme Court precedent
in Geier dictates the same result in this case.
As with the DOT in Geier, the FDA is
primarily concerned with public safety. The
conclusion of what is best for public safety
is arrived at by considering various policy
factors that are sometimes in tension with
one another. . . . In the specific context of
warnings on drug labels, the FDA considers
not only what information to include, but
also what to exclude. As the Eighth Circuit
has noted in the medical device context,
"[t]here are . . . a number of sound reasons
why the FDA may prefer to limit warnings
on product labels." See Brooks v.
Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785, 796 (8th
Cir.2001).
No drug is without risks. The FDA balances
the risks of a drug against its benefits to
maximize the availability of beneficial
treatments. The FDA's decision in
approving a drug, its uses and labeling
reflect consideration of these and other
policy factors. While a state-court jury
presumably shares the FDA's concern that
drugs on the market be reasonably safe, the
jury does not assess reasonableness in the
context of public health and the associated
risk-benefit analysis. A jury does not engage
in a measured and multi-faceted policy
analysis. Rather, a jury views the safety of
the drug through the lens of a single patient
who has already been catastrophically
injured. Such an approach is virtually
guaranteed to provide different conclusions
in different courts about what is "reasonably
safe" than the balancing approach taken by
the FDA. In fact, different conclusions were
reached in this case.
The jury in this case was instructed that "[a]
prescription drug is unreasonably dangerous
due to inadequate warnings or instructions if
reasonable instructions regarding
foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to
the physician and other medical
professionals who are in a position to reduce
the risks of harm." Faced with plaintiffs
tragic injuries, the jury concluded that
allowing Phenergan to be delivered through
IV administration was "unreasonably
dangerous." The jury's verdict conflicts
squarely with the FDA's assessment of
precisely the same issue: whether Phenergan
is safe and effective when delivered through
IV administration. The claim is preempted.
For the above reasons, I dissent.
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"Justices to Hear Cases on Products Liability"
New York Times
January 19, 2008
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court's
already substantial investment in defining
the boundary between federal regulation and
state tort law grew even bigger on Friday.
The justices added two new cases to their
docket on drug and cigarette labeling
requirements.
In each case, as in four others the court has
already agreed to decide in the current term,
the question is one of federal pre-emption.
The cases offer variations of a common
question: if a product meets federal
standards, can the manufacturer be liable for
damages under state law for injuries suffered
by consumers? ...
In the drug labeling case, the plaintiff was a
guitar player who suffered the career-ending
amputation of her right arm after being
injected in a hospital with an anti-nausea
drug made by Wyeth.
Gangrene and subsequent amputation was a
risk from intravenous administration of the
drug, Phenergan.
The plaintiff, Diana Levine, argues that the
federally approved label did not give doctors
a specific enough warning about the risks of
the method used to give her the drug.
The state courts in Vermont allowed Ms.
Levine to sue for damages under state law
and upheld a jury verdict of more than $6
million. The manufacturer's Supreme Court
appeal, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249,
argues that the lawsuit was pre-empted by
the Food and Drug Administration's
approval of the label.
The Bush administration, which reversed a
longstanding policy against pre-emption in
drug cases, is supporting the appeal. In a
brief filed this month in response to the
Supreme Court's request for its views, the
administration said the agency's approval of
the Phenergan label "reflects F.D.A.'s expert
judgment that the labeling strikes the
appropriate balance." The brief added:
"Where, as here, F.D.A. was presented with
information concerning the relevant risk, a
jury's imposition of liability based on a
drug's F.D.A.-approved labeling would
interfere with F.D.A.'s expert judgment."
Nonetheless, the court's decision to grant
Wyeth's appeal at this point was surprising.
The administration urged the justices to
defer action until they decide, later this term,
another medicine-related pre-emption case
that was argued last month.
That case, Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., No. 06-
179, presents a question under a separate
statute, the Medical Device Amendments,
which governs the F.D.A.'s premarket
approval process for devices like the balloon
catheter at issue in the case. There is
considerable overlap between that process
and the one for approving new drugs under
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which is
at issue in the new case....
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"Court Considers Protecting Drug
Makers from Lawsuits"
New York Times
February 26, 2008
Gardier Harris
Less than a week after issuing a sweeping
ruling that bars most lawsuits against
medical device makers, the Supreme Court
heard arguments Monday in the first of two
cases that could determine whether drug
makers receive similar protection.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer said the
fundamental question in the cases was who
should make the decisions that will
determine whether a drug is "on balance,
going to save people or, on balance, going to
hurt people?"
"An expert agency on the one hand or 12
people pulled randomly for a jury role who
see before them only the people whom the
drug hurt and don't see those who need the
drug to cure them?" Justice Breyer asked.
Normally a member of the court's liberal
wing, Justice Breyer came down squarely on
the industry's side when he answered his
own question, saying Congress left the role
of policing the medicine market exclusively
to the Food and Drug Administration.
"What worries me is, what happens if the
jury is wrong?" he said.
If the justice's view prevails, most lawsuits
against drug makers, thousands of which
have been filed in recent years and settled in
some cases for billions of dollars, would be
barred. But the Supreme Court is likely to
wait until next year to answer Justice
Breyer's question completely.
That is because the question before the court
Monday in Warner-Lambert v. Kent was in
part restricted to the effects of a Michigan
statute that bars personal injury suits against
drug makers unless injured patients can
show that the company deliberately withheld
information from the F.D.A. that would
have led the government to block the
medicine from being sold.
The case was brought by 27 Michigan
plaintiffs who claim they were injured as a
result of taking a Warner-Lambert diabetes
pill, Rezulin, which has since been
withdrawn from the market. The plaintiffs
claim the company withheld from the
F.D.A. evidence of Rezulin's dangers to the
liver that would have led the agency to deny
an approval.
But in a 2001 case involving the Buckman
Company, the Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs cannot sue based upon claims that
a manufacturer defrauded the F.D.A.
Many of the arguments Monday concerned
whether the court should strike down all of
the Michigan statute or just the part allowing
an exception for claims of fraud.
In October, the court will hear arguments in
Levine v. Wyeth, a pharmaceutical case with
no such state complications. In the Levine
case, the court is being asked to decide
whether F.D.A. approval bars personal
injury lawsuits-the same question it
decided in device makers' favor last week.
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Before the Bush administration, the F.D.A.
argued that lawsuits provided patients with
additional protection.
Now, the administration says the lawsuits
largely conflict with the agency's ability to
do its job, and several of the justices seemed
to agree.
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. asked the lawyer
for the Michigan patients to explain why
their lawsuit should go forward given that it
might "very seriously interfere with what the
F.D.A. is doing?"
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy asked whether
the patients intended to argue whether
Rezulin "should not have been on the
market?"
Even Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the lone
dissenter in the case decided last week that
gave medical device makers broad
protection against lawsuits, asked whether
certain claims in the suit against Warner-
Lambert, now Pfizer, "are the kind of thing
that the F.D.A. would want to police itself
and not have state courts look into?"
Allison M. Zieve, the lawyer for the
plaintiffs, pointed out that lawsuits against
drug makers are still allowed in every state,
pending the court's decision next year.
Carter G. Phillips, who represented Pfizer,
said the Buckman case and the Michigan
statutes allowed lawsuits to be filed against
drug makers in Michigan only if the F.D.A.
itself concluded that a company had
committed fraud. Such a determination by
the F.D.A. is exceptionally rare.
The government argues that the F.D.A.
competently oversees the drug and device
markets, and should not be second-guessed
by courts. But the Institute of Medicine, the
Government Accountability Office and the
F.D.A.'s own science board have all issued
reports saying poor management and
scientific inadequacies make the agency
incapable of protecting the country against
unsafe drugs, medical devices and food.
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"Patients' Ability to Sue at Risk"
Los Angeles Times
March 03, 2008
Daniel Costello
Years of high-profile court battles over
drugs such as Vioxx and Celebrex, along
with billion-dollar settlements and jury
verdicts, could soon be a thing of the past.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision,
ruled last month [in Riegel v. Medtronic
Inc.] that patients injured by most medical
devices can't sue their manufacturers. And
this fall, a similar case could extend the
same legal protection to the much larger
pharmaceutical industry-a frequent target
of lawsuits.
In last month's case, the high court backed a
legal theory, supported by the Bush
administration, that maintains that the Food
and Drug Administration adequately
regulates the drug and device industries and
should not be second-guessed by courts.
Critics say such an argument would make
more practical sense if the FDA were doing
a better job.
The high-profile cases come as the federal
agency faces growing challenges and some
of its most withering criticism in years,
some from within its own walls. ...
A trio of recent reports, including one by the
FDA's own advisory committee, has raised
serious questions about the agency's recent
performance.
Last fall a yearlong study by the FDA's
advisory committee found "the agency is so
underfunded and understaffed that it's
putting U.S. consumers at risk in terms of
food and drug safety."
In an unusual public departure from the
view of the Bush administration, the current
FDA commissioner, Andrew C. von
Eschenbach, said in an interview last week
that the agency needed a systemic overhaul
that could take years.
In last month's Supreme Court case, the
widow of a New York man who died after a
balloon catheter burst in his chest during
surgery sued the manufacturer, Medtronic
Inc., saying the catheter was defective.
Because federal law makes few provisions
for suits against drug and device makers,
injured patients have turned to state law and
won substantial awards.
In 2004, the Bush administration reversed a
long-standing federal policy, contending that
if the FDA approves a medical product, that
should protect manufacturers from damages
under state law.
Supporters of that stance say it is overdue.
Drug and medical-device manufacturers
have contended for years that the legal
environment around their products has
grown too restrictive and is stymieing
innovation.
"You have to balance the costs that so many
lawsuits place on" the system, said Glenn
Lammi, chief counsel for the Washington
Legal Foundation. The foundation, a group
that seeks restrictions on lawsuits, submitted
an amicus brief on behalf of the device
manufacturer in last month's case.
Dane Titsworth of Bakersfield sees things
200
differently. After nearly a decade of
worsening back pain, the former building
manager had disks in his lower back
replaced two years ago with new-generation
artificial disks.
But after the surgery, he said, his pain was
worse than before, immobilizing him to the
point that he could no longer garden or play
catch with his children. He has since left his
job.
Titsworth and several dozen patients with
similar stories have sued the disk's maker,
DePuy Spine Inc., a Raynham, Mass.-based
subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson.
"This sounds to me like just another way big
business can line their pockets," Titsworth
said. "I was a guinea pig for this company. I
should be compensated for that." He expects
his case to be heard later this year.
In October, the court will hear arguments in
another case, Levine vs. Wyeth, in which it
might decide whether FDA approval bars
personal-injury lawsuits involving drug
companies.
The mere prospect that the high court could
bar injury claims for FDA-approved
pharmaceuticals helped precipitate the
recent $4.85-billion settlement of Vioxx
claims, according to lawyers involved in the
negotiations.
Some legal experts and attorneys are
concerned that without such lawsuits,
regulators and the public may never hear of
evidence that manufacturers knowingly
marketed products they knew were unsafe.
In recent years, documents and e-mails
uncovered in court cases have shown that
some companies kept safety issues involving
their products from the FDA.
"Without the tort system, what reasonable
assurance do we have we will learn about
the bad actors?" asked David Vladek, a law
professor at Georgetown University. "A lot
is lost without these lawsuits.
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"The State of Medical Device Tort Litigation
in the Wake of Riegel"
Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly
May 19, 2008
Eric J. Parker and Richard S. Cabelus
In 1906, muckraker and investigative
novelist Upton Sinclair revealed to the world
the horrors of the Chicago meatpacking
industry in his novel The Jungle.
His account of human and animal parts
being ground into rotted and spoiled meat
that was sold for public consumption led to
consumer revulsion.
In order to quell public outrage and restore
the U.S. meat market to economic viability,
President Theodore Roosevelt spearheaded
the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug
Act, the precursor to what is today the Food
and Drug Administration.
In the decades following the FDA's
creation, the administration's regulatory
scope grew to include not only drugs and
certain foods, but vaccines, medical
products and medical devices as well.
For the past several decades, the FDA's
mission has been to regulate these
industries, with a mandate to ensure that
anything receiving FDA approval meets its
promulgated minimum standards to
safeguard the public health and welfare.
The recent decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., has rather
dramatically supplanted the FDA's core
mission with respect to medical devices and,
in effect, given large corporate
manufacturers of medical devices immunity
from state and common law products-
liability claims stemming from "defects" in
the devices they produce.
Riegel
In Riegel, the court held that so long as a
new medical device receives pre-market
approval from the Food and Drug
Administration, the medical device
manufacturer will be shielded from all state
and/or common law claims for damages in
the event the product is later found to be
defective.
The court found that if the medical device
was classified by the FDA as a Class III
device, meaning the device is "purported or
represented to be for supporting or
sustaining human life," and was screened by
the FDA and received "pre-market
approval," all state or common law
"requirements that are different from or in
addition to" the FDA's pre-market
requirements would be preempted by the
1970 Medical Device Amendments to the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
Examples of Class III devices include
replacement heart valves, cerebella
stimulators and pacemakers, to name just a
few.
The decision now makes regulatory
compliance an affirmative defense for Class
III medical devices that receive pre-market
approval from the FDA, except in the rare
circumstance where a device maker
knowingly commits fraud on the FDA.
Therefore, any negligence or implied
warranty suit brought by an injured plaintiff
regarding such devices would be dismissed,
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as it is no longer a valid claim. Prospective
plaintiffs faced with such design defects
would be required to prove that the device
manufacturer failed to comply with FDA
regulations, or that doctors or other medical
personnel misused the device, placing an
even greater strain on the medical
profession.
180-Degree Change
This holding is an about-face for the court,
which only 12 years ago, in a strikingly
similar case, held that the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act did not preempt state or
common law defect design claims with
respect to Type III medical devices.
So why the 180-degree change? The
rightward shift in the composition of the
court brought about by the Bush
administration closely mirrored the shift that
took place at the FDA.
Under the Bush administration, the
adopted a new approach with respect
Class III medical device classification.
FDA
to its
Historically, the FDA promulgated
minimum standards that medical devices
would be required to meet in order to be
granted "FDA approval." Of course, these
benchmark standards varied depending on
the degree of danger of the device, but they
were nonetheless a minimum standard.
In recent years, however, the FDA has taken
the approach that a Class III medical device
that has met pre-market approval has
thereby met an optimal standard as set forth
by the FDA with respect to safety and
efficacy.
Indeed, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for
the majority in Riegel, went to great pains to
emphasize that a device that receives pre-
market approval goes through a "rigorous
process" and is screened and tested "an
average of 1,200 hours."
Therefore, the court held any state or
common law claim for damages would be a
requirement different from, or in addition to,
the FDA optimal standard and thus
preempted.
Gaping Loophole
On its face this does not seem too egregious
until one discovers the gaping "loophole"
that many medical device makers may now
jump through to avoid the pre-market
process.
This loophole with respect to Class III
devices allows a device maker to qualify for
preemption, and be immune from suit,
without ever passing the FDA's pre-market
approval process. So long as (1) the device
was in use prior to the 1976 Medical Device
Amendments to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and is therefore
"grandfathered-in"; or (2) the new device is
found by the FDA to be "substantially
equivalent" to another device that is exempt
from pre-market approval, no pre-market
approval of the device is required.
In fact, most new Class III medical devices
find their way to the medical market by way
of the second loophole and receive roughly
20 hours of screening, consisting mostly of
FDA officials ensuring that the necessary
paperwork is in order.
For example, a 1983 report by Congress
revealed that of the approximately 1,100
Class III devices entering the market, nearly
1,000 never received pre-market screening
because they were found to be "substantially
equivalent" to previously approved devices.
Alarmed, Congress made
amendments to the Medical
further
Device
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Amendments in 1990, rendering it more
difficult for the most dangerous devices to
exploit this loophole.
Nevertheless, in 2005, more than 3,100 new
Class III devices entered the market under
the "substantially equivalent" exception,
with only 32 devices required to undergo
pre-market screening.
To make matters even worse, the
"substantially equivalent" exception is
premised on economic considerations and
not those of safety. Buried in the majority's
opinion, Justice Scalia reveals the driving
force behind the "substantially equivalent"
exception as "seek[ing] to limit the
competitive advantage grandfathered
devices receive."
Through Riegel, the Supreme Court has
radically undermined the spirit and purpose
of the Medical Device Amendments to the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act based on the
conclusion that the "rigorous" pre-market
process employed by the FDA is the optimal
standard that Class III devices seek to meet.
Therefore, it should not be left to "juries
[who] see only the cost of a dangerous
design, and unconcerned with benefits to
apply the tort law of fifty states."
In reality, however, the Riegel decision
widens the economic loophole, which is
likely to be exploited with impunity by
corporations more intent on conforming
their devices to pre-existing designs so as to
compete economically than being concerned
with the safety and efficacy of their devices
as the act was intended to promote.
And as the numbers clearly show, meeting
the substantial equivalency exception seems
to involve little heavy lifting.
The FAA
The underlying theme of the Riegel court is
that tort law seeks not only to make an
injured party whole, but also to regulate
conduct by penalizing medical device
manufacturers.
The court found that the "optimal" standard
employed by the FDA for Class III devices
cannot live in harmony with the negligence
standard employed at common law.
However, if the court had broadened the
scope of its inquiry, it may have been
surprised to find that rigorous federal
standards and tort law have peacefully
coexisted for years.
To emphasize this point, one need look no
further than the Federal Aviation
Administration's requirements for airplane
design and product certification. The FAA's
product design approval process is a
complex five-phase process in which the
FAA and the manufacturer work jointly
through each phase to analyze material and
inspect and re-inspect mountains of data.
Even after a new design receives FAA
certification, the design is still subject to a
post-certification inspection and tests to
ensure maximum safety. In contrast with
current state of FDA approvals, there exists
no similar means of circumventing the FAA
approval process.
Courts, however, have been reluctant to hold
that the express preemption section of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 preempts
state law claims for negligence and gross
negligence causing personal injury. Indeed,
relatives of 59 victims of last year's TAM
Airlines flight 3054 crash in Brazil recently
brought wrongful-death actions in federal
court in Florida, alleging, among other
things, a faulty right thrust reverser.
Why the Supreme Court seeks to impose
preemption in the complex realm of medical
devices, but not in the equally sophisticated
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area of airplane products and design, is
perplexing if not totally inconsistent.
Hopefully, when the Supreme Court takes
up FDA preemption again in the fall in
Wyeth v. Levine, its rationale will become
clearer and the public will be provided with
greater insight into the future of federal
preemption as it relates to product safety.
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"No Special Treatment"
The National Law Journal
May 19, 2008
Sol Weiss
Pre-emption threatens the vitality of state
tort law and the historic co-existence of
federal prescription drug safety standards
and common law remedies for injuries
arising from prescription drugs. The recent
trend of pharmaceutical companies filing
procedural motions seeking immunity from
state law tort liability and prevailing raises
serious questions about federalism. Why
should this industry deserve special
treatment?
Courts that grant dismissals do so by
ignoring the force of the settled presumption
against pre-emption that protects consumers.
Furthermore, in the context of prescription
drugs, Congress never intended to pre-empt
state court litigation. There is a complete
absence of any concrete law from Congress
that might be frustrated by a state law tort
suit.
Congressional intent is the "ultimate
touchstone of preemption analysis,"
Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc. (1992). In
ascertaining that intent, the U.S. Supreme
Court's pre-emption jurisprudence has
repeatedly applied a presumption against
pre-emption. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC (2005). The Supreme
Court has always held fast to the
presumption, especially in implied (conflict)
pre-emption cases. Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co. (2000). The rationale for that
practice is clear: The presumption against
pre-emption-and in favor of the sovereign
state-is at its strongest when Congress has
not explicitly trumped that sovereignty.
Should mere regulatory action remove all
means of judicial recourse for consumers
injured by unsafe drugs?
In 2006, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), without public comment, in a
preamble, announced its belief that a tort
lawsuit for a failure-to-warn case is pre-
empted when the warning urged by the
lawsuit has not been required by the FDA.
71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3936 (Jan. 24, 2006).
This preamble follows earlier amicus briefs
filed by the FDA arguing the same outcome.
FDA Should Get Little Deference
Some courts have given deference to the
FDA's view of pre-emption. However,
under the high court cases Skidmore v. Swift
& Co. (1944) and U.S. v. Mead Corp.
(2001), the degree of deference should be
reduced by the fact that the FDA's earlier
position was different. Under Mead, courts
should afford a "relatively low level of
deference" because the FDA's position has
been inconsistent; the FDA is not an expert
on federalism concerns; and there is no
evidence of any degree of formality in its
position. Some courts that apply implied
pre-emption discuss the tension between the
FDA regulations and the potential for
verdicts caused by unsafe drugs under
common law. Both fora seek to balance
safety and efficacy. If those results do
conflict, Congress could, if it so chooses,
step in and pass curative legislation.
Allowing multiple-source inquiries into the
strength of warnings on drug labels can have
important benefits. State courts provide a
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check on agency power. Discovery in state
tort suits provides a useful venue to raise
questions about new and existing drugs.
Immunity from litigation eliminates these
potentially valuable information-gathering
tools.
The scope and power of regulations against
common law lawsuits was addressed by the
high court in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine
(2002). The plaintiff argued that a motor
boat was unreasonably dangerous without
protective propeller guards. The Illinois
Supreme Court found that the U.S. Coast
Guard had explicitly considered and rejected
the adoption of a regulation requiring
propeller guards under the Federal Boat
Safety Act (FBSA). The state court thus
concluded that "the Coast Guard's failure to
promulgate a propeller guard requirement
equates to a ruling that no such regulation is
appropriate." The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the plaintiffs claims were
neither expressly nor impliedly pre-empted
by the FBSA. The court commented that it
was "quite wrong" to view the Coast
Guard's rejection of the protective measure
in question as "the functional equivalent of a
regulation prohibiting all states from
adopting such a regulation." Rather, the
recommendation by the Coast Guard "left
the law applicable to propeller guards
exactly the same as it had been before the
subcommittee began its investigation."
The FDA's conduct, in post-marketing
safety analysis, closely parallels the
agency's conduct underlying the regulatory
inaction in Sprietsma. Sprietsma mandates
that an agency's intentional and careful
consideration does not convey an
"authoritative message of federal policy
against" safety measures that trumps the
positive effects from jury verdicts finding
products unsafe without proper warnings.
Conflict pre-emption infringes on the
Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury.
It vests absolute power in an agency that at
best is underfunded and that has close
associations with drug companies that earn
greater profits with fewer warnings.
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Pacific Bell v. linkLine
07-512
Ruling Below: Linkline Communs., Inc. v. Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876, (9th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiffs, Internet Service Providers, sued Defendants, regional telephone companies, for alleged
violations of the Section 2 of the Sherman antitrust act. Plaintiffs claim Defendants engaged in a
price squeeze by selling wholesale DSL access to the ISPs at a drastically higher price than
Defendants provided retail DSL access to their direct customers, intending to squeeze Plaintiffs
out of the DSL market. The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court's decision to deny Defendant's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that the Defendants' retail pricing scheme
could have created an anticompetitive price squeeze.
Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff states a claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act by
alleging that the defendant-a vertically integrated retail competitor with an alleged monopoly at
the wholesale level but no antitrust duty to provide the wholesale input to competitors-engaged
in a "price squeeze" by leaving insufficient margin between wholesale and retail prices to allow
the plaintiff to compete.
LINKLINE Communication, Inc.; Inreach Internet LLC; OM Networks, dba Omsoft
Technologies, Inc.; Nitelog, Inc., dba Red Shift Internet Services, Plaintiffs-Appellees
V.
California, Inc., fka Pacific Bell Telephone Company; PACIFIC BELL Internet Services;
SBC Advanced Solutions, Inc., Defendants-Appellants
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided September 11, 2007
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted.]
THOMAS, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the question of whether
the Supreme Court's decision in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
("Trinko"), bars a plaintiff from claiming a
violation of § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
by virtue of an alleged price squeeze
perpetrated by a competitor who also serves
as the plaintiffs supplier at the wholesale
level, but who has no duty to deal with the
plaintiff absent statutory compulsion. We
conclude that it does not, and affirm the
order of the district court denying judgment
on the pleadings.
I.
This action was filed by linkLine
Communications, Inc., In-Reach Internet
LLC, Om Networks, and Nitelog, Inc.
(collectively "linkLine"), who are Internet
Service Providers ("ISPs") who sell DSL
access to the internet to retail customers.
While some ISPs affiliated with local
telephone companies own their own
infrastructure and facilities for transmitting
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data between the internet and consumers,
these four lease those facilities variously
from SBC California, Inc., Pacific Bell
Internet Services, and SBC Advanced
Solutions, Inc. (collectively "SBC Entities").
As is true in many regions, because of the
development of the telecommunications
industry and the costs of building the
necessary infrastructure, regional
monopolies have developed that own and
control the lines necessary for the delivery
of telecommunication services. These
regional telephone companies are known as
incumbent local exchange carriers
("ILECs"). ILECs tend to own the local
telephone network as well as the telephone
lines-known as the "last-mile"-that
connect each individual consumer to the
network. Because any company seeking to
connect with users at the end of these last
mile connections must interconnect with the
ILEC, the ILEC's facilities are commonly
referred to as "bottleneck" facilities.
At the time of the filing of linkLine's
amended complaint . . . [t]he SBC Entities
were . . . organized so that they sold both
wholesale DSL access ("DSL transport
services") to independent ISPs as well as
retail DSL access (through PBIS and then
SBC-ASI) to individual consumers. At the
time the amended complaint was filed, the
SBC Entities were both a supplier to the
Plaintiffs at the wholesale level, and a
competitor at the retail level.
Linkline filed its original complaint on July
24, 2003, alleging that the SBC Entities,
acting as a single entity, have monopolized
and attempted to monopolize the regional
DSL market in violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act. In support of the § 2 claim,
the complaint alleged that SBC Entities:
(a) created a price squeeze by
charging ISP a high wholesale
price in relation to the price at
which defendants were providing
retail services;
(b) intentionally adopted
anticompetitive procedures and
processes for handling customer
ordering and installation to ISPs
that are calculated to (i) cause ISP
customer disruption and
interruption in service, and (ii)
create extraordinary and serious
delays and a substantial backlog of
orders, in the hope that the ISP
customers will revert back to
defendants;
(c) purposefully created and
imposed procedures that impeded,
and/or caused significant delays
and costs for, end user customers
of defendant switching to the
services of independent ISPs,
including plaintiffs;
(d) misled, harassed and exhibited
hostility toward customers of ISPs,
including plaintiffs;
(e) disparaged and created doubts
about the efficacy and legality of
ISPs, including plaintiffs; and
(f) purposefully failed
properly for DSL services.
to bill
In short, defendants adopted
procedures carefully calculated to
deny ISPs access to an essential
facility and to preserve and
maintain its monopoly control of
DSL access to the Internet.
On July 6, 2004, the SBC Entities filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings. The
district court read linkLine's complaint as
alleging three different categories of
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anticompetitive conduct: refusal to deal,
denial of access to an essential facility, and
price squeezing. In an order dated October
20, 2004, the district court dismissed the
first two as barred by the Supreme Court's
decision in Trinko [finding that "Defendants
were obligated by law to offer their DSL
transport facilities to the Plaintiffs under the
1934 Telecommunications Act ("1934 Act")
and the FCC rules implementing it." This
conclusion is not disputed on appeal.] With
respect to the price squeezing claim, it
ordered the Plaintiffs to file an amended
complaint "limited to the price squeeze
claim that details beyond the normal
requirements of Rule 8 specific facts
supporting Plaintiffs' price-squeeze claim."
The first amended complaint described the
allegation as follows:
(1) As set forth above defendants
unlawfully manipulated their dual
role as vertically integrated
monopolists as both a wholesale-
monopoly supplier and retail
competitor of plaintiffs for DSL by
engaging in an unlawful price
squeeze by intentionally charging
independent ISPs wholesale prices
that were too high in relation to
prices at which defendants were
providing retail DSL services and
necessary equipment to end-user
customers-and for a period by
charging wholesale DSL prices to
competing ISPs (such as plaintiffs)
that actually exceeded the prices at
which defendants retail affiliate
(PBI) was charging retail end-user
customers for DSL services and
necessary equipment-thereby
making it impossible for
independent ISP competitors such
as plaintiffs to compete at the low
retail prices set by defendants for
combined DSL-Internet Service
and necessary equipment provided
to end-user customers.
(2) If plaintiffs charged retail DSL-
Internet access customers the same
retail price as defendants' retail
affiliate charged, plaintiffs could
not cover the cost of providing
DSL service, which costs
necessarily includes the wholesale
transport costs charged by
defendants.
(3) By the same token, if
defendants themselves charged
their retail affiliates the same
wholesale costs for DSL transport
that they charged their wholesale
ISP customers (such as plaintiffs),
defendants could not cover their
wholesale costs and make a profit
from DSL service at their low
retail prices for their bundled
offering of DSL, Internet Service
and necessary equipment (e.g., free
modem and installation), that were
in some cases, and for some
period, even below the wholesale
DSL transport cost. Given the price
margin relationship between retail
and wholesale prices, defendants
are clearly attempting to
compensate for deliberately
sacrificing profits on the retail end
of their operations (with offsetting
margins on the wholesale side) in
order to stifle, impede and exclude
competition from independent ISPs
such as plaintiffs that are both
wholesale customers and retail
rivals.
[The amended complaint also contained
allegation (b)-(f) listed above.]
In response, the SBC Entities filed various
motions challenging the price squeeze
allegations and other portions of the
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amended complaint.
The district court granted in part the relief
requested, but denied the motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. Acting on the
request of the SBC Entities, the district court
certified the order for interlocutory appeal.
We granted permission to appeal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1292. We review the denial of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings de
novo. Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058,
1061 (9th Cir. 2005).
II.
In antitrust terms, a price squeeze occurs
"when a vertically integrated company sets
its prices or rates at the first (or 'upstream')
level so high that its customers cannot
compete with it in the second-level (or
'downstream') market." Von Kalinowski et
al., 2 Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation §
27.04[1], 27-40 (2d Ed. Matthew Bender
2007). For over six decades, federal courts
have recognized price squeeze allegations as
stating valid claims under the Sherman Act.
[In a footnote, the court stated: "Section 2
states that "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony."] See United States v.
Aluminum Co. ofAm., 148 F.2d 416, 437-38
(2d Cir. 1945) ("ALCOA") (holding price
squeeze unlawful); see also Bonjorno v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d
802, 809-11 (3d Cir. 1984) (price squeeze is
only an antitrust violation if plaintiffs can
show that "the defendants deliberately
produced the effect" to "destroy its
competition"); Lansdale i. Philadelphia
Electric Co., 692 F.2d 307, 309-10 (3d Cir.
1982); City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co.,
671 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (8th Cir. 1982)
(antitrust liability can still lie for price
squeezes even when rates are regulated);
City of Mishawaka v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,
616 F.2d 976, 983-85 (7th Cir. 1980)
(antitrust liability can lie for price squeezes
in regulated industry upon a showing of
specific anticompetitive intent).
We have joined our sister circuits in holding
that claims of price squeezing under § 2 are
viable against monopolists in regulated
industries. City of Anaheim v. Southern
Calfornia Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373
(1992). In Anaheim, we held that even in a
business where prices were regulated at both
the wholesale and the retail level, it was
possible for a price squeeze to occur. Id. at
1377 ("[I]t is possible for a utility to
manipulate its filings and requests in a
manner that causes a, at least temporary,
squeeze which might be just as effective as
one perpetrated by an unregulated actor.").
In Trinko, however, the Supreme Court held
that the failure by a monopolist to deal with
a competitor on certain service terms when
that monopolist was under no duty to deal
with the plaintiff competitor absent statutory
compulsion, did not state a claim under § 2
of the Sherman Act. This holding raised the
question of whether a price squeeze is
merely another term of the deal governed by
the Supreme Court's analysis in Trinko, or
whether it is something else. The D.C. and
Eleventh Circuits have offered conflicting
answers to that question. Compare Covad
Communications Co. v. Bellsouth Corp., 374
F.3d 1044, 1050 (11th Cir. 2004)
("Bellsouth") (holding that price squeeze
claims survive Trinko), with Covad
Communs. Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d
666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("Bell Atlantic")
(holding that they do not).
In Trinko, a customer of one of Verizon's
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rivals sued Verizon Communications, Inc.,
alleging that Verizon had engaged in
anticompetitive practices by discriminatorily
delaying orders placed by customers of
Verizon's competitors-orders Verizon was
required to fill by the Telecommunications
Act of 1996. 540 U.S. at 404. Trinko alleged
that by rendering poor performance on
orders placed through Verizon's
competitors, it would sour those customers'
relationships with their CLECs and drive
them back to Verizon. Id. Trinko sued
Verizon after both the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") and
New York's Public Services Commission
("NYPSC") had already investigated the
matter, resulting in a series of orders by the
NYPSC and a consent decree with the FCC.
The Supreme Court held that "Verizon's
alleged insufficient assistance in the
provision of service to rivals is not a
recognized antitrust claim under this Court's
existing refusal-to-deal precedents." Id. at
410. Trinko began from the premise that the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 neither
added to nor subtracted from the class of
punishable conduct under traditional
antitrust laws. Id. at 406 (quoting 47 U.S.C.§ 152, note ("nothing in [the 1996 Act] shall
be construed to modify, impair, or supersede
the applicability of any of the antitrust
laws")). Accordingly, the Court set out to
determine whether Trinko's allegations
made out an actionable antitrust claim under
the Court's existing refusal-to-deal
precedents, irrespective of Verizon's
statutory requirements under the 1996 Act.
The Court reiterated that "the Sherman Act
'does not restrict the long recognized right
of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an
entirely private business, freely to exercise
his own independent discretion as to parties
with whom he will deal,"' id. at 408
(quoting United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)), but that "the
right to refuse to deal with other firms does
not mean that the right is unqualified," id.
(quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601,
(1985). The Court then stated that it is "very
cautious" when recognizing exceptions to
the right of refusing to deal and that Aspen
Skiing was "at or near the outer boundary of§ 2 liability" for refusing to deal. Id. at 408-
09. In Aspen Skiing, the Court saw strong
evidence that the defendant's sole purpose in
refusing to deal was to attempt to
monopolize, "not by competitive zeal but by
anticompetitive malice." Id. at 409. That
evidence included that (1) the parties had
"voluntarily engaged in a course of dealing"
(proving that the defendant would have done
so absent statutory compulsion); (2) the
defendant refused even to sell highlands ski
passes at retail rates; and (3) the services it
was withholding were "otherwise marketed
or available to the public." Id. at 409-10.
Having found no similar evidence in Trinko,
the Court held that Verizon's alleged
insufficient service failed to state a valid
antitrust claim since Verizon's refusal to
deal with its competitors at all could not
even be seen as anticompetitive. Id. at 410.
The Court went on to reason that not only
did Trinko's allegations not make out a
traditional antitrust claim, but that it would
not be justified in extending antitrust
liability to include Trinko's case. In
reaching this conclusion, it emphasized "the
existence of a regulatory structure designed
to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm,"
and the dangers of judicial intervention. Id.
at 412-14. The latter include the risk of
"false condemnations" that might "chill the
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed
to protect." Id. at 414 (quoting Matsushita
Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)). Importantly, the
Court did not say that the existence of a
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regulatory scheme was a per se bar to
judicial enforcement of the antitrust laws,
only that "the existence of a regulatory
structure" is "[o]ne factor of particular
importance." Id. at 412 (emphasis added).
Trinko never addressed price squeeze claims
specifically. However, Trinko is of
significant import. Indeed, we have already
had occasion to apply Trinko to bar antitrust
liability when the complaint centered on
allegedly anticompetitive price terms, albeit
not price squeezes. See MetroNet Servs
Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124 (9th
Cir. 2004).
Given this background, we must decide
whether Trinko entitles the SBC Entities to
judgment on the pleadings, which in turn
requires us to decide whether Anaheim
remains viable after Trinko....
Here, reconsideration of Anaheim is not
required because the reasoning and theory of
Anaheim is not "clearly irreconcilable with
the reasoning or theory" of Trinko. First, as
the Eleventh Circuit has underscored, Trinko
did not involve a price squeezing theory.
Indeed, Trinko took great care to explain
that in this particular regulatory context,
"claims that satisfy established antitrust
standards" are preserved. 540 U.S. at 406.
Because a price squeeze theory formed part
of the fabric of traditional antitrust law prior
to Trinko, those claims should remain viable
notwithstanding either the telecommun-
ications statutes or Trinko. See Bellsouth,
374 F.3d at 1050 ("price squeezing claim
survives [Trinko] because it is based on
traditional antitrust doctrine").
Second, Anaheim did not embrace an
unlimited view of § 2 price squeeze liability
in regulated industries. To the contrary,
Anaheim rejected the idea that, in the case of
regulated industries, "a mere showing that a
price squeeze developed would suffice to
cause antitrust liability." 955 F.2d 1378.
Anaheim recognized that "courts should
tread carefully" in imposing antitrust
standards on regulated industries, id. at
1378, and ultimately required a showing of
specific intent on the part of the wholesale
monopoly holder to "serve its monopolistic
purposes at [retail competitors'] expense" in
order for § 2 liability to attach. Id. Thus,
Anaheim recognized the viability of the
theory, but carefully circumscribed it.
Trinko did not, as the SBC Entities would
argue, completely eliminate the viability of a
§ 2 price squeeze theory in regulated
industries. Were that the case, Trinko would
not have referred to the existence of a
regulatory regime as only "one factor" to
consider in determining whether antitrust
liability might also lie. 540 U.S. at 412.
Moreover, the existence of regulation does
not always eliminate the danger of anti-
competitive harm. See Mishawaka, 616 F.2d
at 983-84 (noting that the presence of a
regulatory structure offers price squeezers a
"ready made illegal opportunity with a
legitimate gloss"). The key, under Trinko, is
the nature of the regulatory structure at
issue. As Justice Scalia observed:
One factor of particular importance
is the existence of a regulatory
structure designed to deter and
remedy anticompetitive harm.
Where such a structure exists, the
additional benefit to competition
provided by antitrust enforcement
will tend to be small, and it will be
less plausible that the antitrust laws
contemplate such additional
scrutiny. Where, by contrast,
"[t]here is nothing built into the
regulatory scheme which
performances the antitrust
function," Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 358
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(1963), the benefits of antitrust are
worth its sometimes considerable
disadvantages.
Thus, consistent with Trinko, 540 U.S. at
412, Anaheim rejected the wholesale
importation of antitrust theory as applicable
to regulated industries. In the particular
industry at hand, Anaheim recognized that,
even in the regulatory scheme at issue, "it is
possible for a utility to manipulate its filings
and requests in a manner that causes a, at
least temporary, squeeze which might be
just as effective as one perpetrated by an
unregulated actor." 955 F.2d at 1377. Thus,
Anaheim undertook a Trinko-type analysis
in the context of the particular industry and
factual setting. Significantly, after
examining the particular pleadings, the
Anaheim panel concluded that the price
squeeze theory was not viable in that case.
Of course, in any future application of
Anaheim, we will have to ensure consistency
with Trinko. However, a careful reading of
Anaheim does not demonstrate that the
holding is "clearly irreconcilable with the
reasoning or theory" of Trinko.
When we apply Anaheim and Trinko to this
case, the soundness of the district court's
conclusion in denying judgment on the
pleadings is clear. Here, unlike the
circumstances in Anaheim and Trinko, we
are confronted with a partially regulated
industry. At the wholesale level, there are a
series of regulatory mechanisms and
regulatory agencies charged with assuring
fair play. These regulations grew out of the
1934 Act and have been considered in a
series of FCC decisions known as the
"Computer Inquiries." In short, under FCC
rules in place at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the SBC Entities were subject to
certain regulatory requirements if they
wished to enter the enhanced services
telecommunications market (i.e., offer DSL
internet access).
If an ILEC wished to offer DSL internet
access, it could choose one of two routes. It
could form a separate subsidiary through
which it would offer DSL internet access,
but which had to obtain the infrastructure
necessary to provision such services from
the ILEC on the same terms as unaffiliated
ISPs. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(c) (codifying
the second "Computer Inquiry").
Alternatively, an ILEC could provide DSL
internet access itself, but to do so it must file
what is known as a "Comparably Efficient
Interconnection" plan ("CEI") with the FCC.
See In re Computer III Further Remand
Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Provision of Enhanced Services, Report and
Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 4289 (1999)
[hereinafter "Computer III" order]. These
plans indicated how ILECs planned on
providing competing ISPs with equal access
to all the elements necessary to provide their
own DSL internet access services. Among
the requirements for CEI plans, ILECs had
to "provide competitors with interconnection
facilities that minimize transport costs. This
provision ensures that [ILECs] cannot
require competitive ISPs to purchase
unnecessarily expensive methods of
interconnection with the [ILECs] network."
Id. The 1934 Act also required that "[a]ll
charges, practices, classifications, and
regulations for and in connection with such
communication service, shall be just and
reasonable. . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
The 1934 Act charged the FCC with
enforcing these regulations and, in some
cases, parties can also bring complaints
before state public utility commissions.
Aggrieved parties can either file a complaint
in federal district court or before the
Commission. 47 U.S.C. § 207. The FCC
may also initiate its own enforcement
proceedings and craft remedies as it deems
appropriate. 47 U.S.C. § 205. In practice,
however, the FCC tends to rely on market
players bringing complaints to its attention.
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See Cannon, Guide to the Computer
Inquires at 70.
All of this regulation, however, applies only
to the wholesale prices the SBC Entities
charged linkLine; there is no comparable
regulatory attention paid to the retail DSL
market. Any restrictions on pricing at the
retail level derive primarily from the
antitrust laws. It is unclear at this juncture
the extent to which linkLine is basing its § 2
price squeezing theory on wholesale pricing,
retail pricing, or both. However, since
linkLine could prove facts, consistent with
its complaint, that involve only unregulated
behavior at the retail level, its action or
lawsuit survives a motion for judgment on
the pleadings. We do not preclude the
district court, however, from re-examining
the viability of this claim on summary
judgment after the record is more fully
developed and it is clear whether the
complained of behavior took place at the
regulated wholesale level, the unregulated
retail level, or some combination of the two,
and to what extent, if any, the responsible
agencies have devoted attention to or had
involvement in the complained of conduct.
Based on the record before us at this time,
we are able to conclude that the district court
was correct to deny the SBC Entities'
motion for judgment on the pleadings
because linkLine's allegation that the
pricing scheme created an anticompetitive
price squeeze states a potentially valid claim
under § 2 of the Sherman Act.
AFFIRMED.
Dissent
GOULD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent, concluding that the
amended complaint should have been
dismissed for failure to state a claim, in light
of dispositive Supreme Court precedent,
notwithstanding the permissive standard by
which we assess a complaint when
confronted with a motion to dismiss on the
pleadings.
As the court correctly notes, we assume the
facts pleaded in linkLine's amended
complaint to be true. As a general matter it
is not correct to dismiss the complaint if any
facts might be proved under which the
complaint would be valid. However, the
complaint only generally alleges a "price
squeeze" and related exclusionary conduct.
The complaint does not allege that the SBC
Entities had any market power to set or
influence the retail price for internet service.
So it seems quite odd to say they could have
violated the antitrust laws in part because of
retail pricing; if SBC has no power to set its
retail prices above the price at which it has
sold its wholesale connection, it does not
make sense to consider its pricing an illegal
"price squeeze" under the antitrust laws.
Given that SBC's DSL internet connections
compete with connections by cable and by
satellite, it is by no means clear that SBC
has the market power to influence the retail
market price.
Moreover, the complaint does not allege that
the prices at which the SBC Entities sold
retail "DSL" internet connections were
below cost, under any measure of cost; yet
to the extent the concern is with predation at
the retail level, then it would seem that, in
current antitrust theory, below-cost sales
must be shown. The complaint does not
allege that the SBC Entities, to the extent
they had losses by selling below cost in the
retail market, had any realistic prospect of
recouping losses; yet again, this prospect of
recoupment is an integral element of a
predation analysis under current Supreme
Court doctrine.
Because of the expense and burden of
proceeding in the antitrust litigation, it
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would be inefficient and unwise to permit
the complaint to proceed on the general
allegations of price squeeze, absent
allegation of critical facts that in my view
are needed for liability. To put the matter
practically, it seems to me that the Supreme
Court's decision in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
("Trinko") in essence takes the issues of
wholesale pricing out of the case, and thus
transforms what is left of any claim of "price
squeeze." If so, and if plaintiffs in good faith
cannot allege market power, below cost
sales and probable potential for recoupment
in the retail market, then the case should not
proceed. Conversely, if plaintiffs are able to
allege that the SBC Entities had market
power in the retail market to set or influence
the price, and that their retail sales of
internet connection were predatory in the
sense of being below cost with a real
prospect of recoupment, then the case
should proceed for factual development.
After Trinko and Brooke Group v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
(1993) ("Brooke Group"), the case doesn't
get out of the antitrust law starting blocks if
plaintiffs cannot make allegations showing
that the retail prices charged by the SBC
Entities were predatory in a sense forbidden
by the antitrust laws.
The district court dismissed most of the
allegations of the complaint, but let stand the
"price squeeze" allegation. As the majority
opinion notes, "At the time the amended
complaint was filed, the SBC Entities were
both a supplier to the Plaintiffs at the
wholesale level, and a competitor at the
retail level." The majority opinion also
correctly explains: "In antitrust terms, a
price squeeze occurs 'when a vertically
integrated company sets its prices or rates at
the first (or 'upstream') level so high that its
customers cannot compete with it in the
second-level (or 'downstream') market."'
Yet, the notion of a "price squeeze" is itself
in a squeeze between two recent Supreme
Court precedents.
Let us look first at the part of the "price
squeeze" represented by SBC setting the
upstream price at which it would sell use of
its land lines to linkLine and the other ISPs
here suing. The Supreme Court's decision in
Trinko, upholding the ability of a regulated
monopolist to deal with a competitor on
certain service terms, means that if SBC set
its wholesale price, the upstream price, too
high, that cannot be challenged under the
antitrust laws by analogy to permissible
refusals to deal. I substantially and
substantively agree with the position taken
by the D.C. Circuit in Covad Communi-
cations Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., wherein
the court adopted the reasoning of a major
treatise on antitrust law that "'it makes no
sense to prohibit a predatory price squeeze
in circumstances where the integrated
monopolist is free to refuse to deal."' Covad
Communs. Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d
666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2005). I am in
agreement with this reasoning so far as it
goes: Trinko insulates from antitrust review
the setting of the upstream price.
However, although the D.C. Circuit
concluded from this that "price squeeze"
allegations should be dismissed, in this
respect I would disagree if the key
allegations I have identified could be made,
because part of the "price squeeze"l
allegation is based on the retail price set in
the "downstream" market. Thus, here
linkLine is complaining about its inability to
buy use of wholesale service lines at the
price set by SBC when it cannot compete
with the retail price at which SBC itself sells
DSL internet connections to consumers.
SBC's setting of its sale price of the use of
its land lines by ISPs in a wholesale
transaction cannot be the basis of an
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antitrust claim in light of Trinko. That,
however, does not dispose of scrutiny of
SBC's conduct in the retail market, for it is
the price at which SBC sells DSL service to
its retail customers that squeezes linkLine's
ability to resell internet connections at a
profit. Thus the "price squeeze" contention
boils down to a claim of a predatory pricing
on sales of internet connections by SBC in
the retail market. If all that remains of the
"price squeeze" claim is a challenge to the
retail prices set by SBC on sale of DSL
internet connection service, then it seems to
me essentially a predatory pricing claim, and
it can only be viable in the first instance if
the SBC Entities have some real market
power sufficient to set or influence prices in
the retail market.
Moreover, even beyond the need for
alleging and proving some degree of market
power in the retail market, if that is the true
locus of the antitrust complaint after Trinko,
the retail side of a price squeeze cannot be
considered to create an antitrust violation if
the retail pricing does not satisfy the
requirements of Brooke Group, which set
unmistakable limits on what can be
considered to be predatory within the
meaning of the antitrust laws. In that case
the Supreme Court held that a predatory
pricing claim could proceed only if there
were allegations (1) that the prices set were
below an appropriate measure of the seller's
costs; and (2) that the seller had a reasonable
prospect, or, under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a
dangerous probability, of later recouping
losses. Id. at 222-24. Here, plaintiffs in their
"price squeeze" contentions in the amended
complaint did not allege that the seller had
the market power to set prices for internet
connection in the retail market, that SBC's
retail price, contributing to the squeeze, was
set below cost, and that losses could later be
recouped.
Because we have not heretofore held that
there must be a showing of market power in
the retail market, nor held that the standards
of Brooke Group must be applied in
assessing predation in the retail side of a
"price squeeze," I do not think it would be
correct to dismiss the complaint on the
pleadings with prejudice. Instead, after
dismissal, plaintiffs should have been free to
amend their complaint if they could assert in
good faith the allegations that are requisite
here, after Trinko, for antitrust liability.
Thus I respectfully dissent, believing that
the Supreme Court's precedents in Trinko
and Brooke Group have so hemmed in the
potential for "price squeeze" liability that
the specific allegations I have identified are
necessary to state an antitrust claim in the
context of the "price squeeze" alleged.
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"High Court Agrees to Hear AT&T ISP Dispute"
EWeek.com
June 25, 2008
EWeek.com
When the Federal Communications
Commission classified DSL as an
information service in 2005, it put telephone
broadband providers in the same category as
cable modem broadband providers. The
decision relieved both telephone and cable
companies from legal obligations to lease
broadband lines to competitors.
More importantly, telephone companies
would not face the same antitrust laws that
required dial-up carriers to lease their lines
at a discount to independent dial-up
companies. Or did it?
The Supreme Court decided June 23 to hear
a case pitting California broadband provider
linkLine against AT&T. The company,
which leases broadband lines and resells
broadband access to consumers, claims
AT&T's wholesale broadband prices are so
high, linkLine was unable to compete
against AT&T's retail prices.
In the legalese of the case, linkLine accused
AT&T of a "price squeeze" in violation of
the Sherman act. The case was originally
filed against Pacific Bell, which was later
acquired by SBC, which, in turn, acquired
AT&T and began to operate under the
AT&T name.
AT&T contended the FCC's 2005 decision
did not obligate it to lease any lines to
linkLine and that the arrangement shielded
AT&T from antitrust claims. After legal
wrangling on the district court level, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the
case could proceed. With the support of the
Department of Justice, AT&T appealed the
case to the Supreme Court.
"Defendants [AT&T] adopted procedures
carefully calculated to deny ISPs access to
an essential facility and to preserve and
maintain its monopoly control of DSL
access to the Internet," the Ninth Circuit
ruled.
In accepting the case to be heard this fall,
the Supreme Court said it would consider
whether a "vertically integrated retail
competitor with an alleged monopoly at a
wholesale level but no antitrust duty to
provide the wholesale input" could engage
in price squeezing by leaving "insufficient
margin between wholesale and retail prices
to allow the plaintiff to compete."
According to the Ninth Circuit, a price
squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated
company sets its upstream prices or rates so
high other companies are unable to compete.
218
"Ninth Circuit Case Alleging DSL
'Price Squeeze' Can Proceed"
Telecommunications Reports
September 15, 2007
Telecommunications Reports
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit (San Francisco) has affirmed the
finding of a district court that refused to
dismiss an antitrust lawsuit filed by a group
of Internet service providers (ISPs) charging
that subsidiaries of the former SBC
Communications, Inc., had "created a price
squeeze" for DSL (digital subscriber line)
competitors that buy SBC's wholesale
services.
The complaint was filed more than four
years ago by a group of ISPs-including
Linkline Communications, Inc., In-Reach
Internet LLC, Om Networks, and Nitelog,
Inc.-that lease facilities for transporting
data from SBC and its subsidiaries. SBC and
its subsidiaries were both supplier to the
plaintiff ISPs at the wholesale level, and
competitor at the retail level.
The lawsuit accused SBC of charging the
ISPs "a high wholesale price in relation to
the price at which defendants were
providing retail services." The ISPs
specifically alleged that SBC monopolized
the regional DSL market in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act.
SBC subsequently filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, contending that
the anticompetitive "price squeeze"
allegations made under the Sherman Act
were not valid claims. Among other things,
SBC based its argument for dismissal on the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Verizon
Communications Inc., vs. the Law Offices of
Curtis V Trinko and argued that its
wholesale pricing can't be the basis of an
antitrust claim.
The federal district court in California
denied SBC's motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim and determined that the
decision in the Trinko case does not bar a
plaintiff from claiming a violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act by "virtue of an
alleged price squeeze perpetrated by a
competitor who also serves as the plaintiffs
supplier at the wholesale level, but has no
duty to deal with the plaintiff absent
statutory compulsion."
The majority of the Ninth Circuit, according
to a decision written by Judge Sydney
Thomas, agreed with the finding of the
lower court and affirmed the decision
denying dismissal of the plaintiffs' price
squeeze claims against SBC. The court
pointed to its 1992 decision in City of
Anaheim vs. Southern California Edison Co.
in which it determined that even in a
business where prices are regulated at both
the wholesale and retail level, it's possible
for price squeeze to occur.
Judge Thomas also pointed out that the
"Trinko decision did not, as the SBC entities
would argue, completely eliminate the
viability of a section 2 price squeeze theory
in regulated industries." The existence of
regulation does not always eliminate the
danger of anticompetitive harm, Judge
Thomas wrote in the decision.
"When we apply Anaheim and Trinko to this
case, the soundness of the district court's
conclusion in denying judgment on the
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pleadings is clear," Judge Thomas said,
pointing out that at the time the complaint
was made SBC was subject to certain
regulatory requirements related to the
provision of retail DSL.
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the lower court was correct to deny SBC's
motion for judgment on the pleadings
because the allegations made by the ISPs
constitute a "potentially valid claim" under
the Sherman Act. Judge Ronald Gould,
however, dissented from the majority
opinion and questioned the extent to which
the ISPs allege that SBC and its subsidiaries
had any market power to set or influence the
retail price for Internet service. "It seems
quite odd to say they could have violated the
antitrust laws in part because of retail
pricing if SBC has no power to set its retail
prices above the price at which it has sold its
wholesale connection?" Judge Gould wrote.
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"Ninth Circuit Prequels and Sequels"
New York Law Journal
December 18, 2007
Neal R. Stoll and Shepard Goldfein
It must be more than a mere coincidence that
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit's jurisdiction includes California and
its constituent city Hollywood, the locus of
motion picture production. Once again, the
Supreme Court is being asked to review a
decision brought to us by the same Circuit
Court that produced the short-run opinions
in Dagher and Weyerhaeuser.
The 'linkLine' Case
The writ of certiorari, currently pending
before the Court, arises from the Ninth
Circuit's decision in linkLine
Communications, Inc. v. SBC California,
Inc. that affirmed the District Court's
refusal to grant judgment on the pleadings
for a defendant who allegedly priced its
wholesale and retail provision of Internet
connection services so as to monopolize
DSL access to the Internet. The Supreme
Court is being urged to consider whether or
not a claim under §2 of the Sherman Act can
be based on an alleged 'price-squeeze'
theory where the defendant's duty to deal
with rivals only arises under statutory
compulsion.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning
raises questions about the implications of the
Supreme Court's decision in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V Trinko, LLP, i.e., antitrust
oversight over vertically integrated
competitors and the potential limitation of
claims based on pricing to those alleging
exclusionary conduct. Collaterally, the
'price-squeeze' claim also implicates the
Court's Weyerhaeuser decision and the
Ninth Circuit's recent holding in Cascade
Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth.
SBC, the defendant in linkLine, was
required to give access to its local telephone
network to independent Internet service
providers (ISPs), including linkLine,
pursuant to statutory compulsion. SBC and
linkLine both competed in the provision of
DSL Internet services to consumers.
linkLine alleged that SBC's conduct
amounted to a refusal to deal, denial of
access to an essential facility, and was price-
squeezing in violation of §2 of the Sherman
Act.
Trinko, also in the context of
telecommunications deregulation and
compulsory access to networks, held that
antitrust liability was inappropriate where
there already exists a regulatory structure
designed to prevent anticompetitive conduct.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision
required the dismissal of the first two
claims. However, a price-squeeze theory
was not explicitly advanced in Trinko, and
the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel held
that Trinko did not preclude such a claim.
Even though Trinko reiterated the general
principle that the Sherman Act does not
restrict the right to choose with whom to
deal, Justice Antonin Scalia conceded, citing
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., that, '[u]nder certain circumstances, a
refusal to cooperate with rivals can
constitute anticompetitive conduct and
violate §2.' The Ninth Circuit was also
careful to note that the Supreme Court did
not state that the regulatory structure in
existence created a per se bar to antitrust
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liability, only that it was "[o]ne factor of
particular importance."
The regulatory scheme in linkLine required
the defendant to provide access to its
network to independent ISPs with whom it
competed in the downstream market. If it
competed through a subsidiary, SBC was
required to provide access on the same terms
and conditions to independent ISPs as it did
to its subsidiary. If it provided retail DSL
services itself, SBC was required to provide
network access in accordance with an FCC-
approved plan that would ensure comparable
parity in the ability to compete for the
provision of retail DSL Internet services.
The Ninth Circuit noted that the regulatory
structure did not exercise control over retail
prices for DSL Internet services. The Court
of Appeals therefore concluded that there
was room, consistent with Trinko, for
antitrust regulation of the defendant's
conduct, particularly as it related to retail
pricing. Since it was unclear to what extent
the plaintiff was basing its price-squeeze
claim theory of wholesale pricing, retail
pricing, or both, its claim should be allowed
to proceed.
Judge Ronald Gould, dissenting, argued that
Trinko precluded any claim based on SBC
constructing a price-squeeze. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit had come to the same conclusion in
Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic
Corp. However, Judge Gould expressed the
view that Trinko did not bar a claim based
on predatory pricing. The Eleventh Circuit
has already allowed such a claim to proceed
in Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth
Corp. In light of the intervening judgment of
Trinko and its implication that conduct
meeting the standards of Brooke Group must
be alleged, the dissent would have dismissed
the plaintiffs pleading without prejudice,
allowing the plaintiff to amend and re-file its
claim should it have one based on predatory
pricing.
Price-Squeeze Theory
The other context in which the price-squeeze
theory has been advanced in a regulated-
industry context has been with respect to the
supply of electricity generated by vertically
integrated utilities and distributed by
independent local distributors. One such
case is Town of Concord, Massachusetts v.
Boston Edison Company. As noted in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's
opinion in that case, delivered by then-Judge
Stephen Breyer, the price-squeeze theory
has a long and not insubstantial pedigree. In
United States v. Aluminum Co., Judge
Learned Hand held that Alcoa acted
unlawfully when it charged higher than a
'fair price' for aluminum ingot used to
manufacture aluminum sheet because it also
priced aluminum sheet so low as to deny its
competitors an opportunity to make a "living
profit." And since then, various courts of
appeal and district courts have used similar
language in describing claims allowed under
the antitrust laws. In fact, the legitimacy of
price-squeeze theories in a regulated-
industry context has tended to be recognized
in the electricity context, albeit in a limited
fashion, although claims have rarely been
allowed to succeed.
Notoriously absent from the linkLine
decision are references to the Supreme
Court's decision in Weyerhaeuser and the
Ninth Circuit's recent decision in
PeaceHealth. Both of these precedents are
more on point than Trinko in the context of a
price-squeeze claim:
A predatory buying claim resembles a price-
squeeze claim in that, in both instances, the
defendant allegedly inflated the input prices
and left too small a differential between the
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upstream input price and the downstream
output price for rivals to survive.
Applying Weyerhaeuser, overpaying in the
input market becomes suspect only when it
leads to below-cost pricing in the output
market. Moreover, Weyerhaeuser likely
overrules Judge Hand's holding in United
States v. Aluminum Co. that relied on
qualitative concepts such as "fairness" and
"living profit."
As we previously reported, the Ninth Circuit
in PeaceHealth held that a cost-based test is
an essential element of a monopolization
claim premised on multiproduct or
"bundled" discounting. Bundled discounting
describes the practice of offering discounts
that are conditioned upon the customer's
purchase of two or more products from the
seller's products or services. PeaceHealth
applied a rule modeled on the Supreme
Court's landmark predatory pricing
decision, Brooke Group. The Ninth Circuit's
approach unified the legal standard for
Sherman Act §2 claims based on allegations
of predatory pricing, predatory bidding, and
bundled discounting practices.
Analysis
It is only a short distance from where the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, stand
now to the dismissal of a plaintiffs claim
based on a defendant's wholesale service
cost forcing the plaintiff to operate at a loss.
Unless the defendant is also operating at a
loss with respect to its retail services it is
hard to see why the antitrust laws should
protect a clearly less efficient provider of the
retail services.
The Ninth Circuit's use of Trinko as a
keystone to allow linkLine to attack the
defendant's retail pricing is a non sequitur.
The Ninth Circuit, in denying the motion for
judgment on the pleadings, stated that
"linkLine could prove facts, consistent with
its complaint, that only involve unregulated
behavior at the retail level." The fact that a
plaintiff must prove its price-squeeze theory
has a predatory effect in the retail market is
dictated ultimately by Brooke Group, not
Trinko.
Despite the deficiencies in the Ninth's
Circuit reasoning, one might feel some
sympathy for the plaintiff in linkLine,
especially when the end goal is to deliver
cheaper and better Internet connection for
consumers. It might be the case that the
defendant is not as efficient a retail service
provider as linkLine. But so long as the
difference between the defendant's
wholesale price and its retail price is
sufficient to cover the defendant's costs to
provide its retail services (i.e., it is not
engaged in predatory pricing), there will
always be room for a more efficient retail
service provider to make a profit. In fact, in
such a situation, the defendant would
increase its profit by raising its wholesale
price to capture the plaintiffs efficiencies
and exiting retail service provision
altogether; all without any harm to
consumers.
A monopolist has always had the right to be
vertically integrated, even if it is less
efficient than its competitors who it supplies
in the downstream market. Once this is
accepted, Trinko can be used to punctuate
the conclusion, as some commentators have
stated, that 'it makes no sense to prohibit a
predatory price squeeze in circumstances
where the integrated monopolist is free to
refuse to deal.'
At least it ultimately should be a Happy
Holidays for wholesalers with market
power!
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"ISPs File Antitrust Lawsuit Against SBC in California"
Telecommunications Reports
July 24, 2003
Telecommunications Reports
A group of Internet service providers (ISPs)
in California today filed an antitrust lawsuit
charging that subsidiaries of SBC
Communications, Inc., had "created a price
squeeze" for DSL (digital subscriber line)
competitors that buy SBC's wholesale
services.
"SBC has used the classic ' price squeeze' to
put independent ISPs out of the DSL
market," said David Simpson, one of the
attorneys of the plaintiffs. "With DSL,
where SBC has a stranglehold on the 'last
mile' critical for deployment of the
broadband technology, SBC suddenly has
nearly all of the market." The lawsuit
accuses SBC of charging ISPs "a high
wholesale price in relation to the price at
which defendants were providing retail
services." It also says SBC took a number of
other actions to make it difficult for
competing ISPs to do business. The
plaintiffs allege that the extent of the
damages they have incurred exceeds $40
million for each one.
An SBC spokesman said the lawsuit was
"without merit and appears to be a rehash of
issues that have already been resolved with
the California Internet Service Providers
Association." He added that SBC recently
lowered its DSL transport pricing, which he
said allows ISPs to better compete with
cable modem providers.
Filing the lawsuit in U.S. District Court in
Los Angeles against SBC California, Inc.,
Pacific Bell Internet Services, and SBC
Advanced Solutions, Inc., were linkLine
Communication, Inc., InReach Internet
LLC, Om Networks, and Nitelog, Inc. The
action alleges violations of the Sherman
Antitrust Act and the California Unfair
Business Practice statues. It seeks
compensatory and punitive damages and an
injunction on the defendants.
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"U.S. High Court Rules in Favor of Verizon"
Los Angeles Times
January 14, 2004
James S. Granelli
Local telephone companies may have to
share their lines with competitors, but
antitrust laws don't force them to bend over
backward to help rivals serve their
customers, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
Tuesday.
The court rejected a customer's complaint
that Verizon Communications Inc. was
furthering its monopoly in local service by
failing to help AT&T Corp. deliver service
on Verizon lines. The customer, a lawyer in
New York, can't sue under antitrust laws
just because Verizon violated the federal
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the court
said.
That decision could lead lower courts to
throw out most of the nearly three dozen
antitrust lawsuits filed against Verizon, SBC
Communications Inc. and other Baby Bells,
said John Thorne, Verizon's deputy general
counsel. Verizon faces 13 such suits and
SBC 15.
The high court justices ruled that the 1996
telecommunications law, intended to break
up local phone monopolies and promote
competition, didn't give Verizon, SBC and
other Bells immunity from conventional
antitrust actions, as some Bell lawyers had
argued.
New York-based Verizon is the nation's
largest local phone company. In California,
it is second to SBC, serving many of the
coastal communities in Southern California.
Both companies have argued vociferously
that the rates they can charge competitors to
rent their lines and equipment are too low.
Under the 1996 law, the Bells had to open
their markets to competition and lease their
equipment to rivals to get approval to offer
long distance. In exchange for allowing
rivals on their lines, the Bells were permitted
to sell long-distance service.
James D. Ellis, general counsel for SBC,
California's dominant local carrier, said the
decision freed the company from "frivolous
lawsuits" and allowed it to focus more on
new products.
Organizations representing consumers and
competitors were disappointed.
"It will make the process of deciding to
bring a case quite a bit more challenging,"
said Michael McNeely, a lawyer for
Consumers Union, which supported the
customer who filed the complaint, Curtis V.
Trinko. "It ups that ante on what you have to
prove."
Jonathan Askin of the Assn. for Local
Telecommunications Services said the local
loop to homes was an "essential facility,"
and that without fair access to it, "the Bell
cartel will always be able to wield monopoly
control."
"In our view, the decision is not surprising,"
said James Kirkland, general counsel for
DSL provider Covad Communications
Group Inc., which filed a brief supporting
Trinko.
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Kirkland said the decision shouldn't affect
two antitrust suits that Covad has filed,
alleging that Verizon and BellSouth Corp.
illegally furthered their monopoly positions
in digital subscriber line service. Those
actions, he said, are based on conventional
antitrust rules.
Trinko declined to comment on the decision,
and his lawyer was unavailable.
Trinko's law firm was an AT&T customer,
receiving service on lines AT&T leased
from Verizon. Trinko claimed that Verizon
discriminated against AT&T customers by
providing them worse service than it
provided to its own customers.
He claimed this violated both the 1996 act
and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890,
which prohibits monopolies from
aggressively defending their monopoly
positions.
A federal district court ruled that Trinko had
no grounds to sue because he wasn't a direct
customer of Verizon.
A U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals panel
reinstated the Sherman Act claims. Verizon
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Verizon's alleged failure to provide AT&T
adequate access to its lines may be a
violation of the 1996 telecom law, Justice
Antonin Scalia wrote for the majority
Tuesday, but that doesn't mean that Verizon
broke antitrust laws.
Just as "the 1996 act preserves claims that
satisfy existing antitrust standards, it does
not create new claims that go beyond
existing antitrust standards," Scalia wrote.
Having a monopoly isn't unlawful "unless it
is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct."
In this case, he said in the majority opinion,
there was no evidence showing Verizon's
motivation was to further its monopoly
position.
Trinko's complaint led to investigations by
the Federal Communications Commission
and the New York Public Services
Commission, the high court opinion noted.
In the federal case, Verizon paid a $3-
million fine. In the state case, it made a $10-
million payment.
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United States v. EurodifS.A.
07-1059
Ruling Below: EurodifS.A. v. United States, 506 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir., 2007).
The United States Enrichment Corporation (the only company in the United States that enriches
uranium) filed a complaint with the Commerce Department against Eurodif S.A. for selling low
enriched uranium at unfairly low prices, in violation of anti-dumping laws. In two previous
decisions, the court found that contracts for the enrichment of uranium were contracts for
services as opposed to contracts for the sale of goods, and therefore were not subject to anti-
dumping laws. On remand from the Court of International Trade, Commerce redefined the scope
of the anti-dumping laws to exclude such services. The appeal was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit as unripe.
Questions Presented: The antidumping law allows for duties to be imposed on "foreign
merchandise .. . sold in the United States at less than its fair value." The Commerce Department
construed that phrase as including transactions in which a U.S. customer furnishes cash and
fungible raw material to a foreign producer and receives a substantially transformed finished
product. The question presented in this case is whether the Federal Circuit erred in failing to
accord Chevron deference to that construction, when a contrary one will prevent the Commerce
Department from applying the antidumping law to imports causing or threatening material injury
to a domestic industry.
Section 1673 of Title 19 of the United States Code provides that, when "a class or kind of
foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair
value," to the detriment of a domestic industry, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) shall
impose antidumping duties on entries of the foreign merchandise.
The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred in rejecting Commerce's
conclusion that foreign merchandise is "sold in the United States" within the meaning of 19
U.S.C. 1673 when a purchaser in the United States obtains foreign merchandise by providing
monetary payments and raw materials to a foreign entity that performs a major manufacturing
process in which substantial value is added to the raw materials, thereby creating a new and
different article of merchandise that is delivered to the U.S. purchaser.
EURODIF S.A., Compagnie Generale des Matieres Nucleaires, and Cogema, Inc., and Ad
Hoc Utilities Group, Plaintiffs-Appellees
V.
UNITED STATES, USEC Inc., and United States Enrichment Corporation, Defendants-
Appellants
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Decided September 21, 2007
227
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted.]
ROBERTSON, District Judge.
In this dispute about the correct application
of the antidumping statute, 19 U.S.C. §
1673, to enriched uranium feedstock,
appellants United States, USEC Inc., and
United States Enrichment Corp. (the latter
two collectively referred to as "USEC")
appeal from a judgment of the United States
Court of International Trade. EurodifS.A. v.
United States, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2006). In 2005, we issued two
interlocutory opinions in the same case,
EurodifS.A. v. United States, 411 F.3d 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2005) ("Eurodif 1'), and Eurodif
S.A. v. United States, 423 F.3d 1275 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) ("Eurodifl"). Because the issues
appellants raise in the instant appeal concern
only the application of those decisions to
future entries of low enriched uranium, we
dismiss the appeal as unripe.
I. BACKGROUND
In Eurodif I and Eurodif II, we found that
separate work unit ("SWU") contracts for
the enrichment of uranium were contracts
for services, rather than for the sale of
goods, and that the low enriched uranium
("LEU") produced under those contracts
was therefore not subject to the antidumping
statute. Eurodif , 411 F.3d at 1364; Eurodif
I, 423 F.3d at 1278. Following those
decisions, the Court of International Trade
issued a remand order, instructing the
Department of Commerce ("Commerce") to
revise its final determination and order, and
to "explain how its final determination and
order on remand has eliminated all SWU
transactions" in accordance with our
decisions. Eurodif S.A. v. United States, 414
F. Supp. 2d 1263 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006)
("Eurodif IT'). Acting pursuant to that
order, Commerce excluded LEU covered by
SWU contracts from its recalculation of the
duty margin, Final Results of
Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand,
EurodifS.A. v. United States (Mar. 3, 2006),
but it did not modify the scope of the
antidumping duty order to exclude future
imports of LEU covered by SWU contracts.
Plaintiffs-Appellees Eurodif S.A., Cogema,
and Cogema, Inc. (collectively referred to
herein as "Eurodif') supported Commerce's
action, as far as it went, but they also asked
the Court of International Trade to require
Commerce to amend the scope order so that
it would expressly exclude LEU covered by
SWU contracts. Defendant-Appellant USEC
supported Commerce's decision not to
amend the scope order, but asserted that it
was error for Commerce to exclude all LEU
imported pursuant to SWU contracts from
its recalculation without investigating the
facts behind each contract to determine
whether the transaction was a sale of
services, as stated in the contract, or was in
fact a sale of goods.
The Court of International Trade agreed
with Eurodif. It found that our opinions in
Eurodif I and Eurodif H1 took into account
the factual circumstances operating behind
the individual contracts in this case and
therefore that Commerce was correct to
exclude all LEU covered by those SWU
contracts from its recalculation. Eurodif S.A.
v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1354
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2006) ("Eurodif IV").
Furthermore, the Court of International
Trade concluded that our previous opinions
required Commerce to rewrite the scope of
the antidumping duty order, and it remanded
the case to Commerce once again with
instructions to amend the order to exclude
all LEU covered by SWU contracts from the
"class or kind of merchandise" covered by
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the order. Id. at 1355 (citing 19 U.S.C. §
1673e(a)(2)). On this second remand,
Commerce redefined the scope of the
antidumping order to exclude any entry of
LEU that is accompanied by a certification
claiming that the entry is made pursuant to a
SWU contract. The Court of International
Trade sustained, Eurodif S.A. v. United
States, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2006) ("Eurodif V"), and this appeal
followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
II. DISCUSSION
In Eurodif I and Eurodif II, we found that
the SWU contracts at issue "in this case"
were contracts for the sale of services that
were not subject to the antidumping statute.
See Eurodif I, 411 F.3d at 1362, 1364. We
did not address how Commerce should
determine whetherfuture entries of LEU are
made pursuant to SWU contracts. The
contentions of the government and USEC on
this appeal are directed to future entries.
They argue that Commerce should be
permitted to suspend liquidation of future
LEU imports until it determines-
transaction-by-transaction and by
administrative review-whether the SWU
contract exception applies. USEC
additionally argues that the scope
amendment and certification should be
modified now to make it clear that future
LEU imports will not be outside the scope of
the antidumping law if the unenriched
uranium is either (a) obtained from an
affiliate of the enricher or (b) delivered to
the enricher after entry.
Neither the procedural question presented
here (scope review vs. administrative
review) nor the substantive questions
relating to affiliation of the enricher are ripe
for decision. The doctrine of ripeness is
designed "to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies,
and also to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision
has been formalized and its effects felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties."
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-
49 (1967). It is drawn "both from Article III
limitations on judicial power and from
prudential reasons for refusing to exercise
jurisdiction, but, even in a case raising only
prudential concerns, the question of ripeness
may be considered on a court's own
motion." Nat'1 Park Hospitality Ass'n v.
DOI, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (citing Reno
v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 57
n.18, (1993).
Administrative
Determination
Review vs. Scope
The Court of International Trade found that
an administrative review is not the "proper
forum to address whether merchandise is
within the scope of an order," and that
Commerce's own regulations authorize a
different mechanism for this purpose: a
"scope determination." Eurodif IV, 431 F.
Supp. 2d at 1356. At the request of any
interested party, Commerce may "initiate an
inquiry" as to whether merchandise is within
the scope of an antidumping duty order. Id.
(citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(b)). If the
Secretary determines that the product in
question is included within the scope of the
order, he may instruct Customs to suspend
liquidation for each unliquidated entry,
effective as of the date the scope inquiry was
initiated. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(l)(2). That
determination is reviewable by the Court of
International Trade. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).
Appellants argue that this scope
determination process is inadequate,
because, as a practical matter, an entry of
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LEU under review will be liquidated before
Commerce can complete its determination.
They assert that determining whether a
particular transaction is entitled to the SWU-
contract exception requires a careful
analysis of the contract itself and an
opportunity to investigate the manner of its
execution. The administrative review
process would permit Commerce to suspend
liquidation while such an assessment takes
place, but the scope determination process
permits Commerce to suspend liquidation
only after the Secretary has issued a
preliminary scope ruling. USEC notes that
liquidation typically occurs ten months after
entry, but Commerce's previous assessments
of LEU contracts have taken seventeen to
eighteen months. As a result, appellants
argue, the scope determination process will
not be completed before the entry under
review has been liquidated, mooting the
review.
This dispute is about what may or may not
happen with the next LEU case-a case
about which we have no facts. Our decisions
in Eurodif I and Eurodif II did not resolve
the procedural problem that USEC and the
government have presented here, but we
decline to attempt a resolution on this
record. We have held that SWU contracts
are contracts for services and that the LEU
in this case entered under SWU contracts.
Whether the next contested shipment of
LEU is covered by a valid SWU contract is
a question that must await the next case. If
Commerce is correct, and the next disputed
LEU entry is liquidated before Commerce
can complete its scope review, the dispute
will not be rendered non-justiciable, as it
would be "capable of repetition, yet evading
review." S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219
U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
LEU Obtained from or Sold to Affiliates
The more substantive questions USEC
brings on this appeal also require a specific
factual context for their resolution, and such
a record is not before us. USEC wants it
made clear that future LEU imports will not
avoid antidumping penalties if the
unenriched uranium was either (a) obtained
from an affiliate of the enricher or (b)
delivered to the enricher after the
importation of the LEU. Although USEC
does not challenge our finding that the
contracts in this case were contracts for the
sale of services, it seeks clarification as to
whether our holding would apply to future
entries with these characteristics. Until we
have record evidence regarding such entries,
however, USEC's questions are non-
justiciable. Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. SEC,,
303 U.S. 419, 443 (1938) ("We are invited
to enter into a speculative inquiry for the
purpose of condemning statutory provisions
the effect of which in concrete situations,
not yet developed, cannot now be definitely
perceived. We must decline that
invitation.").
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we dismiss.
DISMISSED.
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"High Court to Hear Uranium Case"
Washington Post
April 22, 2008
Robert Barnes
The Supreme Court said yesterday that it
would hear a dispute between USEC of
Bethesda and a French supplier of low-
enriched uranium in a case the federal
government said has implications not only
for the energy industry but also for efforts to
dismantle some nuclear weapons.
Justices agreed to consider in their term that
begins'next fall whether anti-dumping duties
can be imposed on Eurodif, which supplies
utilities in the United States with low-
enriched uranium, a critical component in
the domestic production of nuclear power.
USEC, the only U.S. company that enriches
uranium, complained to the Commerce
Department that Eurodifs prices were
unfairly low, and the agency decided in
2001 that anti-dumping duties should be
levied. But the U.S. Court of International
Trade disagreed, and in September the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
upheld that ruling.
USEC received powerful support from the
federal government, which urged the
Supreme Court to take the case.
The appeals court decision, Solicitor
General Paul D. Clement said in a brief to
the high court, "threatens to undermine U.S.
foreign policy and national security interests
in the remarkably sensitive context of
nuclear fuel, nonproliferation, and ensuring
domestic supplies for nuclear weaponry."
He said it would endanger the financial
viability of USEC, the sole source of certain
types of nuclear fuel used for military
purposes.
A coalition of utilities joined Eurodif and its
parent company, Areva, in urging the court
not to review the case, which they said had
been correctly decided by the lower courts.
If Congress is concerned about the viability
of USEC, they argued, there are other ways
to take care of it.
"The antidumping statute is an instrument of
trade policy with general application to all
industries, and not a tool for the
implementation of national security or
energy policies," argued the Ad Hoc
Utilities Group.
While the Commerce Department sided with
USEC, the courts agreed with the utilities
that, in at least some cases, importing the
low-enriched uranium constituted a
provision of a service by the French
company, not a purchase of a product.
Products are covered by the anti-dumping
laws, while services are not.
The federal government asked the Supreme
Court to uphold the Commerce
Department's authority and expertise. And it
warned that the decision, in a "truly
unprecedented manner" for a trade case, has
implications for national security.
The government said that a program under
which Russia has agreed to convert
weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium
into the kind of uranium needed by U.S.
utilities could be endangered. Dismantling
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nuclear warheads, it said, is a more
expensive process than simply enriching the
uranium as the French company does. It is
economically viable only because the United
States has the ability to use anti-dumping
laws to regulate the entry of low-enriched
uranium from foreign sources.
The combined cases are U.S. v. Eurodif and
USEC v. Eurodif.
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"ITC Rules in Favor of USEC Position
on French Uranium Imports"
Business Wire
November 29, 2007
Business Wire
BETHESDA, Md.-The U.S. International
Trade Commission (ITC) voted today in
favor of USEC's position that terminating
the antidumping duty order on imports of
low enriched uranium (LEU) from France
would materially injure the U.S. enrichment
industry.
Today's ITC vote concludes the "sunset
review" of the 2002 antidumping order
against French uranium imports. A sunset
review is a two-part administrative
proceeding conducted every five years in
which the ITC and the U.S. Department of
Commerce (DOC) make separate
determinations that are required for
antidumping orders and certain other trade
measures to remain in place. In May 2007,
the DOC determined that dumping of French
LEU is likely to continue or recur if the
antidumping duty order were terminated.
This positive ruling from the ITC
demonstrates that the dumping of foreign-
produced uranium imports continues to be a
significant threat to the U.S. enrichment
industry, the economic well being of its
workers and the communities in which they
live. USEC is working vigorously to deploy
new uranium enrichment technology at the
American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio,
while maintaining our current enrichment
operations in Paducah, Ky., and successfully
implementing the Megatons to Megawatts
nonproliferation program with Russia.
Discipline on unfairly traded imports must
be maintained until the success of all these
initiatives is assured.
USEC will continue to support the efforts of
the U.S. government to address the dumping
of foreign-produced uranium imports. USEC
also intends to seek U.S. Supreme Court
review of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit's decision that enrichment
transactions under SWU (separative work
unit) contracts are sales of services, not
goods, and thus outside the scope of U.S.
antidumping law.
USEC Inc., a global energy company, is a
leading supplier of enriched uranium fuel for
commercial nuclear power plants.
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"Sole U.S. Company that Enriches Uranium
Is Struggling to Stay in Business"
New York Times
June 12, 2007
Matthew L. Wald
WASHINGTON-Seventy years after the
United States invented uranium enrichment,
the sole American company in the business
is struggling to survive, while nuclear power
experts worry that its failure would leave the
Russians dominant in the market for fuel
processing.
The company, USEC , has liquidated some
of its valuable uranium inventories to stay
afloat, as its income has declined because of
changing market conditions. But it had also
maintained a high dividend, bought back
stock and spent heavily on severance
payments after frequent purges in the
executive suite. The company spent more
than $100 million on two new technologies
for enrichment before abandoning them and
embarking on a third.
"USEC has been a four-letter word in some
circles," said its president, John K. Welch,
who was hired in October 2005 to save the
company. Though he has taken steps to
strengthen the company, he said the problem
now is to find a way to finance new
technology and become competitive in the
world market.
Enrichment means sorting two types of
uranium to raise the proportion of uranium
235, a step essential for use in American
nuclear reactors. The government is
promoting nuclear as a step toward energy
independence.
The United States invented the process and
used it to build the bomb that destroyed
Hiroshima in August 1945. Later, the United
States offered enriched uranium to civil
nuclear programs worldwide.
In the 1990s, the government privatized its
antiquated enrichment plants. USEC closed
one, in Piketon, Ohio, and still runs the
other, in Paducah, Ky.
But the Paducah plant is a heavy user of
costly electricity, which now amounts to
more than 70 percent of USEC's costs.
Centrifuges, which are used by almost all
other enrichment plants, use only 5 percent
of the electricity used by the Paducah plant.
In February, USEC announced that the
centrifuges it was developing would cost
$2.3 billion, up from a previous estimate of
$1.7 billion, and would take an extra year to
deploy. The company has already spent
about $400 million on the centrifuges and is
looking for financing to complete the
project, which it is trying to build in Piketon,
Ohio.
"Most people expect that $2.3 billion is
going to go up," said Paul R. Clegg, a stock
analyst at Natexis Bleichroeder Inc.
The company has been involved in merger
talks with several companies in the nuclear
business, and the trade press has carried
reports of other negotiations. But two people
with knowledge of the talks said that they
did not appear to be leading anywhere.
In addition to USEC's Paducah plant and its
planned centrifuge project, a European
consortium is building a centrifuge plant in
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it calls the National
and General Electric is
Australian enrichment
Silex commercially
Despite the challenges, and the fact that Mr.
Welch eliminated the dividend, the stock
price is strong. Market analysts say one
reason is that the price of virgin uranium is
so high that customers are demanding more
enrichment work, thus driving up the price
of the service that USEC provides. Some
investors also see the company as a takeover
target, or a likely beneficiary of government
help.
USEC would like to acquire uranium from
the Energy Department on favorable terms,
to help provide funds for its centrifuge
project. But the Energy Department appears
to want a signal from Congress, and the
company faces questions there about its
previous performance, and about the
wisdom of bailing out its stockholders.
The government still owns the Paducah
plant, and could take it over and give it to a
contractor to run. Or it could allow USEC to
operate in bankruptcy, although that would
probably eliminate the company's ability to
build a more modern plant.
The assistant secretary of energy for nuclear
energy, Dennis R. Spurgeon, was USEC's
executive vice president and chief operating
officer until he left in 2003, receiving a
payment of more than $5 million, according
to Securities and Exchange Commission
filings. Mr. Spurgeon, through a spokesman,
declined repeated requests for an interview.
According to people close to the company,
Mr. Spurgeon had clashed with the chief
executive, William H. Timbers, as had other
top officials. Mr. Timbers left the company
Hobbs, N.M., that
Enrichment Facility,
trying to make an
technology called
feasible.
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in December 2004, after disagreements with
the board. In February 2006, USEC agreed
to pay him $14.5 million, according to
S.E.C. filings.
Some Democrats in Congress are
demanding a full explanation of the
departures of Mr. Timbers and others before
they proceed with a discussion about how to
help the company.
USEC has other problems as well. It also
takes in enriched uranium from Russia, left
over from Russia's nuclear weapons
program, under a program called Megatons
to Megawatts. USEC dilutes the material to
reactor grade under an agreement in
operation since the early 1990s.
Half of the enrichment that the company
sells is done under the terms of that
agreement, which were locked in years ago,
and it provides a substantial profit to USEC.
But the agreement ends in 2013, after which
the Russian nuclear enterprise, Rosatom,
wants to deal directly with the nuclear
utilities. Those utilities would like to do the
same.
Another potential problem for USEC is that
a near-total ban on Russian imports beyond
those allowed in the Megatons to Megawatts
program may be coming to an end.
The ban dates from a trade case brought by
American uranium companies against the
Soviet Union. The companies won a ruling
that the Soviets were dumping production in
this country below cost. As a result, the
United States threatened a tariff of more
than 100 percent, and reached an agreement
that limited the imports allowed under the
Megatons to Megawatts program.
But last month, a similar ruling against a
French producer was overturned by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
The court ruled that enrichment was a
service, not a product, and thus not subject
to import quotas.
Russian and American officials said that the
court decision put pressure on the American
side to conclude a deal more favorable to the
Russians.
Russia has vast inventories of enriched
uranium and a huge ability to enrich more,
according to trade experts. The prospect
alarms some on Capitol Hill, who believe
that the United States must maintain the
ability to enrich uranium.
The prospect is that without USEC, the
United States will rely on others not only for
the uranium ore, but also for most of the
work needed to convert it into fuel.
"We import two-thirds of our oil, but 90
percent of our uranium," said Jack Edlow, a
Washington businessman who deals in
uranium and who pointed out that the
reliance was for both raw ore and for
enrichment. "I can't say 'energy
independence' with a straight face."
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Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council
(07-1239)
Ruling Below: Natural Resources Defense Council v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008),
cert. granted, Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2964, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 5165 (2008).
Plaintiffs filed the current lawsuit against Defendants concerning the U.S. Navy's use of mid-
frequency active sonar in Navy training exercises in southern California. Plaintiffs contend that
Defendants failed to comply with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act by
not filing an Environmental Impact Statement concerning the effect of the use of mid-frequency
sonar on marine mammals in the area. The District Court found a likelihood that the Navy failed
to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and preliminarily enjoined the
Navy's use of mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar during training exercises that prepare Navy
strike groups for worldwide deployment. The Chief of Naval Operations concluded that the
injunction unacceptably risks the training of naval forces for deployment to high-threat areas
overseas, and the President of the United States determined that the use of MFA sonar during
these exercises is "essential to national security." The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),
applying a longstanding regulation, accordingly found "emergency circumstances" for
complying with NEPA without completing an environmental impact statement. The Ninth
Circuit nevertheless sustained the district court's conclusion that no "emergency circumstances"
were present and affirmed the preliminary injunction.
Question Presented: (1) Whether CEQ permissibly construed its own regulation in finding
"emergency circumstances"; (2) Whether, in any event, the preliminary injunction, based on a
preliminary finding that the Navy had not satisfied NEPA's procedural requirements, is
inconsistent with established equitable principles limiting discretionary injunctive relief.
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, Inc; The International Fund for Animal
Welfare; Cetacean Society International; League for Coastal Protection; Ocean Futures
Society; Jean-Michel Cousteau, Plaintiffs-Petitioners
V.
Donald C. WINTER, Secretary of the Navy; Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary of the
Department of Commerce; National Marine Fisheries Services; William Hogarth, Assistant
Administrator for Fisheries of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration; Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr., Administrator of the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, Defendants-Respondents.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided February 29, 2008
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
B. Fletcher, Circuit Judge:
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Defendants Secretary of the Navy,
Department of the Navy, Secretary of the
Department of Commerce, National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), and two
Administrators of the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) appeal the district
court's January 3, 2008 order, as modified
on January 10, 2008, granting a motion for a
preliminary injunction and imposing certain
conditions on the completion of the
remaining eight of fourteen large training
exercises scheduled to be conducted by the
Navy's Third Fleet in the waters off the
coast of southern California between
February 2007 and January 2009 (the
"SOCAL exercises"). The motion was filed
by plaintiffs Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., International Fund for Animal
Welfare, Cetacean Society International,
League for Coastal Protection, Ocean
Futures Society, and Jean-Michel Cousteau
(collectively "NRDC" or "plaintiffs"), who
are concerned that the Navy's use of high-
intensity, mid-frequency active sonar
("MFA sonar") in the SOCAL exercises will
cause serious harm to various species of
marine mammal present in the southern
California waters, and by extension, to
plaintiffs themselves.
I. Procedural History
On January 3, 2008, [on remand from the
Ninth Circuit] the district court . . . issued a
new preliminary injunction that allowed the
Navy to conduct the remaining SOCAL
exercises provided that it employ certain
measures intended to mitigate the impact of
the Navy's use of MFA sonar on the
environment. On January 9, 2008, the Navy
applied for a stay pending appeal and
requested relief from the district court by
January 14, 2008.
On January 10, 2008, in response to
arguments raised in the Navy's stay
application, the district court modified the
preliminary injunction by narrowing the
mitigation measures contained in the
January 3, 2008 order. The Navy filed a
notice of appeal the following day. The
district court denied the Navy's stay
application on January 14, 2008.
On the evening of January 15, 2008, the
Navy filed an emergency motion with this
court requesting vacatur of the preliminary
injunction or, alternatively, a partial stay of
the preliminary injunction pending a
decision on its appeal by our court. The
Navy's motion was based in part on two
developments that occurred on the same day
that the motion was filed. First, the President
of the United States, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. §
1456(c)(1)(B), exempted from the
provisions of the CZMA the Navy's use of
MFA sonar during the SOCAL exercises,
finding that such use of MFA sonar is
"essential to national security" and in the
''paramount interest of the United States."
Second, the CEQ, finding "emergency
circumstances," purported to approve
"alternative arrangements" to accommodate
those emergency circumstances, pursuant to
40 C.F.R. § 1506.11. It permitted the Navy
to follow the prescribed arrangements to
continue its exercises pending completion of
the Navy's EIS. The Navy subsequently
adopted the alternative arrangements and
determined that it would comply with them.
On February 4, 2008, following briefing by
the parties and oral argument, the district
court denied the Navy's application to
vacate the preliminary injunction and lifted
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the temporary partial stay. In its published
order, the district court held in relevant part
that CEQ's approval of "alternative
arrangements" was invalid because there are
no "emergency circumstances" within the
meaning of 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11. Feb. 4,
2008 Dist. Ct. Order at 13-25, 527 F. Supp.
2d 1216. Thus, the district court left in place
the original preliminary injunction. The
Navy filed a notice of appeal two days later.
... We now affirm the district court's order
imposing the preliminary injunction.
II. Factual Background
A. The SOCAL Exercises and the Effect
of MFA Sonar on Marine Mammals
Active sonar involves a vessel or other sonar
source emitting a loud noise underwater and
then listening for whether the noise comes
back to the source, indicating that the noise
may have bounced off the hull of a
previously undetected submarine....
The Navy acknowledges in its
Environmental Assessment that MFA sonar
may affect both the physiology and behavior
of marine mammals. Exposure to "very
high" acoustic energy levels may impair the
functioning of marine mammals' visual
system, vestibular system and internal
organs, and may cause injury to their lungs
and intestines. However, the primary
physiological effects of MFA sonar are on
marine mammals' auditory system: very
high sound levels may rupture the eardrum
or damage small bones in the middle ear, but
even exposure to lower levels of sound may
cause permanent or temporary hearing loss.
The Navy also acknowledges that the use of
MFA sonar may overtly disrupt the normal
behavior of marine mammals even if it does
not affect their physiology. While the Navy
acknowledges that active sonar may cause
behavioral responses such as attempting to
avoid the site of sound exposure, swimming
erratically, sluggish behavior, tail slapping,
"jaw popping," and aggressive behavior,
those responses were observed in studies
using trained animals held in captivity.
NOAA concluded in 2006 that studies of
marine mammals in the wild "strongly
suggest" that the use of sonar at levels lower
than those found to produce behavioral
effects in the tests of captive animals can
result in "profound" behavioral alterations,
including changes in feeding, diving, and
social behavior. In a February 9, 2007
Biological Opinion concerning the SOCAL
exercises, the NMFS found that acoustic
exposures can impair marine mammals'
foraging ability and their ability to detect
predators or communicate. The NMFS cited
studies finding that noise has caused whales
to move away from their feeding and mating
grounds and migration routes, and to change
their calls.
B. The Navy's EA and the Predicted
Harm to Marine Mammals in the
Southern California Waters
[Discussion of the Navy's Environmental
Assessment and the estimated number of
marine mammals hurt by the use of MFA
sonar during the SOCAL exercises.]
In light of the harm that marine mammals
are expected to suffer as a result of the
SOCAL exercises, plaintiffs contend that
they and their members living in southern
California will be harmed. For example,
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plaintiff Jean-Michel Cousteau alleges that
as an environmental enthusiast and film-
maker his ability to enjoy and educate others
about the marine environment in southern
California will be impaired if the harmful
effects of MFA sonar on marine mammals
are not sufficiently mitigated. Other
plaintiffs make similar allegations.
C. Mitigation Measures Employed by the
Navy and Those Imposed by the District
Court
While the Navy adopted a number of
mitigation measures intended to reduce the
harm caused by the use of MFA sonar in the
SOCAL exercises, the district court
concluded that those measures were
inadequate both to cure the Navy's likely
NEPA violation and to avoid the possibility
of irreparable harm to NRDC. Accordingly,
following our November 13, 2007 remand
order, the district court established
additional, narrowly-tailored mitigation
measures which the Navy would have to
employ during the remaining SOCAL
exercises....
After reviewing the parties' briefs and
taking a Navy-guided tour of the USS
Milius, the district court imposed six
mitigation measures in addition to those
already required by National Defense
Exemption II: (1) the Navy shall suspend
use of MFA sonar when a marine mammal
is detected within 2,200 yards from the
sonar source, except where the marine
mammal is a dolphin or a porpoise and it
appears that the mammal is intentionally
following the sonar-emitting naval vessel in
order to play in or ride the vessel's bow
wave; (2) the Navy shall reduce the MFA
sonar level by 6dB when significant surface
ducting conditions are detected; (3) the
Navy shall not use MFA sonar within 12
nautical miles from the California coastline;
(4) the Navy shall monitor, including by
aircraft, for the presence of marine
mammals for 60 minutes before employing
MFA sonar, shall utilize two dedicated,
NOAA- and NMFS-trained lookouts at all
times when MFA sonar is being used, shall
employ passive acoustic monitoring to
supplement visual detection of the presence
of marine mammals, and shall use aircraft
participating in the training exercises to
monitor for marine mammals for the
duration of the exercises when MFA sonar is
being used; (5) Navy helicopters shall
monitor for marine mammals for 10 minutes
before employing active dipping sonar; and
(6) the Navy shall refrain from using MFA
sonar in the Catalina Basin between the
Santa Catalina and San Clemente Islands
because ingress and egress to the basin are
restricted and the basin has a high density of
marine mammals. See Jan. 10, 2008 Dist. Ct.
Order at 1-5.
The Navy takes issue only with the first two
of the mitigation measures imposed by the
district court, namely the 2,200 yard
"shutdown zone" and the "power-down"
requirement during significant surface
ducting conditions. Specifically, the Navy
argues that those two mitigation measures
tip the balance of hardships in its favor and
are contrary to the public interest.
III. Standards of Review
Our review of a district court's grant of a
preliminary injunction is "very deferential."
Nat'1 Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'1 Marine
Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782, 794 (9th Cir.
2005). We do not reverse the district court
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unless it "relie[s] on an erroneous legal
premise or abuse[s] its discretion." Sports
Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 686
F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1982). A court
abuses its discretion if it bases its decision
on an erroneous legal standard or clearly
erroneous findings of fact. Earth Island Inst.
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1156
(9th Cir. 2006) ("Earth Island 11").
A district court may grant a preliminary
injunction if one of two sets of criteria are
met. "Under the 'traditional' criteria, a
plaintiff must show (1) a strong likelihood
of success on the merits, (2) the possibility
of irreparable injury to plaintiff if
preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a
balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff,
and (4) advancement of the public interest
(in certain cases). Alternatively, a court may
grant the injunction if the plaintiff
demonstrates either a combination of
probable success on the merits and the
possibility of irreparable injury or that
serious questions are raised and the balance
of hardships tips sharply in his favor."
Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d
898, 902 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Earth
Island II, 442 F.3d at 1158.
IV. Discussion
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
1. Effect of CEQ's Alternative
Arrangements for NEPA Compliance
On January 15, 2008 CEQ purported to
approve "alternative arrangements" for the
Navy to continue its use of MFA sonar
while complying with NEPA, reasoning that
''emergency circumstances" prevented
normal compliance. CEQ's authority to
grant such relief derives from 40 C.F.R. §
1506.11, which provides in full:
Where emergency circumstances
make it necessary to take an action
with significant environmental
impact without observing the
provisions of these regulations, the
Federal agency taking the action
should consult with the Council
about alternative arrangements.
Agencies and the Council will limit
such arrangements to actions
necessary to control the immediate
impacts of the emergency. Other
actions remain subject to NEPA
review.
40 C.F.R. § 1506.11. CEQ's letter of
explanation to the Navy stated that the
district court's modified injunction "imposes
training restrictions . . . that continue to
create a significant and unreasonable risk
that Strike Groups will not be able to train
and be certified as fully mission capable."
CEQ Letter to Donald C. Winter at 3. CEQ
also stated that "the inability to train
effectively with MFA sonar puts the lives of
thousands of Americans directly at risk....
Therefore, there are urgent national security
reasons for providing alternative
arrangements under the CEQ regulations."
Id. at 3-4.
The Navy then petitioned this court to
vacate the district court's preliminary
injunction, arguing that CEQ's approval of
"alternative arrangements" deprived NRDC
of the "likelihood of success on the merits"
of its NEPA claims, thus eliminating the
legal basis for the injunction. We remanded
to the district court to allow it to consider in
the first instance whether this legal
development merited vacatur or a partial
stay of the injunction.
On remand, the Navy maintained that the
CEQ's "emergency circumstances"
determination relieved it of the requirement
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to prepare an EIS prior to commencing the
remaining SOCAL exercises. NRDC argued
that CEQ's action was beyond the scope of
the regulation and otherwise invalid, and
that the preliminary injunction should
remain in place. The district court
considered these arguments and concluded
that its preliminary injunction was "not
affected by [CEQ's] approval of emergency
alternative arrangements because there is no
emergency." Feb. 4, 2008 Dist. Ct. Order at
2, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216. Accordingly, it
held that "CEQ's action is beyond the scope
of the regulation and is invalid[]" and that
"[t]he Navy is not, therefore exempted from
compliance" with NEPA and the
preliminary injunction. Id. The district court
found that CEQ's interpretation of
"emergency circumstances" to include a
court order entered in the course of pending
litigation was not authorized by 40 C.F.R.
§1506.11, because it was contrary to both
the plain meaning of "emergency
circumstances" and the drafters' original
intent. It also found that CEQ's action was
contrary to the governing statute, NEPA.
The Navy makes two basic arguments as to
why the district court erred by failing to
vacate the preliminary injunction in light of
CEQ's approval of "alternative
arrangements." First, the Navy argues that
the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to review CEQ's approval of
alternative arrangements because such
approval constitutes a superseding agency
action that removes as moot any basis for an
injunction predicated on plaintiffs' original
claims concerning the Navy's EA. Second,
the Navy argues that, even if the district
court could review CEQ's action, the court
erred by not deferring to CEQ's and the
Navy's assessment that "emergency
circumstances" exist within the meaning of
40 C.F.R. § 1506.11...
b. The District Court's Assessment of
Whether "Emergency Circumstances"
Existed
(1) Deference
The district court concluded that CEQ's
interpretation of 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 is not
entitled to deference. It reasoned that under
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),
5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., the courts
traditionally afford deference to (1) an
agency's reasonable interpretation of a
statute it administers "if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue. . .," citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), and (2) an
agency's interpretation of its own
regulations unless "an alternative reading is
compelled by the regulation's plain
language or by other indications of the
[agency's] intent at the time of the
regulation's promulgation," citing Thomas
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504,
512.
... Accordingly, the district court concluded
that it did not owe deference to CEQ's
interpretation of § 1506.11 under Thomas
Jefferson and Seminole Rock. We review
that conclusion to determine whether in so
doing it relied on an erroneous legal premise
or abused its discretion; we conclude that it
did neither.
The district court followed established
Supreme Court precedent in finding that an
agency's interpretation of its own regulation
is not entitled to deference when it is
inconsistent with the regulation itself,
conflicts with agency intent at the time of
promulgation, and reaches beyond "the
limits imposed by the statute," NEPA. See
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-63
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(1997). Next, the district court, after
concluding that the meaning of "emergency
circumstances" was clear, applied the
appropriate legal principles that an agency's
interpretation of its own regulation is
entitled to deference "only when the
language of the regulation is ambiguous."
See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576, 588 (2000). Accordingly, the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined not to give deference to CEQ's
overly broad interpretation of "emergency
circumstances."
(2) Plain Meaning and Intent of CEQ
Regulation
In finding that no emergency circumstances
existed, the district court reasoned that the
"Navy's current 'emergency' is simply a
creature of its own making, i.e., its failure to
prepare adequate environmental
documentation in a timely fashion, via the
traditional EIS process or otherwise." Feb.
4, 2008 Dist. Ct. Order at 17, 527 F. Supp.
2d 1216, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8110 *33.
In short, it was not a sudden unanticipated
event. The district court supported its
conclusion by noting that the CEQ letter
does not specify an "emergency" other than
the district court's mitigation order itself,
which, in CEQ's view, creates a "significant
and unreasonable risk" that strike groups
will not be able to train and be certified as
fully mission capable. Id. at 16-17.
There is ample support for the manner in
which the district court exercised its
discretion. The district court properly relied
on dictionary definitions of "emergency"
and "emergency circumstances" to support
its conclusion that CEQ's interpretation is
not entitled to deference. See Watson v.
United States, 128 S. Ct. 579, 583, 169 L.
Ed. 2d 472 (2007) (noting that terms are
construed consistently with their everyday
meaning, including by reference to the
dictionary absent statutory definition or
definitive clue). As the district court
observed, the Oxford English Online
Dictionary defines "emergency" as "[t]he
arising, sudden or unexpected occurrence (of
a state of things, an event, etc.)." Oxford
English Online Dictionary, available at
http://dictionary.oed.com. Black's Law
Dictionary defines the term "emergency
circumstances," through a cross-reference to
"exigent circumstances," as "[a] situation
that demands unusual or immediate action
and that may allow people to circumvent
usual procedures, as when a neighbor
breaks through a window of a burning house
to save someone inside." Blacks Law
Dictionary 260, 562 (8th ed. 2004)
(emphasis added). The district court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that the
circumstances in the present case fall outside
the scope of these definitions because its
preliminary injunction was entirely
predictable given the parties' litigation
history. Feb. 4, 2008 Dist. Ct. Order at 15,
527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8110 *30.
The Navy urges that the risk to national
security created by the preliminary
injunction falls squarely within the legal
definition of "emergency circumstances."
However, the Navy has been on notice of its
possible legal obligations to prepare an EIS
for the SOCAL exercises from the moment
it first planned those exercises. In addition,
NRDC filed its complaint almost a year ago,
and on August 7, 2007, the district court
held that the Navy was likely to lose on the
merits of NRDC's claims. We affirmed that
ruling in November of 2007. Still, the Navy
waited until January 10, 2008, to raise a cry
of "emergency" and request the NEPA and
CZMA waivers it relies on here, in order to
continue its routine, planned training
exercises. We find no abuse of discretion in
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the district court's determination that such a
series of events gives rise to a predictable
outcome, not an unforeseeable one
demanding "unusual or immediate action."
(6) Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the
district court did not abuse its discretion or
rely on an erroneous legal premise in
determining that CEQ's broad interpretation
of "emergency circumstances" was not
authorized by 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 because
it was contrary to the plain meaning of the
regulation and contrary to NEPA and,
accordingly, that the Navy remains subject
to the traditional requirements of NEPA.
2. NRDC's NEPA Claim
We next address the district court's
conclusion that NRDC has shown probable
success on the merits of its claim that the
Navy violated NEPA by failing to prepare
an EIS for the SOCAL exercises.
In our November 13, 2007 order we
concluded that "Plaintiffs have shown a
strong likelihood of success on the merits of
their claims under [NEPA]." NRDC, 508
F.3d at 886. While that conclusion was
based on our review of the record
underlying the district court's August 7,
2007 preliminary injunction order, the only
subsequent developments are CEQ's
approval of "alternative arrangements"
pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 and the
Navy's concession, by virtue of seeking
such approval, that the SOCAL exercises
will have a "significant environmental
impact." See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 ("Where
emergency circumstances make it necessary
to take an action with significant
environmental impact without observing the
provisions of these regulations, the Federal
agency taking the action should consult with
the Council about alternative
arrangements.") (emphasis added). Although
we elaborate on our reasons, our original
conclusion remains unchanged.
a. Statutory Background
As discussed earlier, NEPA requires a
federal agency such as the Navy to prepare a
detailed EIS for all "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C). However, if, as here, an
agency's regulations do not categorically
require the preparation of an EIS, then the
agency must first prepare an EA to
determine whether the action will have a
significant effect on the environment. Nat'1
Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241
F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2001); see 40 C.F.R.
§ 1501.4. If the action will significantly
affect the environment, an EIS must be
prepared, while if the project will have only
an insignificant effect, the agency issues a
Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI).
Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 402 F.3d 846, 864 (9th Cir. 2005);
see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1501.4.
"An EIS must be prepared 'if substantial
questions are raised as to whether a
project . . . may cause significant
degradation of some human environmental
factor."' Blue Mountains Biodiversity
Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212
(9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Idaho Sporting
Congress v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1149
(9th Cir. 1998)). Thus, a plaintiff need not
show that significant effects on the
environment will in fact occur; raising
"substantial questions whether a project may
have a significant effect" on the
environment is enough. Id.; Idaho Sporting,
137 F.3d at 1150.
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exercises will have a significant impact on
the environment....
b. Substantial Questions about the
Environmental Impact of the Exercises
The district court found that NRDC had
raised substantial questions as to whether the
SOCAL exercises would have a significant
impact on the environment. Accordingly, the
court concluded that NRDC had
demonstrated probable success on the merits
of its claim that the Navy's failure to prepare
an EIS was arbitrary and capricious and in
violation of NEPA and the APA. Id. at 7.
The district court did not rely on an
erroneous legal premise or abuse its
discretion in so concluding.
Initially, we repeat our observation that the
Navy, by seeking approval by CEQ of
"alternative arrangements" pursuant to 40
C.F.R. § 1506.11, has effectively conceded
that the SOCAL exercises will have a
significant impact on the environment. See
40 C.F.R. § 1506.11. As the text of
§ 1506.11 indicates, the very purpose of the
regulation is to provide for the possibility of
alternative arrangements where emergency
circumstances require the taking of an action
"with significant environmental impact"
without observing the requirements of
NEPA. See id. The fact that the Navy sought
relief under § 1506.11 is evidence that the
Navy recognizes that the SOCAL exercises
have a "significant environmental impact."
Moreover, the fact that "[t]he Navy is
currently evaluating the environmental
impact of MFA sonar training exercises
through its development of the SOCAL
Range Complex Environmental Impact
Statement," Jan. 15, 2008 CEQ Letter at 2,
confirms that, at the very least, the Navy
acknowledges that substantial questions
have been raised as to whether the SOCAL
c. The Navy's Mitigation Measures
The district court also concluded that NRDC
had demonstrated probable success on the
merits of its claim that the Navy's mitigation
measures were inadequate to obviate the
need for preparing an EIS. Again, we find
no reliance on an erroneous legal premise
and no abuse of discretion in the district
court's conclusion.
The Navy correctly points out that "[a]n
agency's decision to forego issuing an EIS
may be justified in some circumstances by
the adoption of [mitigation] measures" and
that those measures, if significant, "need not
completely compensate for adverse
environmental impacts." Nat'1 Parks &
Conservation Ass'n, 241 F.3d at 733-34.
However, we have also held that a
"perfunctory description" or "mere listing of
mitigation measures, without supporting
analytical data," is insufficient to support a
finding of no significant impact. Okanogan
Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d
468, 473 (9th Cir. 2000). We find no
reversible error in the district court's
conclusion that the Navy's list of proposed
mitigation measures was precisely such a
perfunctory description devoid of supporting
data.
The explanation contained in the EA as to
why the mitigation measures are effective is
contained in four short bullet points, stating
that whales and dolphins spend extended
periods of time on the surface, have
relatively short dive periods, tend to move in
large groups (pods), and frequently come to
the surface and have a high level of activity
there. Three of those bullet points in effect
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state the same thing, namely that whales and
dolphins spend little time under water. This
explanation is inadequate for several
reasons.
First, the Navy's explanation overlooks the
fact that beaked whales spend much of their
time under water, surface infrequently, and
are generally difficult to detect. A study by
NMFS scientists observed that "beaked
whales are always difficult to see when they
are on the surface, spend most of their time
below the surface, and are found at low
densities over large areas." Likewise, NRDC
submitted a declaration by a biologist who
opines that visual monitoring by ship-based
lookouts would result in the detection of
only 2% of beaked whales in the Southern
California Operating Area, in part because
of the speed at which Navy vessels travel.
Declaration of Dr. Robin William Baird P 6.
Second, the Navy's explanation fails to
address the effectiveness of the Navy's
safety zones-the only measure that directly
reduces exposure of marine mammals to
MFA sonar. Specifically, the EA fails to
explain why a safety zone of only 1,000
yards is adequate, why reducing the sonar
level by 6dB and 10dB at the 1,000-yard and
500-yard marks, respectively, is adequate,
and why it is effective to halt MFA sonar
transmission altogether only at the 200-yard
mark. The Navy's explanation also does not
relate to the effectiveness of the measure
requiring passive sonar to be used to detect
sounds made by marine mammals.
We find further support for the district
court's conclusion that the Navy's
mitigation measures did not obviate the need
to prepare an EIS in the fact that, as
explained above, the Navy refused to adopt
several of the more aggressive mitigation
measures recommended by the CCC,
employed in the 2006 RIMPAC exercise, or
imposed by the Department of Defense for
non-RIMPAC exercises in 2006.
Notably, as to most of these measures the
Navy does not contest that they would be
effective. While the Navy claims that some
of the measures would adversely affect its
ability to achieve the objectives of the
exercises, that does not render the measures
the Navy has adopted adequate to avoid the
need for preparing an EIS. Indeed, the Navy
states in its "after action report" following
the first three SOCAL exercises that in
future exercises it intends to incorporate data
collection necessary to address the question
of how many marine mammals not observed
by lookouts may have been exposed to
dangerous sonar levels, and will integrate
additional monitoring tools and techniques.
While the Navy's intent is commendable, it
implicitly acknowledges that its current
mitigation and data collection efforts are less
than adequate.
We conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the
Navy's cursory explanation in the EA for
why its mitigation measures are effective
does not demonstrate that those measures
"constitute an adequate buffer against the
negative impacts" that may result from the
SOCAL exercises. See Nat'1 Parks &
Conservation Ass'n, 241 F.3d at 734.
Accordingly, we uphold the district court's
conclusion that the Navy's reliance on its
incomplete mitigation plan in deciding not
to prepare an EIS was likely arbitrary and
capricious and affirm its determination that
NRDC has demonstrated probable success
on the merits of its NEPA claims. Cf
Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th
Cir. 2000).
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V. Conclusion
The district court concluded that plaintiffs
have met the necessary burden of proof to
demonstrate that preliminary injunctive
relief is appropriate. It held that plaintiffs
have shown a strong likelihood of success
on the merits, as well as the possibility of
irreparable injury if relief is not granted. It
also held that plaintiffs have shown that the
balance of hardships tips in their favor in
light of the preliminary injunction's
narrowly tailored mitigation measures which
provide that the Navy's SOCAL exercises
may proceed as planned if conducted under
circumstances that provide satisfactory
safeguards for the protection of the
environment. Finally, it held that the public
interest is advanced by a preliminary
injunction that imposes adequate mitigation
measures. In reaching these conclusions, the
district court neither relied on erroneous
legal premises nor abused its discretion. We
therefore affirm the district court's
preliminary injunction.
AFFIRMED
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"Justices Take Case on Navy Use of Sonar"
New York Times
June 24, 2008
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court on
Monday stepped into a long-running
environmental dispute over the impact on
whales and other marine mammals of Navy
training exercises off Southern California.
The court, warned by the Bush
administration that a set of conditions placed
on the exercises by the federal appeals court
in San Francisco "jeopardizes the Navy's
ability to train sailors and marines for
wartime deployment during a time of
ongoing hostilities," agreed to hear the
Navy's appeal during its next term.
The training exercises, which are due to end
next January, will continue in the meantime,
because the appeals court issued a stay of its
own order when it ruled in the case four
months ago. That court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
ordered the Navy to suspend or minimize its
use of sonar when marine mammals are in
the vicinity.
The Navy acknowledges that the sonar can
cause "behavioral disruptions" and short-
term hearing loss in dolphins and whales,
but denies that these effects are serious or
lasting. But the Natural Resources Defense
Council maintains that the high-intensity
sonar causes "mass injury," including
hemorrhaging and stranding. The appeals
court said the Navy's own assessment
"clearly indicates that at least some
substantial harm will likely occur" without
the measures designed to mitigate the
sonar's effects.
The justices themselves will not resolve the
debate over the extent of the harm. Rather,
as presented to the Supreme Court, the case
is a dispute over the limits of executive
branch authority and the extent to which the
courts should defer to military judgments.
In January, as the case was proceeding in the
appeals court, President Bush granted the
Navy an exemption from one federal
environmental law, the Coastal Zone
Management Act. Simultaneously, the
Council on Environmental Quality, an
executive branch agency, declared that
"emergency circumstances" warranted
granting an exemption from the full effect of
another statute, the National Environmental
Policy Act.
These actions did not sway the appeals
court, which said that "while we are mindful
of the importance of protecting national
security, courts have often held, in the face
of assertions of potential harm to military
readiness, that the armed forces must take
precautionary measures to comply with the
law."
In the government's appeal, Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, No.
07-1239, the administration describes
training in the use of sonar to detect
submarines as an "essential element" of the
exercises, which it says are designed to
"train the thousands of military personnel in
a strike group to operate as an integrated
unit in simultaneous air, surface and
undersea warfare."
The administration's brief says that by
imposing conditions on the use of sonar,
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"the decision poses substantial harm to
national security and improperly overrides
the collective judgments of the political
branches and the nation's top naval officers
regarding the overriding public interest in a
properly trained Navy."
Under the appeals court's order, the Navy
must suspend the use of sonar or reduce it to
specified levels when a marine mammal is
seen at certain distances. The appeals courts
said this requirement would not compromise
the Navy's ability to conduct the exercises.
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"Court Upholds Whale Protection
in Navy Exercises"
The San Francisco Chronicle
March 2, 2008
Bob Egelko
A federal appeals court has ruled that the
Navy must protect endangered whales from
the potentially lethal effects of underwater
sonar during anti-submarine training off the
Southern California coast, rejecting
President Bush's attempt to exempt the
exercises from environmental laws.
In a Friday night ruling rushed into print
ahead of the next scheduled exercise on
Monday, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco upheld a federal
judge's decision that no emergency existed
that would justify Bush's intervention.
The Navy is engaged in "long-planned,
routine training exercises" and has had
ample time to take the steps that the law
requires-conduct a thorough review of the
environmental consequences and propose
effective measures to minimize the harm to
whales and other marine mammals, the
three-judge panel said.
The court noted that the Navy has been
conducting similar exercises for years, has
agreed in the past to restrictions like the
ones it is now challenging, and was sued by
environmental groups in the current case
nearly a year ago. The lower-court judge
reviewed the evidence and found nothing to
support the Navy's claim that the protective
measures would interfere with vital training
or hamper national security, the court said.
Past rulings have established that "there is
no 'national defense exception' "to the
National Environmental Policy Act, the
court said. That law requires government
agencies to review projects that might harm
the environment and propose reasonable
protective measures.
Nonetheless, the panel allowed naval
commanders to modify two of the
restrictions if they arose during a "critical
point in the exercise," when certain levels of
sonar are needed for effective training. The
modifications reduce the protective zones
within which vessels must reduce or shut
down sonar when whales are detected.
Those changes are to remain in effect for 30
days, and will be extended if the Navy
appeals the ruling to the Supreme Court, the
appellate panel said.
The ruling sets a precedent for federal courts
in California and eight other Western states.
One of those states is Hawaii, where a
federal judge on Friday ordered similar
restrictions on Navy sonar exercises off the
Hawaiian islands. The ruling by U.S.
District Judge David Ezra includes
requirements to reduce sonar when whales
are detected within certain distances or when
conditions make monitoring difficult.
The Navy has completed six of the 14 large-
scale training exercises scheduled off
Southern California between February 2007
and January 2009. It decided not to conduct
a full environmental review before the
operations, saying it had already agreed to
post lookouts for whales and taken other
adequate protective measures.
In an August 2007 ruling, U.S. District
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Judge Florence-Marie Cooper of Los
Angeles said the Navy's measures were
"woefully ineffectual and inadequate" and
would leave nearly 30 species of marine
mammals at risk, including five species of
endangered whales.
She said the Navy's own research shows
that its use of mid-frequency sonar can
damage the hearing of whales and dolphins,
can interfere with their ability to find food
and mate, and has been linked to the
beaching of whales.
After Cooper reaffirmed her order requiring
the Navy to observe restrictions on sonar
use, including a ban within 12 miles of the
coast, Bush declared the Navy exempt from
the laws that were the basis of the ruling.
The president's Jan. 15 order said the
restrictions would interfere with training that
was "essential to national security."
But the appeals court said that federal
regulations in place since 1978 allow a
president to override the environmental law
only in an emergency, and that the
administration had failed to demonstrate any
"sudden unanticipated events" had occurred
in this case.
Bush's actions were also constitutionally
questionable, the court said, because he cited
no evidence that Cooper had not already
reviewed, but instead merely disagreed with
her conclusions. Under the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers, "it was the
job of the appellate court, and not the
executive branch," to decide whether the
judge erred, said Judge Betty Fletcher in the
court ruling.
She said the court didn't have to decide the
constitutional issue, however, because the
president's order failed to meet the standard
for an exemption under the environmental
regulations.
The ruling shows that "neither the president
nor the U.S. Navy is above the law,"
attorney Joel Reynolds of the Natural
Resources Defense Council, lead plaintiff in
the lawsuit, said Saturday.
Lt. Cmdr. Cindy Moore, a Navy
spokeswoman, told the Associated Press the
Navy is considering an appeal. The ruling
places "significant restrictions on our ability
to train realistically," although it is less
restrictive than Cooper's earlier decision,
she said.
251
"White House Went too Far in
Sonar Case, Judge Rules"
The Washington Post
February 5, 2008
Marc Kaufman
The Bush administration overreached when
it sought to limit the Navy's obligations
under national environmental laws related to
sonar training exercises off California, a
federal judge ruled yesterday.
In a sharply worded decision that will keep
the Navy from continuing a series of 14
planned exercises, U.S. District Judge
Florence-Marie Cooper wrote that the Navy
and the administration had improperly
declared that an emergency would be
created if they had to accept court-mandated
steps to minimize risk to whales and other
sea mammals. Because no real emergency
exists, she said, the White House cannot
override her decisions and those of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.
Accepting the Navy's arguments, she wrote,
would produce "the absurd result of
permitting agencies to avoid their
[environmental] obligations by re-
characterizing ordinary, planned activities as
'emergencies' in the interest of national
security, economic stability or other long-
term goals."
White House spokesman Tony Fratto said,
"We disagree with the judge's decision. We
believe the orders are legal and appropriate."
A Navy spokeswoman, Lt. Cmdr. Cindy
Moore, said the military was studying the
decision.
Joel Reynolds, an official at the Natural
Resources Defense Council, which obtained
an earlier injunction against the Navy
blocking the exercises, said in a statement
that the court "has affirmed that we do not
live under an imperial presidency."
"The Navy doesn't need to harm whales to
train effectively with sonar," said Reynolds,
who directs the council's Marine Mammal
Protection Project. "By following the
carefully crafted measures ordered by the
court, the Navy can conduct its exercises
without imperiling marine mammals."
Early last month, President Bush signed a
waiver exempting the Navy from provisions
of the Coastal Zone Management Act after
Cooper and the appeals court had concluded
that the law required the Navy to do more to
protect marine mammals during the sonar
exercises. The loud blasts produced during
sonar exercises have been shown to disorient
some types of whales, leading in some
circumstances to strandings and deaths.
At the same time Bush signed his order, the
White House Council on Environmental
Quality determined that the Navy did not
need to follow the procedures of the
National Environmental Policy Act when
doing so would cause an emergency
situation. The Navy has long argued that it
urgently needs to train more sonar operators
because of new threats from "quiet" diesel
submarines that can approach ships or the
U.S. coast without being detected by
traditional passive sonar.
While Cooper's ruling dealt primarily with
the legality of the Navy's "alternative
arrangement" under NEPA, she also raised
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the possibility that the administration's
actions were unconstitutional in general
because they implied that White House
agencies could routinely overrule federal
court decisions. She did not, however, rule
on those grounds.
"The Navy's current 'emergency' is simply
a creature of its own making, i.e., its failure
to prepare adequate environmental
documents in a timely fashion," she wrote.
The ocean off Southern California, where
the exercises were scheduled, is especially
rich in sea life and is on the migration paths
of five endangered species of whales, an
important population of blue whales, and as
many as seven individual species of beaked
whales-small, deep-diving whales which
have been shown to be particularly sensitive
to sonar blasts.
The council and several other environmental
groups have been fighting the Navy over
sonar issues for more than a decade. The
two sides have reached some agreements in
the past, but the Navy in this case offered to
enforce 29 "mitigation" measures to protect
the whales, and nothing more.
The California Coastal Commission, a state
agency, agreed with the environmental
groups that the Navy's offer would not
sufficiently protect the whales. In her earlier
decision, Cooper mandated additional steps
advocated by the commission involving
where the Navy could use sonar, what it had
to do when a whale was spotted, how loud
the sonar blasts could be, and how close to
the coast its ships could come.
The Navy appealed, and then after losing the
appeal, won White House support for
overriding the court's earlier decision.
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"Navy Wins Exemption from Bush to Continue
Sonar Exercises in California"
The Washington Post
January 17, 2008
Marc Kaufman
The White House has exempted the Navy
from two major environmental laws in an
effort to free the service from a federal
court's decision limiting the Navy's use of
sonar in training exercises.
Environmentalists who had sued
successfully to limit the Navy's use of loud,
mid-frequency sonar-which can be harmful
to whales and other marine mammals-said
yesterday that the exemptions were
unprecedented and could lead to a larger
legal battle over the extent to which the
military has to obey environmental laws.
In a court filing Tuesday, government
lawyers said President Bush had determined
that allowing the use of mid-frequency sonar
in ongoing exercises off Southern California
was "essential to national security" and of
''paramount interest to the United States."
Based on that, the documents said, Bush
issued the order exempting the Navy from
provisions of the Coastal Zone Management
Act, and the White House Council on
Environmental Quality granted the Navy a
waiver from the National Environmental
Protection Act.
The government filings said the federal
ruling limiting sonar use "profoundly
interferes with the Navy's global
management of U.S. strategic forces, its
ability to conduct warfare operations, and
ultimately places the lives of American
sailors and Marines at risk."
The exemptions were immediately
challenged by the environmental group that
had sued the Navy and by the California
Coastal Commission, a state agency that
ruled last year that the Navy's plans to
protect marine mammals were too limited
and deeply flawed.
"There is absolutely no justification for
this," commission member Sara Wan said in
a statement. "Both the court and the Coastal
Commission have said that the Navy can
carry out its mission as well as protect the
whales."
Joel Reynolds, attorney for the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), said
the organization would "vigorously" contest
the White House orders in court.
U.S. District Judge Marie Florence-Marie
Cooper ruled this month in Los Angeles that
the Navy's plan to limit harm to whales-
especially deep-diving beaked whales that
have at times stranded and died after sonar
exercises-were "grossly inadequate to
protect marine mammals from debilitating
levels of sonar exposure." A federal appeals
court had previously ruled that the Navy
plan was inadequate and sent the case back
to Cooper to set new guidelines for the
exercise.
In her ruling, Cooper banned sonar use
within 12 nautical miles of the coast and
required numerous procedures to shut it off
when marine mammals are spotted. After
the ruling, the Navy indicated that the
guidelines would render the exercise useless,
but the judge disagreed.
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The Navy had received a federal exemption
from the Marine Mammal Protection Act for
the exercises, which are scheduled to
continue through January 2009, but the
NRDC and other groups filed suit under
other environmental laws. The Navy will
still have to convince federal judges that the
exemptions are legal. The NRDC said
yesterday that waivers are not allowed under
the National Environmental Protection Act.
The NRDC also said the situation does not
constitute an emergency, because the Navy
is allowed to continue sonar training under
Cooper's ruling.
"The president's action is an attack on the
rule of law," said Reynolds, director of the
Marine Mammal Protection Project at the
NRDC, which obtained the injunction
against the Navy. "By exempting the Navy
from basic safeguards under both federal
and state law, the president is flouting the
will of Congress, the decision of the
California Coastal Commission and a ruling
by the federal court."
Navy officials have argued that they must
step up sonar training because a new
generation of "quiet" submarines has made
it increasingly difficult to detect underwater
intruders. The Navy says that more than 40
nations now have relatively inexpensive
diesel-powered submarines, which can be
located only with sonar that emits the loud
blasts of sound. The Navy trains sailors in
sonar use on an underwater range off
Southern California and wants to set up
another range off the Carolinas.
Adm. Gary Roughead, the chief of naval
operations, said in a statement yesterday that
the White House waivers were essential and
warranted, given that the Navy has 29
procedures to mitigate sonar's impact on
whales.
"We cannot in good conscience send
American men and women into potential
trouble spots without adequate training to
defend themselves," Roughead said. "The
southern California operating area provides
unique training opportunities that are vital to
preparing our forces, and the planned
exercises cannot be postponed without
impacting national security."
Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) sharply
criticized the exemptions. "Once again the
Bush Administration has taken a slap at our
environmental heritage, overriding a court
that was very mindful to protect marine
wildlife, including endangered whales, while
assuring that the Navy's activities can
continue," she said in a statement.
"Unfortunately, this Bush Administration
action will send this case right back into
court, where more taxpayer dollars will be
wasted defending a misguided decision."
The NRDC said the waters off Southern
California are especially rich in marine
mammal life and are on migration paths of
five species of endangered whales.
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"Judge Imposes Stricter Rules on Navy
to Protect Marine Life"
New York Times
January 5, 2008
Carolyn Marshall
A federal judge has ordered the Navy to
adopt stringent new safeguards intended to
improve protection of whales and dolphins
during its sonar training exercises off
Southern California.
The ruling, issued Thursday by Judge
Florence-Marie Cooper of the United States
District Court for the Central District of
California, orders the Navy to limit its use of
medium-range sonar to an area beyond 12
nautical miles from shore. Closer to the
shore, marine mammals have exhibited
frenzied and disoriented behavior during the
emissions of sonar blasts as part of the
Navy's practice missions.
Judge Cooper's order also outlined
safeguards, which include a monitoring
session one hour before a military exercise
to detect the presence of marine mammals,
the use of trained aerial lookouts throughout
exercises and a mandatory sonar shutdown
when mammals are spotted within 2,200
yards of training maneuvers.
The ruling stems from a long-running legal
battle between environmental groups, led by
the Natural Resources Defense Council, and
the Navy, which has argued that mid-
frequency sonar is vital to the training of
submarine seamen and other crews who now
face a new generation of quiet submarines
that cannot be detected by traditional passive
sonar waves.
A spokesman at the Pentagon said Friday
that the Navy was reviewing the judge's
ruling to determine its next move, which
could include an appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
"Despite the care the court took in crafting
its order," said the spokesman, Cmdr. Jeff
Davis of the Navy, "we do not believe it
struck the right balance between national
security and environmental concerns."
The Navy, Commander Davis said, remains
especially concerned over the larger safety
buffer zone now offered to protect marine
mammals. Additionally, he said, Navy
experts worry that some restrictions may
make it difficult to adequately train
submarine crews in certain underwater
warfare techniques.
A senior lawyer with the Natural Resources
Defense Council, Joel Reynolds, said the
order established a precedent for court cases
in other jurisdictions, although it applied
only to a specific set of military exercises
used in Southern California.
"Although the court's order recognizes the
Navy's need to train with sonar for our
national defense," Mr. Reynolds said, "this
is the most significant environmental
mitigation that a federal court has ever
ordered the U.S. Navy to adopt in its
training with mid-frequency sonar."
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"Navy Given Choice: New Safeguards or No Sonar"
Los Angeles Times
November 14, 2007
Kenneth Weiss
A federal appeals court Tuesday restored a
ban on the U.S. Navy's use of submarine-
hunting sonar in upcoming training missions
off Southern California until it adopts better
safeguards for whales, dolphins and other
marine mammals.
The order allows the Navy to continue its
current exercises, but will force the
Pentagon to devise ways to ensure that
marine mammals are not harassed or injured
by powerful sonic blasts during a series of
training missions slated to begin in January.
Those precautions, such as reducing sonar
power at night, when whales are not easily
spotted, will have to be approved by the
same federal court in Los Angeles that
ordered the initial sonar ban in August.
Tuesday's decision by a three-judge panel of
the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals came
in a case that had pitted the interests of
unencumbered military training against
environmental protection.
At issue is mid-frequency, active sonar, a
technology developed to hunt for Soviet
submarines in the deep ocean. The Navy has
adopted the technique in coastal waters to
train sailors for a potential threat posed by
quiet, diesel-electric submarines operated by
North Korea, Iran or other nations.
U.S. and NATO warships using mid-
frequency sonar near land have, at times, left
behind clusters of panicked and sometimes
fatally injured whales and dolphins in the
Pacific and Atlantic oceans and in the
Mediterranean Sea.
U.S. District Judge Florence-Marie Cooper
had issued a temporary injunction
forbidding the Navy from training with
sonar off Southern California until she could
hear the merits of a case brought by the
Natural Resources Defense Council and
other groups.
The Navy appealed her decision and won a
reprieve from the 9th Circuit Court.
Tuesday's ruling restored the original court
decision, essentially forcing the world's
most powerful navy either to negotiate with
environmental attorneys or unilaterally
propose measures that will satisfy the
district court.
In its five-page ruling, the three judges said
that the environmental groups had shown a
"strong likelihood" of winning their lawsuit
and that the Navy had used many of the
additional safeguards those groups have
been pushing.
At the same time, the panel said Cooper did
not explain why "a broad, absolute
injunction . . . for two years was necessary
to avoid irreparable harm to the
environment."
The panel ordered the judge to narrow the
injunction to allow the Navy to increase its
safeguards and proceed with training
exercises that military officials say are
needed to certify sailors as battle-ready.
Both the Navy and environmental attorneys
claimed some measure of victory in the
ruling.
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"We are encouraged that the appeals court
found the original injunction was too broad
and ordered the district court to tailor
mitigation conditions under which the Navy
may conduct its training," Navy spokesman
Capt. Scott Gureck said in a statement. He
declined to reveal the Navy's next move,
saying: "We are considering our options."
Attorney Richard Kendall, representing
environmental groups, said his clients will
offer to meet with the Navy immediately to
fashion timely remedies that will not disrupt
the Navy's training schedule.
"Our position has been the same all along:
We are not opposed to training, but we are
opposed to training without precautions that
will prevent unnecessary harm to whales and
other marine mammals," Kendall said.
"We're pleased that the appeals court has
upheld our position."
The California Coastal Commission, which
also sought additional safeguards that were
rejected by the Navy, has joined the lawsuit.
The commission has some say in Navy
activities because of a federal law that
empowers states to protect their coastal
resources.
The Navy says it already uses 29 protective
measures during the exercises, including
placing personnel on ships to look for
marine mammals and turning off sonar when
dolphins or whales come within about 1,000
yards of sonar-emitting ships.
The Coastal Commission and other groups
want to double the radius of that "safety
zone" and require the Navy to reduce the
intensity of sonar at night and during rough
sea conditions, when whales and dolphins
cannot be spotted.
The commission and environmentalists are
pushing the Navy to avoid training in the
gray whale migration route, typically within
a dozen miles of the coast, and to avoid the
Channel Islands, shallow banks and
seamounts, where marine mammals tend to
congregate.
"The Navy is faced with a brick wall," said
Joel Reynolds, an attorney with the Natural
Resources Defense Council. "It has no
alternative but to increase the level of
protections for marine life."
In a similar lawsuit brought by
environmentalists, the Navy agreed last year
to expand its buffer zone, and take other
steps during multinational "Rim of the
Pacific" exercises held off Hawaii in July
2006.
The Navy appeared to be eager to take the
issue to the Supreme Court and establish a
precedent that would prevent further legal
action. But the decision Tuesday made it
unlikely that the nation's highest court
would take up the matter because the Navy
has alternatives through the lower court.
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"Judge Curbs Navy Sonar"
Los Angeles Times
August 7, 2007
Kenneth Weiss
A federal judge in Los Angeles banned the
U.S. Navy from using high-powered sonar
in nearly a dozen upcoming training
exercises off Southern California, ruling
Monday that it could "cause irreparable
harm to the environment."
U.S. District Judge Florence-Marie Cooper
issued the preliminary injunction after
rejecting the Navy's request to dismiss a
lawsuit brought by the Natural Resources
Defense Council.
The lawsuit, along with a similar one filed
by the California Coastal Commission,
argues for broader safeguards to protect
marine mammals from powerful blasts of
mid-frequency active sonar that have been
linked elsewhere to panicked behavior and
mass die-offs of whales.
The Navy, which plans to appeal the
decision, said even a temporary ban would
disrupt crucial training of sailors before they
are sent overseas. The Navy uses the sonar
to detect potentially hostile vessels,
including quiet diesel submarines, which
one captain called "the most lethal enemy
known" on the high seas.
"It's akin to sending a hunter into the woods
after one of the most lethal preys known, but
sending him in partly deaf and blind," said
Navy Capt. Neil May, assistant chief of staff
for 3rd Fleet training and readiness.
Over the last decade, scientists have linked
mid-frequency active sonar to a number of
mass strandings or panicked behavior of
whales after naval exercises in the waters off
Greece, Hawaii, the Bahamas and
elsewhere.
In a well-documented case near the Canary
Islands in 2003, an international team of
scientists found that at least 10 beaked
whales probably succumbed to the bends
after bolting to the surface in a panic.
The dead whales washed ashore after the
Spanish navy led international military
exercises involving warships from the
United States and other members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Pathologists found tissue in the whales'
internal organs that appeared to have been
damaged by compressed gas bubbles
bursting inside them.
Navy lawyers argued in court that mid-
frequency active sonar is crucial to national
security and to keeping sailors safe from
attacks by enemy submarines. Unlike
passive listening devices that rely on
detecting sounds, mid-frequency active
sonar emits bursts of sound waves that can
reveal even quiet submarines.
"Today, dozens of countries-including
North Korea and Iran-have extremely quiet
diesel-electric submarines, and more than
180 of them operate in the Pacific," said
Vice Adm. Samuel Locklear, commander of
the U.S. 3rd Fleet. "Active sonar is the best
system we have to detect and track them."
To remove the temporary ban, the Navy will
have to take the case to the U.S. 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals. Navy lawyers plan to
move quickly because the next training
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mission is scheduled to begin in September.
Cooper said it was never easy to balance the
interests of wildlife with those of national
security. But in this case, she said,
environmental lawyers have made a
persuasive case that the potential harm to
whales and other marine life outweighs any
harm to the Navy while the court case
proceeds.
The lawsuit, according to environmental
lawyers, could be settled quickly if the Navy
would agree to more sweeping precautions,
such as shutting off or reducing the intensity
of the sonar when visibility is too low for
spotters stationed on deck to see whales that
venture into harm's way.
Joel Reynolds, a senior attorney with the
Natural Resources Defense Council, said the
judge's ruling in no way restricts the Navy's
ability to use sonar against real threats or in
battle. Instead, he said, the court decision
zeroes in on training exercises planned long
in advance in waters rich with endangered
blue whales, various kinds of dolphins and
migrating gray whales.
"Just as the Army has a responsibility not to
train soldiers to shoot in the middle of a
crowded city street, the Navy has a duty,
when it's learning how to hunt with sonar,
not to choose a practice range next to a
marine sanctuary."
Cooper also ruled against the Navy last year
in an earlier case, temporarily blocking the
use of active sonar in multinational war
games near Hawaii.
Ultimately, her decision forced the Navy to
negotiate with environmentalists and
establish a buffer zone and other
precautionary measures before conducting
its month-long Rim of the Pacific exercises
involving 40 surface ships and six
submarines from the U.S., Korea, Japan and
Australia.
Other federal judges have also shut down or
forced the Navy and various marine
researchers to negotiate for stronger
safeguards. The U.S. Navy has already
conducted three of 14 planned training
missions scheduled over the next two years
in Southern California waters.
Naval attorneys said in court Monday that
there was no evidence of strandings, injuries
or even behavioral disturbances in marine
mammals during those exercises. But the
Navy's own environmental assessment,
Cooper noted, predicted that the exercises
using powerful sonar will harass or disrupt
the behavior of marine mammals 170,000
times and will cause hundreds of cases of
permanent injury to deep-diving whales.
"The predicted permanent injury of 436
Cuvier's beaked whales is especially
significant in light of' federal scientists'
"estimate that there are as few as 1,211 such
whales remaining off the entire U.S. West
Coast," Cooper wrote in a detailed, 19-page
tentative ruling.
The judge also took issue with an array of
measures to protect whales that the Navy
has already put in place, including rules that
prohibit using the sonar within 1,000 yards
of marine mammals. Sound waves may not
dissipate to sub-lethal levels for more than
5,000 yards, she noted.
Environmental lawyers have argued for a
larger safety zone, as well as for a 12-mile
buffer along the coastline. They want
training missions to remain a respectful
distance from the Channel Islands National
Marine Sanctuary, and they want the Navy
to use acoustic monitoring as well as
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spotters in aircraft to watch for whales.
The California Coastal Commission, which
filed a similar lawsuit, has also been
negotiating with the Navy for extensive
safeguards. Its hand was significantly
strengthened Monday when Cooper ruled
that the Navy had failed to comply with the
federal Coastal Zone Management Act.
That's the law that gives the California
Coastal Commission power to influence
federal activities in waters off the state.
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